I have set myself the problem, in all its generality, of establishing a differential clinic of psychoses. And I thought it would clarify the problem if I began by opposing to it a universal clinic of delirium. To lay the foundation for a differential clinic of the psychoses, I propose nothing less than that we consider the idea of a universal clinic of the delirium.

What I call a universal clinic of the delirium is based on this premise: All our discourses are only defenses against the real. But in order to construct this clinical perspective, one would have to attain the infernal irony of the schizophrenic, an irony out of which he makes a weapon Lacan described as piercing straight to the heart of any social relation. But a universal clinic of the delirium cannot speak for itself; that is to say, it cannot cease not writing itself. Except from the point of view of the schizophrenic.

How are we going to define the schizophrenic here? For the moment, I propose to define this subject, following Lacan’s lead, as the one who specifies himself by not being caught up in any discourse, in any social link. I shall add that this is the only subject who does not defend himself from the real by means of the symbolic, which we all do if we are not schizophrenic. He does not defend himself from the real by language because, for him, the symbolic is real.

The point at issue, then, is the schizophrenic’s irony, and not his humor. And although irony and humor both make us laugh, they are distinguishable one from the other by structure. I call the schizophrenic the subject capable of not avoiding the real. He is the speaking being from the point of view of the schizophrenic.

Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob encloses his children. Irony, on the contrary, does not come from the Other, but from the subject. And it is directed against the Other. So what does irony say? It says that the Other does not exist, that the social link in its very foundation is a fraud, that there is no discourse which is not a false pretense, a semblance – the title of one of Lacan’s seminars. The true masochist sometimes manages to attain irony when he demonstrates that the Other whose slave he seems to be is only the puppet of his will, his, the masochist’s. Doubtless, it is on this path that irony is suitable to the psychoanalyst, no less than to the revolutionary. Lenin, like Socrates, displays irony, even if he disguises it by means of the invective, and even if this irony grows pale when its cause comes into question. Irony is the comic form taken by the knowledge that the Other does not know; that is to say, that as the Other of knowledge, it is nothing. While humor is practiced from the point of view of the subject supposed-to-know, irony is only practiced at the point where the fall of the subject supposed-to-know has already been consummated. In this way, according to Lacan, psychoanalysis, along the path prescribed by Freud, restores irony to neurosis. And it would, in fact, be wonderful if we could cure neurosis by irony. 

We would not need to sustain it, so to speak, by psychoanalysis. But we are not cured of psychoanalysis yet, despite Lacan’s irony and, doubtless, despite what his wish was.

While waiting to be cured of psychoanalysis, then, I shall formulate the wish that our clinic is ironic. The choice is a forced choice: Either our clinic will be ironic, that is to say, based on the non-existence of the Other as a defense against the real – or our clinic will be a flat repetition of the psychiatric clinic, for it often makes fun of the crazy person, this poor madman who is outside the common relationship to language. But the one who makes fun of the psychotic’s means merely remains stuck within a construction of his own clinic, based on already established discourses. What I am saying is also a critique that does not spare the psychoanalytic clinic of the psychoses when that clinic restricts itself to assessing psychosis on the basis of the established psychoanalytic discourse – that means, referring it to the Oedipal norm. I would not point you in this direction if Lacan had not gone into the psychoanalytic clinic of the psychoses, beyond the Oedipal norm. Lacan waits for us to follow him. I say this humorously, of course.

In what I call the universal clinic of delirium, the schizophrenic occupies a place one could call a place of internal exclusion. In fact, if the schizophrenic is this subject for whom all the symbolic is real, his subjective position can, indeed, help us understand that the symbolic is only a semblance for other subjects. The rotation of the four discourses that Lacan distinguished and formalized is, indeed, made to show that there is no discourse which is not a semblance. And this rotation is itself only conceivable on the basis of the existence of a subject outside discourse.

I call the schizophrenic the subject capable of not avoiding the real. He is the speaking being for whom the symbolic does not serve as a way to avoid the real, because for him the symbolic is itself real. If there is no discourse which is not a semblance, there is, however, a delirium which pertains to the real, and it is that of the schizophrenic. Based on this, the universality of the delirium can be constructed. Let us note that the thesis of a universality of the delirium is a Freudian thesis. For Freud, everything is only a dream. That is what Lacan says Freud says. But if everything is only a dream, then everybody is crazy; that is to say, delirious.
I propose to put this thesis on the front of a differential clinic of psychoses: Everyone is crazy. Only then does it become interesting to make distinctions. Everyone is crazy, that is to say, delirious. Not only does this truth appear in the differential clinic of humanity, it appears in that of animals as well. Because animals are not crazy, except for the donkey, the one who carries the Holy-Sacrament, attributing the merit of such a responsibility to his own personal credit. Thus, the donkey constructs a delirium of presumption.\textsuperscript{13} Animals can, however, commit suicide in the small measure that domestication has made the cause of desire exist for them in the Other.

Let us simplify matters. The delirium is universal, based on the simple fact that people speak and that there is language for them. That is the “abc” from where we start, from scratch: Language, as such, has the effect of annihilation.

In dialectical terms, we will say: the word is the murder of the thing. This is a proposition from Lacan’s first teaching.\textsuperscript{14} Already that says everything because it requires that the symbolic separate itself from the real. In the schizophrenic perspective, the word is not the murder of the thing, it is the thing.

It is in this sense that, if the psychotic does not believe in the Other, he is, however, sure of the Thing. If you know how to hear “la Chose” in this, the Freudian \textit{das Ding} as punctuated by Lacan in his \textit{The Ethics of Psychoanalysis},\textsuperscript{15} “the word is the murder of the thing” means this: \textit{Jouissance} is forbidden to the one who speaks as such, or again, that the Other, as the place of the signifier, is the terrace swept clean of its \textit{jouissance}. For the para-noic, the word has not adequately murdered the Thing, since he must occasionally strike the Thing – the \textit{kakon}\textsuperscript{16} in the Other – in an act of aggression that, as we have seen in the Aimée case, can serve him throughout his whole life as a metaphor, as a supplement.\textsuperscript{17} The melancholic subject turns to the mortifying effect of language against himself in the act of suicide in which he accomplishes his destiny of \textit{kakon}.

“The word is the murder of the Thing” means that the word is death. The “death drive,” thus designated by Freud, is inherent in the speaking being. Without a doubt this melancholic short-circuit unfurls itself again with the neurotic, whose desire is perhaps less decided. Let us note that the letter distinguishes itself from the word. Does the agency of the letter kill the Thing? Rather, is the letter the Thing?\textsuperscript{18}

What I have said in dialectical terms can also be said in diacritical terms by passing from Hegel to Saussure.\textsuperscript{19} There is no biunivocal correlation of the word and the thing: The word does not represent the thing. One word is connected to another word. This structuralist axiom is no less pathetic than the dialectical maxim. It implies a passion. The single fact, concerning language, of putting the function of the coupling of signifiers in place of the function of representation – as structuralism does\textsuperscript{20} — creates some perfectly pathetic effects of delirium. To say that the signifier has no relation to the thing, but to an other signifier – one repeats it like Antiphon, always harping on the same thing, that is – implies that the signifier has a function of unrealization. The signifier unrealizes the world.\textsuperscript{21}

It is only when the relation of one signifier to another signifier is interrupted, when there is a broken chain, an interrupted sentence, that the symbol rejoins the real. But it does not rejoin it under the form of representation. Rather, the signifier rejoins the real in a manner which leaves no room for doubt: Take, for example, the interrupted sentences of President Schreber.\textsuperscript{22} In Schreber’s interrupted sentences, the signifier does not represent the real world in the least. It makes an irruption there. That is to say, a part of the symbolic becomes real. It is precisely in this that “schizophrenia,” as redefined, can be said to be the measure of psychosis. But if I recommend this ironic perspective on language, it is only because, by taking things from a reverse perspective, we see where it leads. It leads, for example, to the so-called theory of descriptions that owes its name to Bertrand Russell.\textsuperscript{23}

Russell began this theory of descriptions in 1905, at the same time Freud wrote his “Three Essays on Theory of Sexuality.” It is not excessive to say that all contemporary Anglo-Saxon philosophy comes out of Russell’s theory. This philosophy has developed in our time under the somewhat ridiculous name of formal ontology. At the same time, it is a matter of our having inherited the medieval theory of suppositions,\textsuperscript{24} a theory which Lacan himself echoed in his subject supposed-to-know.\textsuperscript{25}

This theory of descriptions is concerned with the supposed reference of discourse, or, to call it by the name Frege gave it, \textit{Bedeutung} (meaning).\textsuperscript{26}

And what is Russell’s concern? Bertrand Russell, and the others, are bothered by the fact that one can speak about something that does not exist \textit{as if} it existed. It is the same question raised by Plato in the \textit{Sophist}: That speaking about non-being makes it exist in some fashion.\textsuperscript{27} The theory of descriptions would like to reduce truth to exactitude. Its adherents would prefer that one say only what is, that discourse describe the real, then. The theory of descriptions would like to track down the discourse which says what is not. The principle (\textit{principe}) example proposed by Bertrand Russell is: “The king of France is bald.”\textsuperscript{28} In 1905, and for an Englishman – who is not a French royalist – there is no king of France. “The king of France is bald” is a delirium. Evidently there are many connotations around this the “king of France is bald.” It is an echo of the French-English quarrel. And it does not miss evoking “the king is naked.”\textsuperscript{29}

What escapes Bertrand Russell is not that one can speak of what is not, but that what is, owing to the simple fact that one speaks of it, \textit{becomes a fiction}. Were the king of France to exist under the guise of a character who wore the crown, that would not make him any the less a fiction. What is created by a signifier is at the same time made a semblance. That does not exist \textit{because} one talks of it. Then we have to be quiet, would have to keep silent, as Wittgenstein says – if you want something to exist, keep quiet about it (“\textit{Was man nicht sagen kann, muss man schweigen.}”).\textsuperscript{30}

And that is what the psychoanalyst does in his or her practice. The theory of descriptions is useless, not only because the king of France does not exist, not
because the word gives existence to what does not exist, but precisely because language creates the inexistence of what one is talking about. Lacan’s axiom, that truth has the structure of fiction, admits that the word has the effect of fiction. The secret of the universal clinic of the delirium is that the reference is always empty. If there is truth, it is not because of the adequacy of the word to the thing. Rather, it is internal to the act of saying something; that is to say, to the connection of one word to another. In this sense, the signifier, insofar as it is connected to another signifier, allows the reference to be empty. And it is this which constitutes the symbolic as an order, the symbolic as Lacan named it. This is the same movement we observe in Freud when he passes from the factual seduction to fantasmatc seduction, from the fact of fantasy, from the search for exactitude to the scansion of truth, from the unconscious as a referential knowledge, to the unconscious as a textual knowledge. But how do we incarnate the empty reference? Nothing is simpler, if one remembers that the whole Freudian clinic turns around an object which does not exist, that is, the mother’s penis. The reference to the king of France who is bald is a reference to the mother’s penis. It is a fact that Freud started his research with a study of dreams, that he offered the interpretation of dreams as the royal road of psychoanalysis, and that he took the dream as a signifying articulation without reference. It is in that sense that Freud considered the dream as a species of delirium. And that is also why Lacan arranges his whole clinic in terms of an “there is not” whether he writes it with (-o), or by stating that there is no natural relation of the sexes one to the other (“Il n’y a pas de rapport sexuel.”) “Let us begin by separating all the facts,” says Jean-Jacques Rousseau, putting it superbly. This is how analysis begins. As long as one is not in analysis, the conversations are only preliminary conversations. “Associate freely, tell the truth, go ahead, frankly, don’t omit anything” means quite simply; “Join one signifier to another signifier without being concerned about the reference, about formal ontology.” Lacan reintroduced terms which ought to have been proscribed, terms of representation and of reference, but they do not convey the same meaning in his usage. There is representation only insofar as the signifier represents a null reference. This empty reference is written as castration (-o), or as what develops out of castration: the subject, 5. Lacan’s subject is an effect of a non-existent entity, the one which motivates and haunts the theory of descriptions. Up to there, we are still in the Freudian space. The idea of a negative reference, starting with the structure of language, conveys the pivotal importance of Freudian castration. But what is particular to Lacan, properly speaking, is the introduction of a reference of a new type which is born by the very act of linking signifiers. It is not a reference that would already be there, and that one could represent, or about which one could say “there is not.” This reference of a new type, born out of the linking of one signifier to another, is what Lacan called “the object a.” How, by what conditions, does the articulation or connecting of signifiers produce a reference? One day a reference is born from the linkage… In some sense, there is a double reference. The first is negative, absence, (-o), 5. But there is another which is positive, and it is a. This explains why, in the economy of Freud’s discourse, the fantasy can reach the place of the fact. This allows that the object a, if it is a being, is a being of fiction that depends on the linking of signifiers. That is, the object a is a semblance. If this semblance is a being, it is a being that depends on the signifying chain, and precisely, on its consistency. That is why Lacan calls object a a logical consistency. The object a takes on consistency in proportion to the negativization induced by the successive signifiers. Therefore, it is also a remainder, in the sense that something remains to be said. But it is not the same after a chain of signifiers has developed as it was beforehand. If the a depends on the connection of signifiers, the only formal ontology is that of the object a. But why would I say “ontology”? Because the object a, as it is conceptualized in psychoanalysis, seems very much like a being. And it is this one point, especially; that it is crucial not to confuse with the real. The object a as such is a semblance of being. And the very term of consistency clearly conveys its affinities with the imaginary order. Without a doubt, when the object a finds its place in the fantasy, the fantasy holds the place of the real for the subject. That does not mean inasmuch as that the object a is real. That Lacan uses the term axiom concerning the fantasy indicates quite clearly that he places it in a logical system. And it confirms as well that the object depends on the joining, the articulation, that is, of signifiers. That is why the object a, as a semblance, has its place between the symbolic and the real. It is a logical consistency which “pretends” to be, and which is only what one encounters in going from the symbolic to the real. The object a is a symbolic elaboration of the real which holds the place of the real in the fantasy, but is only a veil of it. Its proper function is to complement the negative reference of the subject. As a logical consistency, it is fitting that the object a incarnate what the subject is lacking. Because the subjective lack-in-being calls for the semblance of being, it is appropriate that the object a, as a logical consistency, give its place to forbidden jouissance, that is, to the lost object.

This is what permits us to give a new meaning to what we call psychosis. That is where Lacan leads us. Psychosis is the clinical structure wherein the object is not lost, wherein the subject has it at his disposal. It is in this sense that Lacan could say that the crazy person is a free person. At the same time, in psychosis, the Other is not separated from jouissance. The fantasy proper to the paranoiac implies that an identification of jouissance within the Other. In sum, we can assert the difference between paranoia and schizophrenia in as much as the schizophrenic has no alternative
Other than language—and at the same time lay forth claim to the difference between the Other in paranoia and in neurosis. There is the Other in paranoia, and this Other is real; that is to say that, effectively, the Other of paranoia exists, and is even fond of the object $a$. The theory of the paternal metaphor and of its failure in psychosis has been discussed many times before. But to take it from another point of view, one would have to conclude that when the paternal metaphor fails in psychosis, the desire of the Other, of the mother, has not been symbolized. And for this very reason, it is in the real. In the case of paranoia, the desire of the Other and the Other itself, as well as the chain of signifiers, are in the real. The Other’s desire has become a will to jouissance without limit. This is the path for understanding the fundamental connection between psychosis and anxiety, as well as the connection between psychosis and the erotomania aroused in the Other. There is also the Other in neurosis, except that there, the best proof that it is not real is that one must make it exist by, for example, loving it. This is verified in the first steps of the analytic experience: The transference means that what is at stake for a neurotic is making the Other exist in order to hand over to it the burden of the logical consistency of the object $a$. That is what Lacan called the subject-supposed-to-know: Making the Other exist in order to restore to it the object $a$, made of this object-cause-of-desire. The restoration of the object to the Other, at the same time, renders this object lost, and installs in the heart of neurosis, the demand—whether this be to demand of the Other the object that it conceals, or to ask oneself via the Other for a settlement of the debt that is owed one. The Other of neurosis asks, at least, that the subject justify itself. That also touches the pervert when he brings the unjustifiability of his jouissance to analysis. It is there that one situates what, in other categories than ours, one calls a borderline. To ask the Other for the object it conceals, to make oneself ask for the payment of the debt, that is to say, in all the cases, to situate the logical consistency in the field of the Other, is the foundation of any discourse, the very principle of the social link.

* The Other does not exist as real. To say that the Other is the place of truth is to say that the Other is a place of fiction. To say that the Other is a place of knowledge is to say that it has the status of supposition. Neurosis is to make it exist at the price, for the subject, of consenting to erase oneself before the object. There the notion that desire is a defense takes on its meaning, a defense against the real of jouissance. Let us go further to say that neurosis is a clinical structure where the defense is called desire, while perversion is the clinical structure where the defense is called flat repudiation (démenti). Lacan proposed, as a definition of the psychoanalytic clinic, “the real as the impossible to bear.” One has distinguished, for psychosis, the mechanism of foreclosure. Why not give the same pathogenic status to the Freudian signifiers, are in the real. The Other’s desire has become a will to jouissance without limit. To ask the Other for the object it conceals, to make oneself ask for the payment of the debt, that is to say, in all the cases, to situate the logical consistency in the field of the Other, is the foundation of any discourse, the very principle of the social link.

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Notes:


2. The four modalities noted by Lacan in Seminar XX are ce qui ne cesse pas de s’écrire (what does not stop writing itself), the necessary; ce qui cesse de ne pas s’écrire (what stops not writing itself), the contingent; ce qui ne cesse pas de ne pas s’écrire (what does not stop not writing itself), the impossible; ce qui cesse de s’écrire (what stops writing itself), the possible. Cf. Chapters 8 and 9 in The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XX-Encore, ed. Jacques-Alain Miller, trans. with notes Bruce Fink, New York, Norton, 1998.


8. Concerning Lenin, one can consult One Step Forward, Two Steps Back (1904), Collected Works, Vol. 19. As for the irony of Socrates, it is always present, particularly in the first dialogues of Plato.

9. Miller’s comments at this point are humorous, even somewhat ironic, appropriate to the audience of the analysts he was addressing. Miller’s reference to Lacan’s wish (voeu) becomes clearer in relation to his Course of 1990-1991, Le Banquet. In the course of May 29, 1991, Miller describes Lacan’s wish or desire as an enigma in psychoanalysis. Nonetheless, one cannot doubt that Lacan desired to restore to Freud’s work “the first sense of psychoanalysis” and, thus, Lacan paid homage to the first sense of psychoanalysis by elucidating Freud’s first discovery – that of the unconscious – taken as the effect of truth in the field of language. Freud’s second discovery, the field of jouissance, was one always veiled behind concepts such as “psychic economy,” and so on. Thus, Lacan names jouissance that Freud discovered in Beyond The Pleasure Principle Lacan’s field. Throughout his return to Freud, one cannot doubt that Lacan wished to reveal the “underside” – the envers, the doublure – of Freud’s discourse, Miller says. Citing Lacan (Cf. “The Freudian Thing, or the Meaning of the Return to Freud in Psychoanalysis” in Ecrits: A Selection, Trans. Alan Sheridan, New York, Norton, 1977), Miller evokes his: “Moï la vérité je parle” and “Le style c’est l’objet petit a,” translating the former as: “Think about the unnameable thing which, if one were able to pronounce these words, would go to the heart [l’être] of language, in order to hear them as they must be pronounced, in horror… Lacan’s desire is, doubtless, deflation and occasionally derision – and that is why satire and parody are finally his principal mode, taken, that is, in a logical construction – Lacan’s desire is, nonetheless, magnetized by the will to make himself the equal of the unnameable thing, the one pronounced in horror, to lend his voice to intolerable words;” (course of May 29, 1991).


11. Ser parlêtre in Spanish does not completely make the usage of parlêtre in French (author’s note).


13. That is how the donkey is metaphorized in a story by Lafontaine.


19. The dialectic of Hegel or the Hegelian logic is first developed in The Science of Logic, the so-called Greater Logic. It is taken up again in the Encyclopédie, the so-called Lesser Logic.


24. See, for example, Duns Scotus and the medieval theory of suppositions.

25. The subject supposed to know appears for the first time in Le Séminaire, Le transfert. It becomes a concept in “La proposition… sur le psychanalyste de l’Ecole” in 1967, Scilicet I.


40. The second death is the object of a long development in Seminar VII, The Ethics of Psychoanalysis, op.cit.


42. The schizophrenic does not have the signifier of the lack, but nothing prohibits us from trying to help him obtain it in the real. That is the lesson that I draw from the Robert case of Robert and Rosine Lefort.