Daughter, Mother, Woman

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It all begins with girls… and their mothers. And with the destiny of that relationship. How does the feminine gender reconcile itself to it? After Freud, psychoanalysts deliberately focus attention on mothering and raising children, obscuring the separation between mother and woman that Freud had painstakingly elaborated. Lacan returns to Freud on these matters, denouncing the delineation of the good mother and inaugurating new research on female sexuality. If there is a gap between mother and woman, how then can we conceptualize the series mother, daughter, and woman? If these figures do not, like the Fates,1 spin our destinies, don’t their alternation and their inevitable coexistence in a woman’s life afford any continuity, any anchor? Do they allow neither a shared inheritance, nor a legacy, nor any transmission? Homogeneous in appearance with the series “son, father, man,” do these forms of femininity escape all linear perspective?

The gendered position of girls and its convolutions

Freud first addressed the question of girls by affirming that girls must change gender position (from masculine to feminine), and he maintained that to the end. But in 1919 in “A Child is being Beaten,” the point of origin is on the fixation on the father, and in 1925 in “Some Psychical Consequences of the Anatomical Distinction between the Sexes,” the fixation is on the mother. In between, in 1920 in “The Psychogenesis of a Case of Homosexuality in a Woman,” he distinguished between gender identification and object choice. Gender identification raises the question: does the subject love as a man or as a woman? And object choice asks: does the subject love a man or a woman?

How then can we situate the sexuation of girls between the masculine and the feminine position? Among children, it is not the question of the difference between the sexes that occurs first. What comes first, says Freud, is the question: where do babies come from?2 The question of the difference between
the sexes arises from there. Can one say that the distinction between masculine and feminine corresponds to the distinction between active and passive? Freud objects to such a characterization. One should not identify masculine with active and feminine with passive. Activity in the male animal is limited and linked to the moment of sexual aggression; moreover, female animals are stronger and more aggressive than males who are active only during the act of sexual union. Women would therefore be more active, as is manifest in the fact that the mother suckles her child. Ultimately, the only thing one can say about women is that they are partial to passive goals, and even that comes from socialization! But women can display “great activity” for a passive goal. The feminine position should not, therefore, be identified with passivity.

However, women do manifest bisexuality, as hysterical subjects revealed from the very first in the contradiction put on display by their symptom. In “Some General Remarks on Hysterical Attacks” of 1909, Freud contended that a “hysterical neurosis merely represents an excessive accentuation of the typical wave of repression which, by doing away with her masculine sexuality, allows the woman to emerge.” Consequently, masculinity is present in girls, and it follows that every girl has to change gender position to assume her sex. It is, therefore, necessary for girls to “transfer from one erogenous zone, the clitoris, to the vagina.” In this regard, feminine gendering is not the object of a primary knowledge, contrary to what Karen Horney claims in “The Flight from Womanhood.”

“It will grow”

If the auto-eroticism of girls is a masculine auto-eroticism (“the clitoris […] is homologous to the penis,” writes Freud in “On the Sexual Theories of Children”), it is because children think that all humans have a penis. The little girl thus imagines the penis as a “superior counterpart of her own small and inconspicuous organ.” She therefore practices clitoral masturbation.

But why would the little girl need to replace her primary passivity as nursing infant that she had been by activity? It is because, from the beginning, the mother, for all children, is
endowed with the phallic organ (in a woman’s psychoanalytic treatment, the fantasy that the mother had once been seductive towards her is not unusual, and Freud, in his later texts, will go so far as to note that seduction by the mother is a more archaic fantasy than seduction by the father). Consequently, the little girl attempts to master the situation, to replace passivity by activity: she puts herself in the maternal position by playing with the doll that is herself—and her auto-eroticism is not without a connection to her mother. We should mention that one sometimes observes in the analysis of a female subject a fixation corresponding to this initial attitude, in which the little girl is herself the object of “jouissance” for a mother endowed with a penis, a mother who penetrates her and has an orgasm; and one also observes a fixation which is the reversal of this first phase, in which the girl herself is active, the “little man” of the mother (as revealed in the frequent slip “my wife” instead of “my mother”). Dreams experienced in the course of a determined analysis bear witness to the same fixations.

In this situation, the little girl, who cannot help but attribute a penis to both sexes, concludes that, as for herself, “it will grow.” She waits.

**Between hope and disavowal**

How then can the little girl pass from this clitoral sexuality to penis envy?: When she discovers her brother’s penis or that of any other boy. In this second phase, the “jouissance” of phallic sexuality is spoiled by the influence of penis envy. “[I]n a flash […] she has seen it and knows that she is without it and wants to have it.”8 Humiliation and personal misfortune. She clearly links the clitoris to the penis that she does not have. And envy results. The little girl feels disadvantaged.

In “The Taboo of Virginity” of 1918, Freud writes, “the masculine phase in the girl in which she envies the boy for his penis, is in any case developmentally the earlier, and it is closer to the original narcissism than it is to object-love.”9 What is meant here by original narcissism? Original narcissism, described in the first topic and notably in “On Narcissism: An Introduction” of 1914, is in fact the moment when the child takes himself as love object, between auto-eroticism and object love.
But this primary narcissism is not a state where there would be no object relations. In 1916, in “Mourning and Melancholia,” Freud establishes narcissism as a “narcissistic identification” with the object: thus would the girl identify herself with a boy.

For a boy, things are clearer: he loves himself as an organ-bearer, and he thinks that everyone is made according to his own image, which he loves. In the little girl, it is the clitoris which should allow the same narcissistic satisfaction, but that can only happen at the expense of a radical misunderstanding of sexual difference. The little girl wavers, says Freud, between hope and disavowal; hope sometimes reveals itself in dreams: thus a woman patient who could not have children dreamt that she had given birth to a baby who was too small; she thought “he will grow”; the baby is of course the metonym of the clitoris, and the phallus is folded back on a part of the body itself, the clitoris. This woman was only able to give birth once the baby had finally been conceived as a metaphor of the phallus.

In the case of disavowal, it results in a complex of masculinity; there, phallic narcissism is preserved, no longer as a hope, but as a “don’t give up” on the belief prior to perception of the penis. The little girl clearly sees that she doesn’t have one, but she maintains that both her mother and herself do have one. This belief will later lead to attitudes of more or less conscious defiance vis-à-vis men, but can also create the effect of “a phallic woman,” one who doesn’t seek to castrate men since they don’t exist for her. Freud will go so far as to liken this figure to a psychosis, while for Lacan, it is in her relationship with her child that the phallic woman is revealed: she lets the child that she loves best drop from her arms. Disavowal therefore valorizes the phallus for everyone and reduces sexual difference to nothing.

But if the woman doesn’t go as far as disavowal, she still has “the scar” of penis envy. Along with, for example, the share of man’s scorn in view of the inferiority of her sex, or the choice of a partner “made in accordance with the narcissistic ideal of the man whom the little girl had wished to become” (in that case, the identification is not the symbolic, post-Oedipal identification with the paternal ego-ideal [“idéal du moi”], but an imaginary identification with the supposed organ-bear-
er); or even the renunciation, due to disappointment, of a sex life, or finally, an identification with the father as a deficient phallus. Thus, according to Freud, the penis and the envy it arouses are experienced by the subject as a matter of “having it or not.”

**The castration complex precedes the Oedipal drama**

When the little girl notices that she does not have a penis, she accuses her mother, notably for not having provided her one. There again there is a reversal of position that is manifested by a litany of criticisms and the transformation of love for the mother into hate. The girl blames her mother for not having given her enough milk, for having refused to nourish her at the birth of another child, for having forbidden clitoral masturbation that the mother herself is supposed to have initiated. It is, then, the castration complex that accounts for the fall from phallic sexuality in girls; narcissistic humiliation is at the origin of the rejection of masturbation and the rejection of the mother as the one who seduces, who inflicts starvation, and who has henceforth become an object of scorn. When penis envy has awakened a struggle against clitoral onanism, but when, in the course of that struggle, onanism is not renounced, the little girl finds herself taking on the role of the mother…and is henceforth reluctant to derive all satisfaction from her onanism.

It is therefore not, as has previously been claimed, the oral deprivation experienced by a girl which causes the abandonment of love for the mother, despite the daughter’s accusation, noted by Freud, that the mother has tried to poison her. This rejection of the mother should not be interpreted as originating from aggressive and sadistic oral desires that have been repressed by the daughter; it is rather the daughter’s recognition of her lack of a penis that gives rise to a pre-existing feeling of frustration. It is penis envy that explains the secondary rationalizations. Freud speaks, in this respect, of a “new experience.” Following Freud, the mother as *Das Ding*, The Thing, the prehistoric, primordial Other “who is never equaled by anyone later,” is called into question as fundamentally unsatisfying. This is especially true for the hysterical subject
for whom it is with respect to the phallus that the relationship with the mother must be assessed. Thus, the phallic connection with the mother, beyond the blame that the daughter will heap on her, will ultimately prove to strain the relationship with the father. And it is based on the daughter’s relationship with her mother, which Freud was the first to call “ravage,” that the relation of a female hysteric to a man can be understood.

The phallus is primordial here. It is the imaginary phallus that the girl doesn’t have, the result of anatomical difference between the sexes, that will push her towards men and will lead her to seek and obtain it through the intermediary of a man.

The turn towards the father

If passivity now gets the upper hand, it is because the abandonment of phallic activity has “smoothed out” the terrain for femininity. But the risk is that the repression of masculine activity become total and carry with it the repression of passive drives. When these passive tendencies “escape the catastrophe,” the way is clear for femininity. The little girl then asks the father for a penis. The desire with which the little girl turns toward her father is doubtless the desire for the penis which the mother initially frustrated and which she now hopes for from the father. However, it is always beginning with an identification with the mother, and with the mother’s supposed desire for the father that the girl turns towards him; she turns towards the father “as one enters into a port…”

Driven from paradise

But there she only finds disappointment. “The little girl likes to regard herself as what her father loves above all else; but the time comes when she has to endure a harsh punishment from him and she is cast out of her fool’s paradise.” Freud speaks here of frustration, the frustration of the wished-for child from the father that replaces the wish for the penis according to the symbolic equivalence of child and penis. But it is rather frustration from the withholding of the penis and the real deprivation of a child from the father—the real deprivation of a symbolic object that it was never any question that she
could have, as we would say today with Lacan. Thus begins the
decline of the Oedipal drama. Normal femininity then, accord-
ing to Freud, consists of the little girl giving up on the father as
the bearer of the penis and addressing her demand, or rather her
desire, to a man.

In hysteria, it is often between the wish to have a penis
by acting like a man and the wish to not be deprived of really
receiving something from the father that the subject oscillates.
By acting like a man, the girl believes she is compensating
for the deficiencies of a father who is weak, sick, castrated in
the imaginary, but the father from whom the subject hopes for
something is a veritable kingly phallus.

The Lacanian Phallus

The true nature of the phallus

How will Lacan elaborate the question of the phallus af-
fter Freud? Freud posited the phallus in the order of the image.
In that respect, it is in the image of the penis and its function is
equivalent in both sexes.

For Lacan, the phallus evokes rather what is lacking in
the image and it is the paradigm of a more fundamental lack,
of a symbolic lack. Lacan will renew Freudian thinking on the
phallus by making it the foundation of a symbolic order.

Lacan therefore accepts the Freudian ideal of the imagi-
nary function of the phallus in both sexes. But if, according to
Freud, the phallus appeared in the context of the erect form of
the penis, in the Lacanian reformulation, it is in the context of
lack, in the context of the phallus insofar as the phallus does
not exist that its function will be developed—in the context,
therefore of the lack specific to feminine sexuality as Jacques-
Alain Miller has pointed out, since “the true nature of the phal-
lus is revealed in the mother’s lack of a penis.”

Thus, “what Freud means when he writes […] that a
girl does not have a phallus, is that she does not have it sym-
bolically, meaning therefore that she could have one—it is
through the intermediary of […] castration that she enters into
the Oedipal complex.” The girl enters into the Oedipal com-
plex through the symbolic castration of an imaginary object
(the penis as clitoris). This equivalence is a fantasy of which
she must rid herself in order to turn towards her father; at that
time, the little girl notices that her mother isn’t better endowed
than she. Castration is the castration of the mother.

It is, then, the real penis of the father that the little girl
desires: the other face of penis-nejd. But in that case, only
the symbolic father, the one who forbids, can be the agent
of frustration, experienced this time in the imaginary of the
subject. Regarding the little girl’s fantasy of having a baby by
the father, this is, having a penis in a symbolic form; it is here
a matter of a deprivation which is quite real. The baby that the
little girl hopes for from her father is only the symbol of that of
which the little girl is quite really deprived.

Therefore, if the phallus is what is missing in the image,
the baby can be substituted for the phallus, or even confused
with the mother herself (“I my daughter” as one mother was
wont to say). And every subject is first identified with the phal-
lus that the mother lacks. Lacan said that feminine perversion
exists only in relation to her child. Because it is a substitute for
the phallus and because it occupies the place of the object in
her fantasy, the child completes the mother.

But it is indeed from the negative power of the phallus
as lack that what Lacan calls the paternal metaphor derives its
function. This paternal metaphor, which allows the meaning
of the phallus to be “evoked in the imaginary of the subject,”
consists of situating the mother as the place where lack is
inscribed. The subject must therefore symbolize, as the phallus,
that of which the father deprives the mother. “You shall not
reintegrate what you have produced,” is the limit he imposes.
The mother as woman is thus subjected to castration and no
primary satisfaction is attainable in the undifferentiated moth-
er-child relationship. Only the substitution of the Name of the
Father for the Desire of the Mother can humanize desire.

If the imaginary phallus is the root of the symbolic
phallus (both the instrument and the veil of the latter), it is
nonetheless only the symbolic phallus, signifier of a fundamen-
tal lack-in-being, that is able to account for the “minus phi” of
the imaginary of castration [-φ]. Thus the lack-in-being can
occupy a function between the sexes. “Sexual desire conjoins
with ‘having’ the threat or the nostalgia of a ‘lack of having.’”
Lacan expresses in this way the threat of castration for the boy, with nostalgia referring to the Freudian penis-neid in the girl.

It is thus an “appearance” that the phallic signifier brings into play in a sexual relationship. The phallic semblant on the man’s side will protect the “having,” and on the woman’s side, it will mask the lack of having, since man is only in a masculine position insofar as he is defined by his object, the castrated object; and the woman, behind her veil, is the one whom the lack of a penis turns into a phallus.

**Feminine desire**

But how does a woman constitute her object of desire and how does she constitute herself as object of desire? Beginning in the 1970s, particularly in *L’Étourdit*, Lacan will exempt women from the “obligation” of confronting castration, from “measuring [themselves] on the hobble of castration…”24

Already in his “Propos directifs pour un Congrès sur la sexualité féminine”, he stated that “it is from a place beyond the maternal counterpart that a woman receives the threat of a castration that does not really concern her.”25 Beyond the mother, her castrated double, there is of course a father who can threaten his daughter with castration. But here’s the problem: the threat has no effect because the father “beyond” is an unrealized, ideal father.

What then does a woman find in that place of the “beyond”? “A castrated lover or a dead man, perhaps even the two combined, who for the woman is hidden behind the veil in order to call for her adoration…” A partner who is castrated or dead, that is to say a man insofar as he is “deprived of what he gives.”26 Even if he can hardly be seen behind the phallicized male.

In addressing herself to a man, a woman is therefore always subjected to a certain duplicity since the place to which she addresses her love is situated beyond the bearer of the phal-lus: she doubtlessly desires the man who has the organ, but she loves the same man insofar as he is deprived of what he gives; therefore it is the figure of the symbolic father as dead that looms behind.
The phallus as “semblant”

Then what does a woman find in the body of her partner? She finds the penis as “fetish.” If fetishism concerns an object which sustains and displaces the existence of the penis, there is therefore for a woman a “fetishism of the penis”, but the penis in question is of course entirely invisible. And it is insofar as she identifies herself with the castrated Other, insofar as she is the barred Other [Ø], that a woman can desire the positive figure of the imaginary phallus—which is expressed in the formula of feminine desire given by Lacan (Ø ◦ -φ).

But how can a woman propose herself as an object of masculine desire? She can only succeed by making her feminine attributes the signs of man’s omnipotence. By presenting herself as a semblant of the phallus, that is by offering up to man’s desire the object at stake in phallic demand, the non-detumescent object, she makes herself desirable to him. It is thus that a woman overcomes penis-neid. Lacan adds in this regard that through seduction, woman is “more real and more true” in that she knows the measure of what she must deal with in matters of desire and knows that she has a certain “scorn for her being mistaken.”

What she gives, then, by making herself into the semblant of the phallus for a man, becomes the cause of her desire. The originality of the feminine position resides in fact in this gift of an imaginary object, the semblant of the phallus that she makes herself, and, in the act of “herself becoming” that which she creates in the imaginary. Therein is the cause of her desire. In the seminar La logique du fantasme, Lacan says: “in the love relationship, a woman discovers a jouissance of the order of a “Causa sui,” in as much as what she gives in the form of what she does not have is indeed the cause of her desire.” For this reason, a woman can cede her place as such to the semblant: she “knows what disconnects jouissance and semblant”.

It is therefore insofar as she is not the phallus and that she does not have one that a woman can accept to appear to be a phallus for a man. Often, however, she seeks to acquire what she does not have by several means: through power, glory, knowledge, or… a child.
Mother and phallus

If a woman is the one who does not have, the mother is then the one who has. In this regard, Lacan emphasizes the mother’s desire and not her love. It is not a matter of knowing if the mother is full of objects as she is for Melanie Klein, nor if she is “good enough” or shows “ordinary devotion” as Winnicott believed; neither is it a matter any longer of the dual and interdependent unit of mother and child caught up in “primary object love” as Balint thought. Here it is a matter of the dialectic of desire in its relation to lack. The child enables a covering up of the phallic lack in the mother, and the place of the child is for a woman the very measure of her castration. That is why the routes which “fantasies take to pass from mother to child,” sometimes take, when the child is a girl, complicitous paths of a conjugal kind, beguiling like an illusion which entraps, or the paths of the horrified fascination of the mother confronted with the phallic lack of her daughter, binding the daughter in prohibitions that lead her finally to submission or revolt.

But what occurs when the child is not that which covers up the phallic lack, but rather the object “appearing in the real” as Lacan noted in his “Note à Jenny Aubry?” Indeed, he stressed that “it is important to ask if phallic mediation siphons off all of the manifestations of drive in a woman and particularly the whole charge of maternal instinct.”

The “Pas-tout” (not-all)

If phallic mediation does not siphon off the whole charge of maternal instinct, what manages to escape this mediation?

It is necessary to bring into play notions which Lacan, in his final teachings, develops concerning the logic of feminine jouissance insofar as this jouissance can be not taken up in the signifier. Already in “The Purloined Letter,” Lacan emphasized the notion that if the law maintains a woman in the position of signifier or of fetish for a man, her being is, nonetheless, outside of the Law. He discerns a “Verwerfung” (foreclusion) of the signifier for woman. In this way, the question of her jouissance can come to light in a truly innovative manner in psy-
choanalytic theory. In the period around 1970, by introducing the graphs of the phallic function and by making the father a function, Lacan advances the idea that if no woman can include herself as an exception, as is the case on the male side of the phallic function, neither is there any need for a woman to be enlisted in that function. “The Woman” does not exist, just as, on the male side, there exists the “At-least-One” who says no to the phallic function. In this way, a woman is not the Other of the One. The fact that women are within the phallic function does not imply that they are all included. They are “not all” (“pas toutes”) there.

Where, then, is woman? She is “between”: between the center of the phallic function and the absence that—lacking the signifier which would represent her—is at the center of herself. And it is in relation to this unrepresentability that a woman can experience what Lacan names an “Other jouissance”: a jouissance Other than the limited phallic jouissance. This jouissance, about which a woman says nothing, is the one through which she experiences herself as Other. It is a “jouissance,” an “ex-time” jouissance, in the center of oneself, foreign to oneself. It is indeed to a “beyond” of the phallic term incarnated by man that this jouissance is addressed, in a space where the forbidden is no longer in effect. There, jouissance goes beyond the limits of representation of the Other as sexualized, and if the phallus is the condition for this jouissance, it is not its cause. In this respect, neither the object that a woman is for a man, nor the phallus as sexual jouissance consistent with a semblant, is sufficient to draw near to the real. The phallus does not saturate the relation of a woman to the real, and if we consider a woman’s jouissance as real, contiguous with herself, then we must assume that all women are more on the side of the real than on the side of the semblant. What accompanies a woman here is ignorance, lack of meaning, solitude. If the symbolization for woman is indeed lacking, this jouissance without words has to do with the point of lack in which the real deprivation originates for her. And this is how women can passionately love nothingness with a deadly passion that can swallow up everything, and which Lacan calls “surmoitié” (“overhalf”).
Not-all woman ("femme pas-toute") and mother

Can we therefore envision the place of the child, given this "not-all" jouissance of a woman when she is also a mother? The fact that a mother’s desire is not articulated in the name of the father does not mean that a woman is psychotic. As a woman, a mother can be torn between her relation to the symbolic phallus and her relation to the unrepresentable that Lacan writes as "S of A".

There it is a question, especially when the child is a girl, of what Lacan calls, following Freud, a “ravage,” even though he uses it in a way different from Freud. The “ravaging” mother, considered here as a woman whose jouissance does not have a symbolic inscription, is the one who lets go of the child. To let go, to let fall, does not necessarily mean to deprive the child of care, but it is to allow a form of absolute silence to dominate in the relation with the child. The child is neither taken up in a gaze full of life, nor heard. The child is struggling with a jouissance unscribed in language and which can only be destructive.

Concerning the mother-daughter relationship, Lacan goes further than Freud: “The labored Freudian notion of the Oedipus complex, which situates woman like a fish in water, by virtue of the fact that castration is her lot from the get-go (dixit Freud), painfully contrasts with the phenomenon of ‘ravage’ which constitutes in a woman, for the most part, her relation to her mother, from whom she seems to expect, as a woman, more substance than her father—which doesn’t go along with his being second in this ‘ravage.’” Here the “ravage” in the relationship of a girl to her mother takes on a different meaning than the one given by Freud. For it is no longer a question of what Freud calls the bad relationship toward the mother and neither is it a question of the daughter’s blaming the mother for having made her be born castrated. The daughter, according to Lacan, expects more substance from her mother than from her father, and that is the source of the “ravage.” Sub-sisting is what supports an existence. Thus, the girl asks for a bodily consistency from her mother. But this substance that she expects from her mother is founded, in fact, on a “ravishment,” on an abduction. The daughter’s body is “ravished” because it is impossible
to share femininity (the signifier for femininity is a forclosed signifier). Therefore, we cannot say with Freud, nor even with the early Lacan, that it suffices to conform oneself to the paternal function in order to straighten out this “ravage.”

The Freudian point of view is thus transformed. The price that a woman must pay for the freedom to situate herself in a non-phallic jouissance is the “ravage” she suffers from her relation to her mother, from her relation to the Other jouissance which inhabited her own mother. And the fantasy of a woman in analysis manifests at times, beyond the question of the phal-lus, a kind of response to the mute and unrepresentable jouissance of the woman who was her mother.

The daughter in analysis must, when she is neurotic, distinguish between the ways in which she has been caught in the net of this maternal jouissance that is impossible to symbolize, and the ways in which she has responded to it as best she could, sometimes by a strengthening of her phallic identification, but often by the triggering of a destructive drive; on the condition, then, that she make the terrible dictates of that fundamentally feminine superego “become refuted, emptied of consistence, undecided, undemonstrated.”

Between daughter and mother, girl and woman, mother and woman, there is no chain, no sharing, no transmission. Each expects something from the other: for one, the phallus, for another substance, for yet another an impossible separation; and none of them knows what she should nonetheless hope for: that the mark of desire, in which lack would be painlessly inscribed, would finally be granted to her. But in order for a woman to become familiar with the desire that inhabits her, she must instead separate out, unknot, invent each time a new story. In his 1932 lecture “On Femininity” Freud recommended: “if you want to know more about femininity, enquire from your own experiences of life, or turn to the poets, or wait until science can give you deeper and more coherent information.” What could better express the uncertain shores on which the feminine position is situated, never sure how to deal with the real condition of being deprived of a signifier, which is nonetheless her distinctive trait. Women know, however, how to compensate for this difficulty by drawing on the resources
offered by thousands of years of experience, or by poetry about them written by men. But today they come up against the belief that science should be able to help them articulate their being, only to discover a being reduced to her appearance, or on the contrary, they hope, like little girls, for the love that would keep the precariousness of the semblant at bay. (Love’s) labour’s lost. It falls to psychoanalysis to undo the illusion of quick fixes and to bet on the strange accommodations that are women. These accommodations can be sought, forged, and discovered, case by case, only through the emergence, from women’s words, of speech.

Translated by Mary Jane Cowles with suggestions from Chantal Hubert

Endnotes

1 Clotho who spins the thread of life, Lachesis who winds and measures it, and Atropos who cuts it.


11 Freud, Sigmund, Ibid., p. 253.

17 Ibid., p. 179.
33 Lacan writes it as “ S de A”