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A Reading of Some Details in Television in Dialogue with the Audience

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I do not want to give a paper. I'm going to offer a reading of a very particular text by Lacan, *Television*, which has just appeared in book form with Norton.¹ Nor shall I give just an introduction either, which, as a matter of fact, I already gave in New York. I give an invitation to read the book - and I hope many of you have the text with you. I shall be referring to sentences and eventually call for your interpretation of those sentences. Actually, this conference in New York is conceived by us as a *Séminaire* in the French way. That is, with two parts: one about the text, the other about a thematic. When we speak about the text we mean *the text* that we refer to word by word. I will try to explain a bit later why this careful attention to the text is more than ever necessary to psychoanalysis as an analytical practice, today. We do not believe the careful reading of a text is exclusively a university matter; that to scrutinize a text in all its details is outside analytical practice.

I say details, but that is a problem for us because details do not give the whole picture. To know that Lacan gave great importance to speech and language is not enough to get at Lacan. I will try to show you, following Lacan, how this connection between psychoanalysis, language and speech remained problematic for him. Even when he was seventy-two years of age, he took language and speech to be a problem, not a solution. To understand why the function of speech has such far-reaching effects in the psychoanalytic session is still a problem. I don't believe Lacan thought he had the solution. He had a problem he took very seriously. So this conference will not offer you a solution to everything. On the contrary. In spite of the fact that perhaps many of you, like myself, thought Lacan had all the answers, or as he himself, encouraged by me, may have thought. We are going to study this text, but not with

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the idea that here is some sort of final reading (such as the paragraph).

I have to take into account that others call me the authority on Lacan. It is difficult to be that, because I believe we are all equal before the text. And that is the way I want you to feel. As a matter of fact, if I included the title "in dialogue with the audience," it is because I consider the audience the true authority. You will understand. You have the work to do, but it is up to you to say it. That is the difficulty of this exercise. And, really, I would not try to comment on *Television* again if it were not to try to elicit something from you, something new from me, and eventually something new for you, coming from the self. I tried to say this last year at Kent State University concerning a text by Lacan called "Kant with Sade."² I must say I had the collaboration of the audience. I hope the New York audience will be as collaborative as the Kent State audience. Let me begin this reading of some details of *Television* with a sentence by Lacan, not in this text, but in another. I shall take this point, exterior to *Television*, to offer a path into *Television* and to give you an idea of my perspective for today. When I say today I mean today, not tomorrow and surely not the week before.

Point One: SURRENDER

I shall call my first point "Surrender." I offer you this sentence from Lacan, dated 1967, as an exergue to reading the following details of *Television*: "When psychoanalysis has surrendered its weapons to the growing impasses of civilization, . . . someone Who ? . . . will take anew the observations of my work... someone will pick up the observations contained in my work."³ Is this sentence difficult to understand? It does not seem so. Nevertheless, it is quite surprising. First, it does not say *if* psychoanalysis surrenders its weapons; it says *when* psychoanalysis will have surrendered. And secondly, it says the written text will add to psychoanalysis without the surrender of psychoanalysis to civilization. And then there will be another forum scrutinizing the details of Lacan's texts. Could it be that psychoanalysis has already surrendered to civilization and its growing impasses and we do not yet know it? When Lacan criticized ego psychology during the 1950s he said something like this: that in order to protect a social propriety in American society, psychoanalysis had to surrender its weapons. From the beginning, the trial of psychoanalysis in the United States of America was

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made possible through a surrender of psychoanalysis. To succeed in the United States, psychoanalysis had to waive, give up, renounce an ethics of psychoanalysis. When Lacan wrote in 1967 that the surrender of psychoanalysis was to come about in some way, he had already spoken in the 1950s about the surrender of psychoanalysis.⁴

Lacan's harsh criticism of the tenacious efforts of American psychoanalysis to establish itself *in a society* remains an open, narcissistic wound for American psychoanalysis. And as Lacan's writings are increasingly widely recognized throughout this country today, at the same time, one sees the resentment of American psychoanalysis toward Lacan. But let us try to modify modern psychoanalysis. Could it be that Lacan's criticism was not so much a critique of modern psychoanalysis as an anticipation of the destiny of psychoanalysis? It was said at one time that America is the future of mankind and nowadays, especially nowadays, the Americanization of Lacan can be felt. And we have experienced America as harbingers for us in causing the future. So does the supposed surrender of psychoanalysis in the United States not foretell the disappearance of the discipline itself?

Yet psychoanalytic inspiration permeates American culture. Psychoanalysis is everywhere. But at the same time, the practice of psychoanalysis proper, the practice of pure psychoanalysis, seems extended to a "shrinking" space, if I may say. The "shrink is shrunk." An American colleague gave me that expression. *In their own language*, Americans say that the space where analysis proper is practiced is a "shrinking" space in their society.

Today, with the prospects of the commercial integration of common European space very near, and after that, political integration, we too feel the growing demands of modern civilization, the growing demand for words, reducing psychoanalysis to a therapy, submitting it to cross-accounting and to a calculus of profit. Very recently in Paris, in just the last six months (with the onset of European regulation), we could feel the beginnings of the debasement of psychoanalysis, a debasement well underway in Europe. And that is the very reason we need to go back to the text. There is a famous dictum by Paul Valéry, just after the end of the first World War. He said: "We civilizations know we are monsters. We know we may perish."⁵ Lacan said something about this sentence, which is not in *Television*. Psychoanalysis is not for sure. Psychoanalysis may perish. And more than that, psychoanalysis will perish. Civilizations in the plural will perish. But civilization in the singular will

not. Psychoanalysis goes in the opposite direction from the ethics of civilization.

From its beginning, psychoanalysts have been fond of constantly talking about psychoanalysis. They are never too tired to narrate the story of the beginning of psychoanalysis and of the ethics of psychoanalysis. The story tells how the lonely Freud discovered psychoanalysis through listening to hysterics, how a little band of people ran around him, and how they could cure the world by psychoanalysis. Perhaps we should reverse this perspective. Would it not be interesting to consider psychoanalysis from its final point? From the point of its future disappearance? And for that reason to consider psychoanalysis as something very precarious, something which requires a lot of care, very good care in order to survive a little longer. So, let us consider psychoanalysis from the point of view of its disappearance. Perhaps psychoanalysis is a part of the resistance of the old world [to the force of civilization].

In *Television*, Lacan spoke without compromise, he spoke in his own style, refusing to give way to the demands of the network. The network was terrified. What frightened them so? In the beginning Lacan summoned me, asking me to reduce this two-hour show, to select the fifty minutes that the general public could understand. He asked me to translate it for the general public because he felt I was clearer than he was. But on this small occasion, Lacan's final position was to ask for an unconditional surrender of the network: if the network did not take the program as such, the whole two hours, without cutting anything, we would withhold our approval and just tell everybody. At that time in 1973-1974 the network gave in and the program was aired. *Television*, this text, was shown.

And now, many years later, I believe that is what one does when one thinks about the future surrender of psychoanalysis. One tries not to surrender anything now. Lacan gave *Television* in this obscure style out of his refusal to surrender. And, I must say, it is because Lacan refused to surrender that we are here in 1990 in New York scrutinizing the details of what he said. The fact that we are here is directly connected with the fact that he did not surrender.

Point Two: THE WAY OUT

This text is a testimony to a refusal of sorts. A clean-cut act of resistance to the pressure to conform. And so it takes into account this principle of the ethics of psychoanalysis according to Freud:

that giving up on one's own desire breeds a feeling of guilt. And Lacan was not prone to any feelings of guilt. So, let us begin our reading of some details of *Television* with the sentence that leads to the second point which I call "The Way Out." Let me now dispel the rumour of the gloomy predictions about the theories of psychoanalysis. Let us dispel this gloom with a burst of laughter. I'll ask you to take your text from page 16, the end of the third section, the last sentence and last paragraph there: "The more saints, the more laughter; that's my principle, to wit, the way out of capitalist discourse - which will not constitute progress, if it happens only for some." This was written six years after the first sentence I quoted in my point one. This sentence does not speak of the inevitable surrender of psychoanalysis. It says the contrary. And, as I understand it,

this sentence is made of the same framework as the one I quoted before. That is to say, the antinomy between psychoanalysis and civilization: "Psychoanalysis versus civilization." I would say that in this text Lacan gives its Marxist name of capitalism to contemporary civilization: "Psychoanalysis versus capitalism."

Do not be afraid of the word discourse, capitalist discourse. Just use the definition of discourse Lacan himself offers in *Television* as the term for a social link.⁶ So capitalist discourse may be translated as the capitalist's social link. What is surprising in this last sentence on page 16 is that, in this obscure way, Lacan envisioned psychoanalysis as the way out of capitalism. Psychoanalysis was the way out for some people during the 1970s in France, after the student uprising in 1968. As a matter of fact, Lacan knew to whom he was talking at that moment when I interviewed him for *Television*. All my efforts went toward erasing myself and having Lacan speak. But this only makes one see his efforts to bring me in. Somewhere in the text he alludes to my *gauchisme*, my student leftism. He envisioned psychoanalysis as the way out of capitalism, which in some sense, was already underway in the years after 1968. But he asks for more, that psychoanalysis be the way out of capitalism for more than just some.

And psychoanalysis enters this antinomy in the guise of sainthood. Perhaps this can be understood in some other way. Psychoanalysis enters into the position of sainthood. On page 15 Lacan gives this ironical definition of the psychoanalyst: "There is no better way of placing him objectively than in relation to what was in the past called: being a saint." To understand this you must see the connection between sainthood and capitalism in terms of the

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difference between the position and attitude of the saint and the subjective attitude necessitated by capitalism. The saint, in our thinking of the past, or a reference from the past, is a comparison with the position of psychoanalysis, capitalism being that of the modern and future attitude. We can now understand this placing of psychoanalysis in connection with capitalism. It is not a matter of situating psychoanalysis as a parody, but as an ethical attitude compared to another ethical attitude. If you remember Max Weber on the Protestant work ethic . . . Well, I will not comment on that further.⁷ But, to connect sainthood with capitalism, you have to take psychoanalysis outside the realm of pure therapy. You also have to take capitalism outside the realm of pure sociology or political science.

Sainthood placed alongside capitalism can only lead us to a realistic meaning if you consider both from the point of view of evidence. Capitalism as the order of exploitation of production whose law is "more." That is, as in [Nicolas] Baudeau, growth as such.⁸ When Lacan refers to the growing impasses of civilization in 1968, the growing impasses of civilization are precisely the growing impasses of a civilization of growth: that is, a civilization which tends to exploit more and more without setting any limit in advance. We are now experiencing the efforts of various groups in our society to put a limit on this growth. Ecological groups, for instance, try to limit this self-maintaining growth. We know this civilization of growth was supposedly produced to *satisfy* needs. But, as a matter of fact, we *produce* needs, new needs, and never satisfy desire. Capitalism could be defined by Lacan as the intensive production of the want-to-enjoy: that is, the lack-of-enjoyment and at the same time, the desire-to-enjoy. We have in France, and I suppose in the United States too, the creation of ecological groups or ethical committees trying to put reins on biological research, for example. All this activity proposes ways out of capitalism. If

we answer these efforts with the point of view Lacan presents, one would ask: if psychoanalysis is enough? Is ecology enough? Is ecology a way out?

From Lacan's point of view, ecology would not really be a way out because it falls under the Lacan principle (you will find this on pages 13 and 14) that denouncing a discourse, the capitalist discourse, improves it. At the end of page 13 Lacan says: ". . . in relating this misery of the discourse of the capitalist, I denounce the latter. Only here, I point out in all seriousness that I cannot do this, because in denouncing it I reinforce it - by normalizing it, that is,

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improving it." When you denounce, you normalize and improve capitalist discourse. This is surely true of ecological protest, thus justifying it. As a matter of fact, the ecological critique of capitalism gives rise to new industry. Limiting the devastation of capitalism helps capitalism survive. You can extend that. Let us just say that for Lacan ecology would not be a way out, in the same sense that psychoanalysis *could* be the way out.

And here we come again with the ironical definition of the psychoanalyst as a saint. Sainthood is certainly an attitude foreign to capitalism. But it is very clear, if you prefer capitalism to the Protestant ethic. Perhaps to understand the gist of Lacan's reference to the saint as it concerns the analyst, one must understand that there are many kinds of saints, very active saints who earn their sainthood through activity, very dramatic saints. Even Santa Teresa [of Avila] was very active, creating convents all around Spain. You have saints who were Asian or Oriental (Saint Francis Xavier in Japan, for example), or saints who were creating a kind of social security or medicare by themselves : Saint Anne, Saint Vincent de Paul, for instance. Clearly, this is not the kind of saint Lacan has in mind. I believe he is thinking of the patient saints, the saint for whom the work ethic is foreign; it is the saint who assumes the position of being useless and, in this very nonusefulness, finds his true usefulness to others. That is the saint that follows the path of Diogenes, the path of the true cynic. Such a saint transforms himself into a testimony and a cause of the desire of the Other. In this sense, this saint is closer to the Tao way. But when the law of capitalism is one of intensive production, one that has developed production more than at any time in history, the saint it is not the producer . . . Lacan sought a contrast to the capitalist notion in the saint as being similar to the psychoanalyst, insofar as a saint is *not* a producer, but a *product of what remains* after production: that is, simple trash, refuse, reject. Mario, do you have a contribution?

Mario: Page 15, two paragraphs before the one you quote.

Miller: Yes.

Mario: It is interesting that the saint in both is Gracián. What do you make of that?

Miller: Oh, no problem. I was trying to define precisely the saint Lacan had in mind. This would not be the saint of the imagery from the Canto before.

Mario: But Gracián is known for his style.

Miller: Yes. I know. You have a way, as Lacan shows us, not to match this second saint with the saint we have in the Canto before. There

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we have a supposedly ideal saint who was a paragon of all virtues and goodness, who, as Lacan referred to him, would get a halo. Lacan makes the point and then constructs this second notion

of the saint who is not the saint of the Canto before, or the nineteenth century image. He shows us that his second saint is not even religious.

At that he brings in Gracián who was a man of the church, but not a model of piety. On the contrary, he wrote treatises on how to behave with Machiavellian inspiration, but with disinterest in the state. Machiavelli had an interest in a good state and in how to manage a good state. Gracián is different. What was translated into French by Amelot de la Houssaye as *L'Homme de tour*, the courtier, was described by Gracián as *el discreto*; that is, someone who knows how to veil his state of mind and to speak ambiguously, making the other reveal his own truth while keeping himself in apparent discretion so as not to be caught.⁹ Gracián is caught. Despite all his treatises, he spent some time in jail because his Jesuit masters saw him as some kind of deviant. But you are right to refer to his interest in style. His *Agudeza y arte de ingenio* is a treatise of wit.¹⁰ Nietzsche also takes him as a reference.

Mario: Nietzsche. And Gracian was very influential on Napoleon also.

Miller: This I did not know.

Mario: Also La Rochefoucauld. But the way Lacan puts it there, he puts the Way with a capital W "No one notices him as he follows . . ." Way with a capital W, Way of Life. But Gracián's way of life was not one of piety.

Miller: I would say that is the way of the translator. In French "the way" of life was not capitalized. It is simply "the way." But you are right. It is not just a mistake in the translation. It is an important reference, the passive saint, this reference to Gracián. But underneath we also have a reference to the Tao - "the way" - the way of a certain modality of passivity.

Later in *Television* Lacan refers to the Tao. He compares three things: the way of Gracián, the way of the Tao, and the way of the analyst. In some sense, he inscribes psychoanalysis in a series of ethical attitudes. He offers this *ethical attitude* as an alternative to the capitalist attitude and as a confrontation with the value of civilization. It is also a confrontation with the values of American civilization. That is, the value of this pursuit of happiness which inscribes itself in the future and to which you have the Freudian objection, namely *Civilization and its Discontents*.¹¹ This is a Freudian objection

to the American Constitution based on the pursuit of happiness. In Freud there is the notion that civilization breeds unhappiness. This is the basic framework of the Lacanian orientation.

Question: I was going to say, regarding the reference to Tao, that its primary metaphor is that of water. This would be a passive idea. But in its passivity, it is the most powerful.

Miller: True. But I believe it is fairly simple to understand the direction developing a theory of work; the Tao way of production. That's why Max Weber tried to find in Protestant ethics the basis of capitalism: the central importance of doing something, producing something. In French we call this *les oeuvres*. You have "to do," to produce. The way of the Tao is contrary. We do nothing. But a certain type of nothing which orders the universe is in sympathy with it. Lacan is not saying that analysis is Tao. But he puts analysis on this side, against the ethics of capitalism. That is a central point in the Seminar: *The Ethics of Psychoanalysis*.¹² If, after Freud, we take a position between an ethics of psychoanalysis and an ethics of civilization - not just general civilization but modern, present day capitalistic civilization - it is clear in Freud and Lacan. Yet this does not impede various French enemies from denouncing Lacan. They denounce Lacan for inventing a new ethics against the ethics of everyone else. And so you still have movements in

France to budge Lacan away from his proposal of an ethics which goes against the common man. But, as a matter of fact, it is development of the position between psychoanalysis and civilization, where we find Freud and his *Civilization and Its Discontents*. The reserve of the psychoanalyst, that he remains silent, is often presented as a technical device for analytic neutrality. Lacan tries to show an ethical problem underneath this technical device. That is it precisely. Lacan elevates what appear to be the technical devices of psychoanalysis to the dignity of an ethical position. Furthermore, in *Television* he elevates what appears to be psychopathology to the dignity of an ethical position. Depression is an ethical position. And even psychosis is an ethical position. Sure, these positions are not ethics. Clearly, technique is ethics. There Lacan elevates the analyst to a dignity of refusing to surrender to the demands of capitalism. So what would we do today with Diogenes? Would we ask Diogenes to answer the census requirement? And if he did not want to answer, would we tell him that he is costing the community a lot of money? Would we try to put him in a list of unemployed workers? Understand that Lacan is resisting, desperately resisting an effort to inscribe psychoanalysis into the capitalist economy.

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When we propose psychoanalysis as a way out of capitalism, let us create more and more saints on the way. It is up to everyone who reads to opine if Lacan is serious or not. One may even believe that psychoanalysis will not be able finally to resist the onslaught of civilization. This is not a speculative question for tomorrow. It is possible that in United States it is a question of yesterday.

For the European, it is a question of today. Lacan in the 1970s' proposed viewing the psychoanalyst as an outcast of society. He proposes the career of the analyst as a kind of "dropping out" from the demands of civilization. In 1973 he writes another text, a letter to the Italians defining how we see the analyst in terms of the way we see him at the end of analysis. And he says you have to look for the mark of a dropout. In every true analyst you have the stigma of the dropout. Every analyst has something to drop out. But let us not be fascinated by the image of the "dropout," the one who makes himself trash. It has a very peculiar fascination.

And let us end this second point in the text on page 27. Lacan compares himself to a self-made man. And more than that, he says he *is* a self-made man. At the same time a saint has dropped out of capitalistic discourse, and a self-made man is someone who has made the most of his position as trash and drop out, you have both trash and [Donald] Trump. This declaration: "I'm a self-made man." I've become rich by psychoanalysis. You may also hear something of a cynical provocation. It is not the same as the nineteenth-century model here in the text. We'll find this quotation elsewhere. We'll find it again when we talk about the *objet a*. What appears to be trash from one perspective, is surplus value in another, sent by what comes with excess. We may see this as either a positive or negative value.

Point three: GLUTTONY

Let us now move to the third point. Perhaps this excellent translation [of *Television*] could benefit by some corrections or some discussion. But I will take the word as it is translated: "greediness" on page 28. I suppose greediness is fine since we have been talking about capitalism. But the French word, *gourmandise* (gluttony) is preferable. We are *gourmands* if we like

cake. Maybe "greediness" could be corrected to gluttony. As a matter of fact, this central antinomy between psychoanalysis and civilization is in Lacan a pure Freudian concept. When Lacan speaks of the growing im-

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passes of civilization, in a sentence on page 67, he refers very precisely to civilization and its discontents. His manner of bringing into the present the old Freudian reference, asks what those impasses of civilization are? According to Freud, those impasses are grounded on an ethics of civilization, built upon the subjective position civilization requires of all its participants. Freud invented the word *superego* there as the name of this ethical civilization. One could put its name as upon a theatre. The *superego* has insistence in relation to the drives; that is, to satisfaction.

Let us see very precisely what this impasse is as Lacan translates it. This impasse draws on the opposite of the definition of desire. Everytime we speak of desire, we speak of something which is not the security of the drive. In some sense, the drive does not pay. We speak of desire when we have refusal, hesitation, doubt. The drive aims straight on to accomplish what it wants. That is not to say that the drive succeeds. Freud erects the *superego* as a block, there in front of the drives which blindly seek satisfaction. This *superego* supposedly imposes restrictions on the drive by saying no to its satisfaction. Let us say that for Freud the invention of the *superego* is [inaudible]. The fact that it is a [inaudible] requires the surrender of satisfaction. What Freud called *Triebverzicht* was a renunciation of the drive. And the Freudian *superego* represents it as a conceptual [inaudible] of this requirement of surrendering satisfaction. Up to that point, there is nothing new in Freud, but, rather, a very fine presentation of the creation of moral consciousness.

But Freud's construction differs from classical construction on a single point which he stresses very carefully in chapter six of *Civilization and its Discontents*: that is, not only that the *superego* requires the surrender of the satisfaction of the drive, that it impedes the drive from seeking the satisfaction it wants, but that the *superego* feeds on this surrendered satisfaction which blocks the drive from fulfillment. The *superego* feeds on this satisfaction, secretly. In renouncing satisfaction more and more, we deny the *superego* more and more. This is exactly what Freud called a paradoxical functioning of the *superego*. Lacan translates this as "growing impasses." *The superego is a growing of impasses*. What Lacan called "Kant with Sade" is precisely this functioning. You go from Kant as you discover that the energy from which his pure moral imperative is drawn is the same energy incarnated in Sade's perversion. So "Kant With Sade" responds to the same framework. It is actually Freud who connects the Kantian imperative of the *superego* with the sadism of the *superego* in his representative text:

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"The Current Problem of Masochism."¹³ We could say that this *superego* which feeds, grows more and more demanding, the more the subject accepts these demands, is capitalism itself.

That is where Lacan introduces the word *gourmandise*, translated here as "greediness." This word shows the connection of the *superego* with capitalistic greed very well. It could better be translated as gluttony. Perhaps the translator had a good reason for not using this word. In the same way, Lacan says on page 45 near the end of the text, in the third paragraph: "This brings home to us at what cost neurosis sustains itself, about which Freud reminds us that it's not evil,

but good, that engenders guilt." This sentence corresponds exactly to the same schema. It is precisely this: the more you obey the demands of the superego, the more you feel guilty. This sentence is another comment on the Freudian mechanism. It can be commented on in many other ways once you understand the structure.

From this, one comes to the second point of what Lacan called the ethics of psychoanalysis: not an ethics of the superego, but an ethics in which you have this principle: the only thing one is guilty of, from the analytic point of view, is to have given up on one's own desire or drive (on this occasion one may use both). That is the central point of the ethics of psychoanalysis, a central point of *Television*, and, I believe, a central point in understanding Lacan.

Point Four: THE OBJECT

Let us now go to point four and try to understand the object. For the moment, we have used the word on which Lacan has not commented in *Television*: the *Triebbefriedigung*, or satisfaction of the drive. Lacan's own word for this German expression is *jouissance*. The first meaning of this French word is the translation of Freud's *Triebbefriedigung*, which we cannot translate only as "pleasure," because this unconscious pleasure may very well be translated at a conscious level as "displeasure." So, we cannot translate it as pleasure. Freud showed that there was a certain kind of satisfaction in the symptom which translates consciously as displeasure. So you have to use another word. Let us call back the word "satisfaction." Is *jouissance* (and *Triebbefriedigung*) a sexual satisfaction? In terms of Freud, is it really sexual? It depends on what you understand by sexual. If by sexual you mean it is connected to the Other sex, then we must answer that *Triebbefriedigung* is not a sexual satisfaction.

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When Freud speaks of drives, they most precisely do *not* imply the Other sex, but a derivative satisfaction. This is not the satisfaction of the other without the Other present. To illustrate the satisfaction of the drive in some way, Lacan is led to more or less circular schemas like the mouth which kisses itself. This implies the involution of oneself.

That is what Freud and his pupils come to through the stages of the development of objects, bringing with them the problem of how we reach the stage where we could enjoy the other. According to Karl Abraham, all problems of development concerned how to reach the stage where you could enjoy the other (that he calls the stage of genital love) through substituting past objects in the development of all the stages.¹⁴ Starting with this developmental presentation, Freud and his pupils met with different kinds of objects they called the object itself. They speak of the oral object or the anal object, when not simply referring to the Other sex as such. They are speaking of a kind of derivative satisfaction, then. When Lacanians speak of trash, we are on the slope of analogy, on the side of the anal object. When we speak of gluttony or the superego, we are on the oral side. With both "objects," we deal with the different ways they are objects lost to the subject. They are lost, by nature, like faeces as the anal object. And the oral object introduced in Freud through the disappearance of the maternal breast after weaning.

From working with the experience of psychosis, Lacan invented two more objects, added to the two Freudian objects. Lacan added the gaze and the voice which are in evidence in the experience of psychosis. In *Television* you have two expanded references to the gaze and the

voice. On page three of the text, Lacan refers to the audience of the *Seminaire* and the audience of *Television* at the same time: "There is no difference between television and the public before whom I've spoken before now, a public known as my seminar. A single gaze in both cases." So, there you have an expanded version of the object "gaze," in which television itself is not taken in the sense of "looking at TV"

Perhaps you look at or "watch" television. But the gaze, taken as this thing derived from the look, is the gaze coming from the TV and filling the void of the subject. You have a second reference to that on page 27, an expanded version of the object "voice," at my expense, I think. Lacan's question (and the answer) is a question "that might well be understood as being about your wanting to be able to answer it yourself. That is: if you were asked it by a voice,

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rather than by an individual, a voice inconceivable except as arising from the TV, a voice that does not ex-sist." So he's telling me, as a matter of fact, that the question I'm posing comes from the superego in some way.

I suppose, as such, he gives another definition of TV: not only the gaze, but also the voice. If we take this observation seriously, it indicates the growing impasses of civilization that produce the gaze" and the voice. We are at a stage of the growing impasses of civilization when we are able to multiply the gaze and the voice; that is, multiply the supports of the superego. What supports the superego is the object *a* which takes the place of the lost object. At this stage of civilization, we have gazes and voices multiplying in our society. We have the very production - what we may call the media industry - that is part of the growing impasses of civilization insofar as it intensifies the presence and demands of the superego.

Before our modern civilization, this paradoxical function was reined in by the discourse of the master, a master who was able to limit the superego. He could not say too much, but he could refute. The discourse of the master in Antiquity could contain the superego by employing slaves who made machinery and machines an accessory. So the full functioning of the *productive* superego could not take place. And this persisted for centuries. Regulation-functions prevented the advent of the superego's functioning as it wanted. That was a conservative way of living we had, that we called History. Social changes were very slow. And then something changed.

What we call capitalist discourse is certainly a mode of the discourse of the master, but it is not able to rein in the superego. It reigns, rather, at the service of the superego. So we are speaking of the acceleration of History when we see the very serious consequences of the absence of any reining in of this superego and we *are* trying to rein it in with our committees, protests, demonstrations in the street, with our petitions, signatures, and righteousness. Lacan reminds us that it is so powerful a discourse that when we denounce it, we improve it. What we are living now, this year in world history, appears to be happening in this perspective. In 1972 Lacan had already called capitalism a global discourse: the discourse which dominates the world. At that time, the Soviet Union and its Allies in the Socialist Bloc appeared very powerful. But from Lacan's perspective, capitalism had already won. I must say that nowadays when we see the working class itself proposing to free

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the market, we feel through this moment in *Television* that we have some "lead" to understand what's happening.

Point Five: TRANSLATION

I should take up the fifth point which I call "Translation." I can signal two words in answer to all the questions in *Television*: first the unconscious and then *jouissance*. "Unconscious" is already my first question to Lacan: "The unconscious - what a strange word!" It's not such a good word. What is it about? Lacan's rejoinder to my opinion is: "Freud didn't find a better one, and there's no need to go back on it" (p. 5). I would translate that differently. There is a need to go back on it, but we can't. It's not useful to go back on it. As a matter of fact, what Lacan says is that the word is already there and we aren't going to change it in spite of the fact that the word is negative. Perhaps, I could signal this to the translator. First the unconscious, secondly *jouissance*. *Television* moves between this inadequate word [unconscious] and this untranslated word [*jouissance*], with Lacan trying to make a new connection between the Freudian unconscious and what he calls *jouissance*, which creates another problem for the translation. Some translations say "to come" or "he comes" (*jouit*). It is more convoluted than that. This translation is very difficult. On page 128 Lacan imagines the presidents of France supposedly exhibiting the students and saying: "Watch them fuck." But it's more like: "watch them enjoying themselves." I will not expand on this.

In *Television* Lacan offered a definition of the unconscious, accepting the word as it is, but saying that the unconscious is a very precise thing in intent, not just the negative of consciousness. In this chapter, there is a new definition of the unconscious in Lacan's teaching. As you know, the Lacanian definition of the unconscious stems from language. He reminds us that there is no unconscious without language and speech. So, the path of Lacan, the way of Lacan, goes from language to the unconscious, from the supposedly known which is language, to the unknown which is the unconscious. You know the old theory of the unconscious by Lacan, the classical one, which takes its point of departure from "The instance of the letter" and defines language, according to Saussurean linguistics, on the basis of distinction of signifier and signified. This is Lacan's simplification of Saussure. His definition is an interpretation of Saussure. What Lacan adds to this separation is

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a relation of causality between the signified and the signifier, suggesting that the combinations of the signifier determine the signified. The essence of the schema is this: you have a metaphorical or metonymical combinations of the signifiers. Lacan considered the symptom as a kind of *signified* which you could cure through operating on a signifier, through interpretation, and through the analyst. By adding some signifiers to the initial signifier you could modify the symptom, considered as a mode of the signified. You would have interpretation by adding one signifier, such that you modify or nullify the symptom. There you have something in the path of Lacan which goes from language to the unconscious, something new which complexifies the word "unconscious" that the translator kept the same.

Lalangue is known in the classical Lacanian teaching, what we have built as a classical Lacanian teaching. Why write *lalangue* this way: not respecting the difference between the

article and the substantive, not connecting it as a single word like *language*; *lalangue* which is more like tongue than language? Lacan refers first to what is spoken as a supposedly pure level of inscription, a pregrammatical level; the purely spoken at the level of sound where you may distinguish the signifier as a phoneme, but not as a grapheme. Then, *lalangue* introduces in his teaching the fact that language is not primitive data, but already a construct, an elaboration of those sounds of the speaking being.

What we call language - what we call grammar - is a special knowledge we have built upon the sounds of language. We may learn a whole language without learning its grammar. It's only when you're becoming intelligent that is, when you become stupid - that you have to go through grammar to learn a language. But your own language you did not learn from grammar. You learn it as pure *lalangue*. And only then do you learn writing, if you want to take a developmental point of view. Lacan distinguishes this level of *lalangue* as distinct from language, and there [writing on blackboard] you have grammar and writing. You have to go from *lalangue* to language to have the unconscious, all the things we have to talk about: metaphor, metonymy, interpretation, equivocation and the famous errors of the unconscious that we call slips of the tongue and dreams. All of this presupposes writing, the fact that two things which are said the same way are written in a different way. Analytic interpretation would not have any basis if there were not a difference between the way words are pronounced and the way they are written.

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So when Lacan says the unconscious is structured like a language, it is precisely to say that *language is a construct* and that the drives themselves, as presented by Freud, are dependent on grammatical articulation. Freud presents the drive from grammar itself. Lacan presents it from satisfaction, so that when you introduce *lalangue* as exterior to language you seriously complicate the classical Lacanian canon. Metaphor, metonymy, slips of the tongue, puns, are plays in between language and *lalangue*. You have one thing more from Lacan in *Television* regarding *lalangue*. Correlatively, he had another point of view. Let us see what this change is in his definition of the unconscious, what, largely, the unconscious is as Lacan proposed it.

First, he defines the unconscious as he defines language now in *Television*, that is, as a kind of knowledge. Before, in the classical Lacan, he does not define language as knowledge, nor does he define the unconscious as knowledge. The definition of the unconscious as knowledge presupposes that you have distinguished *lalangue* and language. He defines the unconscious as knowledge, if you admit that knowledge may reside outside of consciousness. But not if you do not make an equivalence between knowledge and consciousness.

From the outset, Lacan offered a kind of knowledge which was distinct from consciousness. He speaks of animal instinct as the knowledge which is needed for its survival and which the animal obeys in order to survive. If instinct is a knowledge, it is a knowledge outside of consciousness. Lacan offered this as a referent for supposedly human knowledge, the human unconscious as knowledge. As a matter of fact, the unconscious is an inadequate knowledge if compared with animal instinct. The Freudian unconscious is not something needed for survival. On the contrary, we recognize the Freudian unconscious as detrimental to survival. We recognize the unconscious when we see something, an instance, which apparently works *against* the best interest of the subject. That is why it is offered up to be cured. The Freudian unconscious is not a function useful to the survival of the subject. That is why we speak of the death drive.

The death drive is Freud's way of saying the unconscious functions in a manner detrimental to the happiness and well-being of the subject. In that sense, the unconscious is not subservient to the pursuit of happiness. We could also take another point of view on this knowledge and say that through the stupidity of the unconscious, the human species survives. It is through the "stupid"

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invention of love, and its different modalities to which Lacan refers in *Television*, that we manage the survival of the species, more or less, in spite of the fact that we do not have a direct formalizable relationship to the Other sex. Let us not expand a lot on this. First, you have the definition of the unconscious as knowledge in *Television*. And through this definition, the direct connection between the unconscious and transference defined as the subject-supposed-to-know. Second, Yes. . .?

Mario: Yes. I want to ask a question about *lalangue* and why it is written as one word.

Miller: I've tried to say that the difference between the article and the substantive exists only through grammar. So Lacan's writing it as one word - *lalangue* - notes a pre-grammatical or pre-written level of language. It is phonetic writing, in a way. He is writing it as one word, trying to show a pre-grammatical and prewritten level of language: such as when the child says MAM-AMAMAMAMAMA. Again, trying to remember what I was speaking of, the same as you at the level of MAMAMAMAMAMA, try to recapture what *lalangue* is when you listen to someone speaking a tongue you don't understand and you hear it only as a modulation of the voice. For instance, if you listen to Arabic, and you do not know the language, you do not even know where to cut the signifiers.

Mario: So, you're saying *lalangue* is prior to language given on the side of meaning?

Miller: Prior to language before meaning? That's difficult because MAMAMAMAAMA has meaning. Lacan refers to this when he says that the signifier is a battery of signifiers, already given in *lalangue*. Even if you don't know, you could try. Each word takes on an enormous and disparate range of meanings, conforming to conditions often attested to by the dictionary: from *lalangue* through the dictionary, which is already a very elaborate knowledge on language, *lalangue* presents the phonetic condition of language or the sound level of language as the site of meaning. Then you have to decipher it according to writing, grammar, according to the broadest knowledge of language. You won't decipher it the same way according to the dictionary. And we decipher it in some other way.

Mario: There is one sentence on page 23 in the middle of the page: "By which I designate the identification of the Other with the One." And there I think the reference is to *lalangue*, *lalangue* as One.

Miller: I don't agree, but perhaps that's the idea of the passage.

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Mario: You don't agree? Why not? You don't agree with the Heraclitean interpretation of this?

Miller: No, I don't agree that *lalangue* is this One. If you buy the *Oxford Dictionary* you may say that all the English language is there. Generally you have to complement it with a dictionary of Americanisms or a dictionary of slang or whatever. On the contrary, *lalangue* is *par excellence* at the level of the not-all (*pas-tout*). There is nothing which enables you to encompass *lalangue*.

You only have the whole at the level of the battery of signifiers. There, if you believe Morris Halle and Roman Jakobson, at this level you have the whole of language: all the sounds someone may pronounce that would get signification in one language. But if you are not at this level, you don't have the One, although you have people who believe there is a One of language. That is the purist in language who says you may say this and you may not say that.

Mario: But the One is the *logos*, the *enpanta* of Heraclitus: "The identification of the Other with the One." I think it is a reference because Lacan immediately gives a reference to Aristophanes in Plato's Symposium. And the reference there is very clearly to the pre-Socratic notion of the Other as One; to, that is, to Heraclitus's *logos*.

Miller: I hadn't thought of that. I'm not saying the question is not interesting. I just wouldn't answer it the way you do. Let me say, when you speak of language, you speak of the structure of language. Lacan explained to us that it is always at the place of the Other. Insofar as we must direct ourselves to an audience, we direct ourselves to the language of the Other. So language is never at the same place as the subject. It is with the Other. And we have to enter it. We are in the place of the Other in ordering the structure of language. Is *lalangue* also at the place of the Other? Or is *lalangue* with the One? In some way, if we differentiate the One from the Other, we could say of *lalangue* that it is with the One, and not the Other. We would have to complement something which Lacan does not say.

At the level of pure sound emitted from the mouth, *lalangue* is an enjoyment for the body. As a bodily enjoyment you could make the exercise of *lalangue* masturbation. You could make it precisely the *jouissance* of the One. This is what Lacan first presents in *Television*. The unconscious as knowledge. Then, the unconscious as thought already identified as such in Freud. In the unconscious you have thought as distinct from sound and the body, as destructive of the harmony between sound and body. But in some way he presents an unconscious thought as more connected to the body than to sound.

And on page 6, Lacan says that "the subject of the unconscious is only in touch with the soul via the body, by introducing thought into it." He is saying something tremendously important. He repeats it concerning the affects.

Actually, he is looking at the direct connection between the unconscious and the body. He says that unconscious thought comes first to the body. This connection is precisely what he is going to call *jouissance*, insofar as *jouissance* has to do with the signifier and at the same time is linked to the rims of the body. The central problem of *Television*, which is not resolved in this text, is this: how come the signifier, language, *lalangue*, has an effect on the body? How come like *lalangue* the signifier produces effects of *jouissance*? That is the definition of the unconscious which Lacan offers in *Television*. The unconscious as work. When you present the unconscious as work, you say blind, non-thinking work.

So, it takes a second level of description. Blind and non-thinking work. And work for what? There you define the unconscious as work for *jouissance*. The new thing Lacan introduces is to consider the signifier not only as an agent that produces signification, which is the classical Lacan. The central problem in *Television* is how come the signifier produces an effect of *jouissance*, a direct effect which you experience? You can't say you don't experience it in the body. You have various solutions offered by Lacan in *Television*. For instance, in some way *jouissance*

is signification, a special kind of meaning. Or when he disconnects the word as *jouis-sens* and says that it is a "sense which is enjoyed" or "enjoyed meaning." It is trying to, all the way.

Once Lacan defined the unconscious as a work of knowledge, a combination of signifiers, you have something which adds up to the pure effect of signification, that is, the enjoyment of signification. There Lacan refers to the Tao, just to differentiate the Tao from psychoanalysis. For the Tao was a way of behaving with those difficulties of the unconscious. Lacan is not criticizing the Tao, but saying how it is useless for us because it leaves our *jouissance* cold. It was meaningful for them and is no longer meaningful for us. When he says this he introduces an element which is precisely the heat of *jouissance*. That it is not only a matter of a signifier producing a signified, but also of enjoying the signification, and veiled significations meaningful in the past, which we may try to mimic, but which do not compromise our *jouissance*. In these thermo-dynamics of *jouissance*, which Lacan refers to in *Television*, we mustn't produce it. We find this problem in *Television*. That in some way *jouissance*

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. . . appeared to be pure signifiers. And Lacan says: "*Jouissance* consists in logical straits" (p. 9).

The translation Freud achieves reveals *jouissance* as "consisting in the logical straits through which he so artfully leads us" (p. 9). The consistency of *jouissance* is its logical straits. *jouissance* is a translation and combination of signifiers. We have no other substance than that. At the same time, this *jouissance* implies a bodily element. The problem of *Television* is how to gather together the logical consistency of *jouissance*, which is no other substance than those logical straits, at the same time that even those logical impasses and that "something" of the body are compromised in these logical straits. And all *Television*. . . Yes?

Question: I'm sorry to interrupt. In English, a strait could be a passage.

Miller: Yes, in English, we say the Bering Strait, for example.

Question: Then, I think of *jouissance* as a movement. More particularly, the movement of one word to another, or from one meaning to another. And that relates *lalangue* in terms of the chain of signifiers. Of course, he [Lacan] refers to the primary process which he says includes metonymy and metaphor.

Miller: What we learn from him in "The instance of the letter" is that a combination of signifiers produces the effect of the signified. If you master the combination of signifiers, you master the effect of the signified. And he's saying something else as well. That every combination of signifiers has an effect of *jouissance*. You have to think about it then. Is *jouissance* a special kind of meaning - an enjoying-meaning? Lacan is making an effort to include *jouissance* in his schematics of the unconscious. In this text he is trying to think of *jouissance* as a special kind of meaning, a special effect of meaning. And at the same time, he's preserving the connection with the body which implies that the body is not the nude body. Rather, the body is the first surface of the inscription of the signified.

I don't believe we supercede the problem. I believe we posit the problem.

Question: Is what you're saying in keeping with what Lacan says about *jouissance* in the *Encore* lecture, where he says there are at least two kinds of *jouissance*? There's that special *jouissance* on the feminine side. Is what you're saying also in keeping with that *jouissance*?

Miller: There you have the distinction to be made between this *jouissance*, which consists in signifying straits, but clearly combined

with something else which he distinguishes precisely as nonsignifiers; that is the object small *a*. There you have two types of *jouissance* to distinguish. Suddenly you have the *jouissance* which remains equivalent to the combination of signifiers. When he says *consists*, I take it as a level. You have a level of *jouissance* which is strictly equivalent to a combination of signifiers. I wouldn't put dynamic there; I would not say movement. I would keep it as translation, pure translation: one signifier in place of another. And for metaphoric and metonymic displacement, we ought to suppose a specific *jouissance*. The unconscious working to give the subject a satisfaction which is pure fun. This is precisely what Freud called the primary process.

For Freud, the primary process signified that the unconscious obeys a mechanism which produces a fundamental satisfaction for the subject. That is, less tension. This is a primary process of the dream, of the unconscious. There you have the whole of metaphor and metonymy as mechanisms working for peace of mind. You have an idea of the unconscious as working for satisfaction. We could say the primary process of the unconscious is working for satisfaction. It is not working for the sake of work, but for satisfaction. And that is why Lacan says the unconscious is the perfect capitalist slave: because it is a worker, working for satisfaction. So, we could call this satisfaction, pleasure. But as a matter of fact, the unconscious is not able to maintain us at this level. So, we awake. If it could maintain us at this level of pleasure, we would sleep all the time. Those who want to sleep all the time cannot. So they take drugs to obtain this.

We ought to suppose that the primary process does not succeed in producing a satisfaction. So we need a second principle to answer for the failure of the primary process, which is not really a principle of pleasure. In some ways this second process obeys like the first. But it is a longer process for obtaining this peace of mind. As a matter of fact, it includes the excess which we call surplus *jouissance* which is already there with the pleasure principle, impeding the principle of pleasure and succeeding in suppressing any excess. And that's why Lacan, changing his mind in *Television*, says that what Freud called the pleasure principle, a principle of the acquisition of happiness, does not obey the pleasure principle. Rather, the primary process obeys the principle of the production of *jouissance*. And, with that, Lacan suppressed the necessity for the two principles of pleasure and reality. This principle of pleasure is

such a failure that one might have supposed pleasure was not its aim. That its real aim was the production of surplus *jouissance*.

When you have something which fails repeatedly, you suppose there is a failure in its aim. You suppose it cannot bring you back to stasis because that is not its aim, but rather to entertain a selfish *jouissance*. The third level is, as a matter of fact, that in this surplus *jouissance*, which is always called displeasure, a subject finds its true happiness. So, again, I provide three moments. At the third level, you have a special kind of happiness in *jouissance*, a surplus *jouissance* which Lacan called *le bonheur*. But it is happiness in shock with the Real.

So, the three levels I distinguish are the following: First, the classical Freudian interpretation by Lacan where the pleasure principle fails. So you need the reality principle as subservient to the pleasure principle. Second, you need to define the primary principle that goes with both as a principle of *jouissance*. And the third level is always a success. That is, in this very difficulty you have the only happiness that subjects may find, all the ways one shocks oneself

with the Real. It has always happened that way. The subject of the unconscious is always happening as a level of the primary process, if we define it as a principle of *jouissance*. The subject of the unconscious is so calamitous as to imagine he's happy. It is, we might say, a superior attitude. It's more than fatalism. It's where Lacan is closest to Spinoza.

One does not admit a positivity of happiness, certainly not a positivity of evil. It's a level where everything is a question of function. And that . . . Yes?

Question: You call the first one the *jouissance* of fatalism. Is that the *jouissance* of the Other?

Miller: Which *jouissance*?

Question: The ones in *Encore*.

Miller: Lacan took masturbation as an example to show how *jouissance* in itself does not comprise the Other sex. *Jouissance* of one's own body makes the *jouissance* of the Other very problematic. If I experience *jouissance* in my own body, why do I associate this special kind of *jouissance* as connected to the other? Is it a fiction? Does it exist? What kind of reality is it? When we think of *jouissance*, for instance, of the kind which we possess, it is the *jouissance* of the psychological apparatus. It is something which has nothing to do with anyone in the world. If this fiction of Freud is of the same contained [inaudible] which is working for its own reason, the question is: Is it a failure or a success? Because it is a failure, we don't sleep all the

time. We awake to enable the mechanism to continue its course. I would say that we take an exterior being to feed on this mechanism so that, in some way, we finally have the exterior world from this surplus *jouissance*. The Other is grounded in this surplus *jouissance* that we project as the exterior world.

So, the true Real is this which impedes the functioning of the pleasure principle. That is, what we call reality is a mask of this Real. There's an expression which comes twice in *Television*, very strict. "It [reality] is a grimace of the real" (pp. 6, 42). Lacan associates the word "grimace" with the word "Real." I will make a lot of this grimace of the Real. It is what we pay for the smile of the Other. In fact, it is just a kind of deformation of our own surplus *jouissance*, coming back to us from the exterior. It looks like a very solipsistic point. What we call reality is a fantasy, just a fantasy. Which is a grimace of our own way of obtaining surplus *jouissance*. And it's not solipsistic in the classical philosophical way.

But it is not the Lacan who speaks of communication whom we have first in "The Function and Field of Speech and Language."¹⁵ It's a Lacan for whom communication is a way of becoming lacking, where speech itself is speaking to oneself or is just the movement of the lips as a level of *lalangue*. This makes communication itself, the existence of others, a problem. Do we need anything else in the world but our own way of obtaining surplus *jouissance*? That is, are we awake or sleeping? Now, by this time, I'm sure we're all sleeping. It's a question.

Question: What is the reference when you spoke of the special kind of happiness, *le bonheur*, as a shock? In what sense is it a shock?

Miller: It's not smooth, consisting only of stasis. The idea of stasis is that everything goes smoothly, without a shock. Without this smoothness you have - well it translates somehow as - a happiness in discontent. The problem is too simple to remain within the idea of your being comfortable in civilization. The problem, rather, is much too much being comfortable within our own discontents.

Question: I wanted to add one thing to your description of America as a vanguard in the development of our discontents. I'm not sure you're aware there is a counter-tendency in American philosophical thought which is cyclical; sometimes more, sometimes less, interesting. I'm talking about Emerson. If you look at a figure like Emerson, the mentor of Thoreau (whom I'm sure you know more about) - and Thoreau is the one who said you don't have to go around the world to count the cats in Timbuktu - it's the beginning

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of the end of the consumer movement. Resistance to a certain kind of activism; otherwise passivity. Emerson has a poem called "Days" which concerns the refusal of modern society and its passivity.

Miller: In Lacan, the conservative refusal of modern society and the passivity of looking back to the past as a better time, is not at all critical to . . .

Question: This would be to misunderstand Emerson and Thoreau. They do not look to the past. But much of what they're talking about is a certain kind of informed passivity. A refusal to consume for its own sake does exist in the tradition of American thought.

Miller: Let me submit that Lacan put himself in the category of anti-progressivists, those who do not believe in progress. So, he doesn't hope for a better world through progress. You have a lot of people in this general category. You have all the counter-revolutionaries, all those who rejected the French Revolution or were anti-progressive. A good part of the left became anti-progressive. In Western culture in general, from the start of the French Revolution, you have the progressives and the anti-progressives. From the left to the right. And sure, Lacan is on the side of the anti-progressives, which doesn't mean he believed in turning back, but that he did not see anything better in the future. So perhaps we can say he was anti-progressive.

Question: In *Encore*, the schema of *jouissance* is as the signifier of the barred Other. In that particular essay he speaks of *jouissance* as a failure of meaning, the failure of signification outside of meaning, *jouissance* in nonsense. I was trying to reconcile that with what you were saying about *jouissance* which started sounding like the possibility of mastery of language which would seem to me . . .

Miller: Who said this?

Question: That's what I was trying to find out. That would seem to be more narcissism than *jouissance*. I have another question. If the unconscious is the perfect slave of capitalism, I don't understand that, unless desire runs counterwise to the superego. . . .

Miller: The unconscious works as blindly as the capitalist discourse would have the slave work. It's an analogy It's not to say that . . . As a matter of fact, we say that *jouissance* has a signifier effect and is present in a combination of signifiers and pain on the body. How do we act with psychoanalysis? In fact, we do not act. We do not intervene directly at the level of the body. If you do that, you go outside of the practice of psychoanalysis. We try to influence *jouissance* and the distribution of *jouissance* and survey the different ways and means the subject uses or is used to produce *jouissance*.

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We do that through speech and language, somehow enabling the subject to learn how to. That's why Lacan offered the ethics of psychoanalysis as an ethics of *bien dire*, the well-spoken that

comes through as a way of speaking the truth. It was through this enabling of a subject to speak in a new way, to speak differently, that Lacan hoped to produce a different distribution of the way of pain and *jouissance*. In some way, this obliges one to connect *jouissance* with the signifiers.

For a long time, Lacan would not do that. He read that as outside the realm of what could be said from the analytic point of view. And he was satisfied with the Freudian reading. But, as he recalls libido in the Freudian myth to us, he's trying to decipher the Freudian myth. In *Television*, he gave a definition of myth as something which gives an epic form to what operates from structure. He said that this is appended meaning for the libido itself, for which *jouissance* is the Lacanian word. With the difference that libido is a myth. And Lacan tries to make of *jouissance* the sexual conflict. And its structural complement is derived from the combination of signifiers. All this is not abstract. All this is trying to conceptualize something which happens in psychoanalytic experience. That is, if you don't speak of the symptom only as a decipherable passivity. And, if you see, furthermore, apart from deciphering of symptoms that you're supposed to effect a redistribution of the *jouissance* which was present in the symptom, which was obtained through the combinations in the signifier, you ought to think of the connection between *jouissance* and the signifier. Lacan's solution is very simple. Let us try to think of *jouissance* as an effect of signifiers. As we have said before, meaning is an effect of the signified. How does it enter into that? Is it a different thing? Is it the same kind of thing? Is it a special kind of thing? How does the body come into it?

Let us try to look at *jouissance* as an effect of signifieds, as meaning is an effect of signifieds. Lacan then comes to a definition of the body. And what is a body if it is susceptible of connection with the *jouissance* which is a logical consistency? So, we move to a logical definition of the body. Perhaps, we can stop now.

Endnotes

1. Jacques Lacan, *Television*. New York: W .W Norton & Co., 1990.
2. Jacques Lacan, "Kant avec Sade." *Ecrits*. Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1966, pp. 765-90.

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3. Jacques Lacan, "Proposition du 9 Octobre 1967 sur la psychanalyse de l'Ecole." *Scilicet* (1968): 14-29.

4. Jacques Lacan, "Agency of the Letter." *Ecrits*. Trans. Alan Sheridan. New York: W .W. Norton & Co., 1977, pp. 146-78.

5. *Paul Valery: An Anthology*. Ed. Jackson Matthews. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1977.

6. See the section "A Jakobson" in Jacques Lacan, *Le Seminaire: livre XX: Encore* (1972-73). Texte établi par Jacques-Alain Miller. Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1975, pp. 19-28, for an earlier discussion of "social link" (*le lien social*).

7. Max Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and The Spirit of Capitalism*. Trans. Talcott Parsons. London: G. Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1930.

8. Nicolas Baudeau (1730-c.1792) was a political economist who, in his essay *Principes de la science morale et politique sur le luxe et les lois somptuaires* (1767), defined luxury as

"that subversion of the natural and essential order of national expenditure which increases the total of unproductive expenditure to the detriment of that which is used in production and at the same time to the detriment of production itself" (p. 14).

9. Abraham Nicolas Amelot de la Houssaye (1634-1706) was the translator of Balthasar Gracian's *Oráculo manual y arte de prudencia* ("The Pocket Oracle, or Art of Prudence") (1647) as *L'Homme de cour* (Paris, 1684). Amelot collected maxims and pithy sayings with a political content for popular audiences and was also the translator of Tacitus and Machiavelli.

10. Balthasar Gracian y Morales, SJ (1601-1658), *Arte de ingenio, tratado de la agudeza* ["The Art of Wit, a Treatise on Subtlety"].

11. Sigmund Freud, *Civilization and its Discontents*. *SE* vol. 21, pp. 59-148.

12. Jacques Lacan, *Le Séminaire: Livre VII: L'éthique de la psychanalyse*. Texte établi par Jacques-Alain Miller. Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1986.

13. Sigmund Freud, "The Current Problem of Masochism." *SE* vol. 19, pp. 57- 72.

14. Karl Abraham, *Clinical Papers and Essays on Psychoanalysis*. Ed. and trans. Hilda C. Abraham. London: Hogarth Press, 1955.

15. Jacques Lacan, "Function and Field of Language." *Ecrits: A Selection*. Trans. Alan Sheridan. New York: W .W. Norton & Co., 1977, pp. 30-113.