

Chapter 1
Presentation of the Year's Theme

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To continue the series, the serious
Two modes of jouissance
No clinic without ethics
The fantasy is an axiom
The body of the Other

The person who just brought me here told me she was very happy the course was starting again. Well, me too.

I conceive of what I am doing here as a course - a rather long course, since you will meet me at this place and at this time, all the available weeks.¹ Not less than twenty-eight times before the end of the month of June, that is. If we advance a bit into July, it will be thirty.

I realized that this course - this long course - suited me, despite the work it imposes on me. There is, not only in psychoanalysis, but also in existence, the function of staying the course and running the distance - which I am trying to do here.

Here. That means that I have some other lectures to give as well, and even a seminar² where, above all, it is up to others to prove themselves, although I must make certain interventions. I have to provide orientation, in other words, in a context which is, in general, like all contexts: it is alluvial, made of deposits where various materials have already become sedimented.

The difference for me here is that the context, the sedimentations, are what I myself have already said the preceding year. I must confess in reference to this context. That happens for me here, not elsewhere. It is here that I must say what follows, that I must continue the series.

In Lacan's sense, to canyon with the series is the only way to be serious. That consists, in particular, of drawing the consequences from what one has said, and especially the consequences of the consequences. This is especially difficult because

it happens, more often than one wishes, that the consequences of the consequences are not in agreement with the premises.

Certainly, I 'profess' this course insofar as I have a profession in the University. I have done so by this rubrique since 1972 - precisely from 1972 to 1979. That means that, for seven years, I have addressed myself to the systematic coherence of the teaching of Lacan. I have tried to say how it holds together, how - according to the very terms of Lacan - he did not fall flat on his face, and how these terms, these constructions, responded to one another.

Then I stopped for two years. I was not on strike during these two years, but I stopped the series.³ What led me to mark this scansion? What incited me to it? It was the destruction of the University of Vincennes.⁴ This University was razed. I am not using a metaphor. They brought cranes, an especially long street, a long chain, at the end of which there is a kind of ball that they

drove into the building of this university. Now, the only trace that can be seen there is a ruined lawn. Since I found it painful to speak, just in anticipating what is not even a ruin - they don't **even** stop that today - I stopped. I stopped the series.

It so happened at the same time, at the juncture of this decade, that there were other destructions as well, in particular the destruction of the Freudian School of Paris.⁵ That too was razed.

At this juncture, I also began the practice of psychoanalysis. And especially, Jacques Lacan was dead.⁶

That led, last year, to my beginning a second tour of Lacan's teaching.⁷

I do not know if it will continue like that for seven years. There might be seven years of fatted cows, after which there would be seven years of lean cows. But nothing permits me to qualify cows. After all, there are good cows, good troupes of cows. The difficulty is to be in the process of doing something.

I

My point of departure, the one I shall take up again in order to give you a foundation, is situated exactly at this juncture.

12

It seemed urgent to me, in 1980, to promote an other Lacan than the one who has been interpreted for almost thirty years.

An other Lacan - that I introduced to Doctor Lacan, the last time I had the opportunity to speak before him, on the occasion of the International *Rencontre* in Caracas - consisted of opposing the fixity of fantasy to the dialectic of desire. This point of departure is, for me, a guide. It can be found published in an internal Bulletin which is called *Delenda*,⁸ which was doing fine in a period of destruction.

What I did last year seemed, retrospectively, to merit the name of *Scansions dans l'enseignement de Jacques Lacan* (Scansions in the Teaching of Jacques Lacan).⁹ I have continued, from this moment of beginning, in the sense of stressing that it was abusive to interpret the whole of Lacan's teaching based on *L'instant de la lettre* ("The Agency of the Letter").¹⁰ It is also abusive to interpret the whole of Freud's work based on "The Ego and the Id."¹¹

This attempt, in which the orthodox New Yorkers have distinguished themselves, often goes very far. It is even too much to say that they interpret all of Freud's work starting with "The Ego and the Id." What they do is much more radical. They distinguish a first theory of Freud's, the one he focused on in *The Interpretation of Dreams*,¹² and the following one, with the three terms of the unconscious, preconscious, con-scious. And they oppose to that, quite simply, the tripartition of the ego, id, and superego. That has produced a work, like that of the most distinguished of the orthodox New Yorkers, Arlow and Brenner,¹³ in which the first chapter is made of the exposé of the first theory of Freud, the second chapter of the exposé of the second theory, the third chapter of the statement that these theories are incompatible, and the fourth chapter opts for the second theory of Freud.

Put another way, I would say that their choice of "The Ego and the Id" is a principle, not for interpreting, but for amputating, Freud's work.

Based on that, what pretends to be the Freudian orthodoxy, the International of Psychoanalysis, as of today, has developed. It is evidently completely abusive. In particular, it cancels everything which is Freud's *path*, which explains that

13

he has passed from one presentation to the other. A large part - not at all negligible - of Lacan's teaching was done to redress this perspective, to show, in particular, that Freud's "The Ego and the Id" only acquired its sense, its value, starting with *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*,¹⁴ that the essential concept of "The Ego and the Id" is the superego - whose name does not figure in the title of the work - as the instance in the subject which works against his good. That is why one encounters the theory of masochism in Freud's subsequent writings.

But in order to approach this turning point, this scansion in Freud's work, one must start with *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, from the beyond in the good that Freud saw on the horizon. It is from this vein that "The Ego and the Id" comes, as his principle writing on the fantasy, "A Child is Being Beaten,"¹⁵ or his text "The Economic Problem of Masochism."¹⁶

I tried to explain last year¹⁷ why "The Agency of the Letter" had fixed the interpretation of Lacan's teaching for his students. I put forth the dichotomy that had gone unperceived, of the laws of the word (*parole*) and the laws of language (*langue*). The laws of the word are of a Hegelian filiation for Lacan, and make *recognition* the pivotal concept in the exercise of psychoanalysis, taken as the difficulties of desire. The laws of language are those that Lacan thought he could base on the linguistic binary of metaphor and metonymy.

I said that interpreters have stopped at that with Lacan - they have exploited it - for which reason I put all my energy last year into marking in what way, if, according to Lacan, everything is structure, *not everything is a signifier*.

I have shown that the introduction of his barred subject (\$) depended on this point, that is to say, of the desire beyond recognition. In the same fashion, I restored the binary of alienation and separation to its place, completely effaced as it had been from the interpretations of Lacan, to the benefit of the binary, metaphor and metonymy.

I explained in what way these two terms responded to each other: alienation in the signifying chain; separation from the signifying chain.

I did not say so much about it last year, but enough to register on the occasion of the last Study Days of the School of

14

the Freudian Cause, this past weekend, that I had been heard.¹⁸ It is certain for me - it is for that reason that I permit myself to make this little excursus in order to begin - that I am speaking of a position which has changed. I have spoken for a long time - I have not deprived myself of it - as a non-analyst. That is to say, I have addressed myself to the knowledge elaborated by Lacan.

To speak of psychoanalysis as a non-analyst does not disqualify anyone, on the condition that he knows his place. When I had to make some small digressions, during these seven preceding years, I did not fail to make them from the place of the non-analyst in the field of knowledge elaborated in psychoanalysis. There is a relevance, that of consistency, even, of the coherence of this knowledge.

There is a good reason to assert that insofar as Lacan's teaching was concerned, many were led - one does not know exactly why - to consider it, on the occasion, as more or less poetic eruptions. In a similar way, I assumed my position for seven years despite the great prejudice of a community which imagined itself to be a community of analysts - when it is, rather, a community of the syndicate type. I must state that I authorized myself to speak insofar as I practice psychoanalysis, but also in the sense that I had covered Lacan's teaching as knowledge for the seven preceding years.

Covering Lacan's teaching as knowledge means to verify its coherence, and that is concluded, definitively, by this mark that I have worn as a guarantee of the consistency of this knowledge. Not long ago, one took me to task for the index since I had written it for Lacan's *Ecrits*,¹⁹ at his request, when I was still a student. Very well, in this index I see the trace of my vocation of bearing the guarantee of the coherence of the knowledge elaborated by Lacan. In return, Lacan himself acted as a guarantee. He did it for many; He did it for me too, in the quality of the relevance of where I was. Now it is a question of fabricating this guarantee. It is very difficult to fabricate a true guarantee, for the reason that there is no Other of the Other. That means - as Lacan himself translates it - that no signifying chain can give proof of its own guarantee. There is no other way to make oneself a

15

guarantee except by continuing, and to verify that that holds together.

It is because there is no Other of the Other that the series is the only guarantee of the serious.

This course gravitates around the analytic practice structured by the work of Freud and by the teaching of Lacan. One cannot have time by not referring to it. Rather, it must be taken as a base. And one must teach oneself to start from there.

I consider that I have given an initial proof of that last February, at the international *Rencontre* which took place in Paris, by trying to construct - in the line of Lacan's teaching, but also starting with what I can deduce from practice - what responds to having traversed the fantasy at the end of analysis as coming from the beginning of the analysis.²⁰ Of course, I took what responds to the beginning in the analysis in the sense of exercising psychoanalysis. For me, that was called an orientation.

I considered at this date that what responds to the traversal of the fantasy, can be found at the beginning of an analysis in the form of the precipitation of the symptom. It is certainly necessary that I note - which I have done - that I am in the mode of framing the analytic experience on the basis of the binary: symptom and fantasy.

Thus, I stressed a certain evidence: Lacan approaches the end of analysis on the basis of the fantasy. That means a very precise thing: he does not approach it by starting with the symptom.

We can repeat "crossing over the fantasy" like a frolicking baby goat. We will never extract anything from it if we do not give a value to the term symptom beside it, that is to say, the term which is not said.

Nor is it said that it would be a question of lifting, of curing, the fantasy. On the other hand, it seemed possible to me, thinkable, to describe - starting with an experience which is not very extended, but sufficient - , the way in which the symptom rushes to hook itself up to the subject-supposed-to-know upon his or her entry into analysis.

The symptom *rushes head long* in the two senses of the term: namely, its haste and also its crystallization, which mark its manifestation on the analytic apparatus.

16

It is at that point that it becomes a question of pursuing a course for me. That is why I announced as the title of the course for this year: *From the symptom to the fantasy, and return.*

II

From the symptom to the fantasy. It is thus that one can qualify the orientation of a treatment. That seems to me, as well, to mark the displacement of an accent in the teaching of Lacan.

I announced last year²¹ that I was going to speak about *jouissance* this year. Very well, that is what the question is because symptom and fantasy are two modes of *jouissance* of the subject.

These two modes of *jouissance* have this difference, even opposition. One is *jouissance* under the genre of displeasure, while the other is *jouissance* - which is not less paradoxical - under the genre of pleasure.

That can be seen in the way analysts, without even reflecting on it very much, repeat themselves in their experience. They willingly talked about the suffering of the symptom, the embarrassment the symptom brings to the subject as an individual, in his behavior, in the realization of his goals, his ideals. Analysts do not talk about the suffering of the fantasy. This remark is all the more costly in that they do not talk about it precisely when it is a question of a masochistic fantasy, completely essential in the register of fantasy, a fantasy which holds a place entirely apart. That is the object of Freud's reflection in the paradigm he left us on the fantasy, his text of "A Child is Being Beaten."

Those who want to take this course through its thirty presentations could spend a bit of time rereading *A Child is Being Beaten*. Basically, what is at stake in the masochistic fantasy, if not to explain to us the way in which a subject can create satisfaction out of grief? This definition is completely plebeian. We can liven it up a little bit by opposing the pleasure of the fantasy to the suffering of the symptom.

I am taking trouble with this binary, symptom and fantasy, because I think it has been neglected - although we have clear guideposts to accentuate it. I believe it also composes a

17

part of this perspective of the other Lacan I am trying to construct. It is a binary which serves in practice - I say that from experience - as a point of reference, in any case, with which I guide myself. That leads us to rectify the orientation we can give to our clinic.

Someone sent me an article - that had appeared in a history of psychoanalysis that you can presently find in the bookstores²² - his contribution on psychoanalysis in France, from the difficult beginnings of this practice in our country, up to the most recent events. The latest events are summed up in one page, the last one ... because there are too many things - it is true that things have gotten a little out-of-hand in recent times. This person, whom I do not know - who, I believe, is, rather, a member of these associations we generally treat with a certain

distance, for completely well founded reasons - terminates this panorama, to my great surprise, by these words: *Launching of the word of clinical order by Jacques-Alain Miller*. This fashion of expressing himself is ill-intentioned. He lets it be understood that the School of the Freudian Cause has been completely corporalized. To all those who know this institution, its statutes and its manner of doing things, this is completely abusive. But what is true is that the theoretical and practical disorientation of the Freudian School of Paris had not stopped accentuating itself before the dissolution of this School - as far as I understand. This cleaning up of the mess called for a return to the common sense of the clinic. From this return, one saw diverse, collective manifestations on the part of Lacan's students. That does not go without negative effects: it risks rebounding on the clinical tableau, that is, on what someone before me called *psychobiography*.²³

There is a legitimate mode of this psychobiography, what Lacan brings us with his *Kant with Sade*.²⁴ Based on the Sadean fantasy - to be distinguished from the sadistic fantasy, Lacan speaks of Sade's fantasy - Lacan presents to us, in perspective, in structure, the life of Sade. What motivates the two schemas which figure in this *écrit* of Lacan's is the way in which, on the one hand, Sade's fantasy, as it is invested in this work, responds to his life insofar as it responds, at approximately a quarter of a turn, to this fantasy.

18

It helps to remember - in order to put a limit on these excesses which, in my opinion, is not yet produced - that the analyst is present in the picture he paints. Which leads to this, that I will express in a very economical fashion by the following terms: No clinic without an ethic in psychoanalysis.

The consideration of the fantasy leads us to the ethic in psychoanalysis. It is one of the reasons which motivates the coupling of Kant with Sade - Kant about whom you know the function of the cut in the history of moral philosophy.

It is understood very well that the fantasy, differently from the symptom, leads to an ethical problematic. The symptom leads completely naturally to a therapeutic problem: how to cure. It is what one aims at as a lifting of the symptom, what one hopes for in the analytic interpretation, and then in starting over and over the work on the task, the working through (*Durcharbeitung*) that one translates in French by *translaboration*.

Lacan speaks of *crossing over the fantasy*, and not of the *lifting of the fantasy*. It is not at all a question of its disappearance. It is a question of obtaining a glimpse of what there is behind. What is amusing is that there is nothing behind the fantasy.

Very well, the end of analysis consists of going to the point of making a small turn on the side of *chez* Nothing. At that point, it appears very quickly that nothing forces you to go there, except this function - that it is necessary to restore to its place - of the desire of the analyst. There, the definite article is deceptive: it is not a question of the desire of any analyst; it is a question of the desire of the analyst in function, of the analyst as function.

This year we will try to discern the reasons for which Lacan introduced this term. He introduced it to erase the consideration within which our international colleagues are enclosed on the counter-transference. One must see that the analyst can perfectly well remain at the level of therapeutic de-sire - which has its letters of noblesse - that one need not carry to *furor sanendi*, a desire on which we focused a long time ago, the desire of the doctor.

Does the desire of the doctor have its own consistency? I would be going too far to say that, in the same way Freud

said that obsession is a dialect of hysteria, the desire of the doctor is a dialect of the desire of the master - which has been true, at least since Harvey discovered the circulation of blood - the desire that it circulate. There is not only the detective who desires that something circulate; there is also the doctor, since a very precise date. Now the desire that things function and keep going in a certain way, is a desire which is completely contrary to the fantasy; it is connected to a discourse which can only maintain itself by breaking the fantasy. We will arrive there eventually. It is exactly in this way that Lacan writes the discourse of the master: a discourse whose base structure is given by the impossibility of fantasy.

The symptom, on the other hand, is perfectly compatible with the discourse of the master, at least in this, that, as a formation of the unconscious, it arises from the discourse of the master. That is why the discourse of the master can operate on the symptom. One notes - that even creates a difficulty in analytic experience - that suggestion can operate on the symptom, not for a long time, but it is not without power thereupon. Until the present, it has been much more difficult to propose that suggestion can have an effect on the fantasy.

The front door in the analytic discourse - if you take it in Lacan's teaching - is modeled precisely on the schema of the discourse of the master, while its exit responds to the structure of the fantasy in function in the discourse of the analyst. That is why, there is a beyond the clinic. I repeat: no clinic without ethics.

That says, first, that there is no psychoanalytic clinic without the implication of an analyst, implication of his wish, of his desire. This famous what do you want? - that Lacan borrows from the *Diable Amoureux* by Cazotte,²⁵ and in the Italian language, which creates a bit of a matheme, thanks to its translinguistic movement - this *che vuoi?* has value for the analyst himself. What do you want to obtain? Subjects who are tidy, subjects who arrange themselves neatly in rows? This is what one called at that time in psychoanalysis - *reparation* - actually, on the Kleinian side - repair, as one also says for cars.

There is a choice, the choice of the response to give to this what do you want? for the analyst, which produces consequences,

I would say immediate ones, on the patient. It is there that the slogan of the responsibility of the analyst is not a vain slogan. There is a whole register of this practice which is of the order of assurance, reassurance, since entry into analysis can manifest itself, on occasion, in the style of panic, putting anxiety in the forefront, for example - for reasons that are completely mappable and structural. The analyst is then put in the position of reassuring, tempering, what has been found there in a moment of rupture, and also finds himself led to bring the subject to the rule of analytic discourse, which, of course, is not the discourse of the master. Finally, any discourse includes something from the master, and, in particular, the obligation of putting oneself inside it.

Very well, to put oneself within the discourse is a discipline. One certainly sees the difficulties which that gives our colleagues in the International, who remain fixed to a completely narrow idea of this analytic discourse. That leads them to speak of *borderlines*. There are no *borderlines* in the clinic. They are the *borderlines* of their own conception of the analytic discourse. These are subjects who enter only with difficulty into the analytic discourse, for

example, in the regularity which the exercise of analysis implies, the regularity of its payment, who only enter with difficulty into the good manners that one asks of the patient when he presents himself, usually in a private apartment, for something which, if one does not place it completely on the side of fortune tellers, resembles the liberal profession.

The *borderlines* are the *borderlines* of discourse. Very often, one can recognize them in their description, these Internationalists, of the decided hysterics. There, the rule of the analytic discourse can take on the allure of the discourse of the master and put the hysteric to work.

Let us suppose that we arrive exactly at this point, since we almost get there. One could take that for the end of an analysis. This training for psychoanalysis can make it look, to the taste of our Internationalists, like an end of analysis, a normalization of the subject, for the little bit that they begin, more or less, to work, even if it is precarious, of course. For the small amount of time that this *borderline* holds out, one can believe one has succeeded in *therapizing* him sufficiently.

21

This point of view, according to which the analysis begins once the normalization to the analytic discourse has succeeded, is very difficult to sustain. Who besides the psychoanalyst can sustain it?

That means that analysis begins beyond the well-being that you have been able to make your patient acquire - well being that I have said to be precarious.

This analysis beyond the well-being supposes that the analyst is himself in discord with common ideas, with received values, which do not impose any beyond in the well-being of the patient. Which gives the analyst, in his practice itself, this allure of being asocial. The analytic practice seems to be a break in the drum roll of being with common values. As Lacan says, it is there that analysts seem unbreakable within the social link.

What is Lacan's wager? To define a new social link from this asociality itself, in reference to the common ideals. This wager is completely extraordinary: to ask analysts to exist outside the admitted social bonds, rather than to excuse themselves for what is exorbitant in their practice.

There is another solution, that of closing oneself off to this beyond of the clinic, to park at the level, properly speaking, of the clinical and therapeutic.

It is for that reason that I repeat this point of view - perspective: no clinic without ethics. Look at what the welcome of the demand for analysis includes. It is an *innocent* person who asks for an analysis, as Lacan said. He is innocent, although guilty, of course, guilty in essence. He is not guilty of an original guilt or sin, but profoundly, because he does not know what he is engaging himself in, or would engage, if the process went to its conclusion - if he comes, for example, to develop his personality. Often, in order to develop their personalities, individuals go to one of these little businesses that now specialize in this kind of proposition. Finally, to come for an analysis in the hope of dissolving a symptom is a sophisticated equivalent of the development of personality. There, the end of analysis as the destitution of the subject can come as a bad surprise, although curiously the destitution of the subject can accompany itself with a completely

extraordinary development of the personality. Analysis produces analytic associations where personalities are extremely developed.

It is not a question of only accepting, in analysis, those who can go to the final term. In any case, it is impossible to prejudge it at all. This acceptance can only be done on the basis of the demand for analysis having been decided - as Lacan says - in the so-called demand for a training analysis, which, most often, has the value of a passport for the institution, or for the group. That is to say how difficult it is to maintain oneself at this level of ethical requirement, and that the clinic can be the passport for what one must call *cowardice*.

The recall of these terms - ethics, exigency - risk pushing one into the position of the superego, a position one must not abuse. The superego - Franz Alexander had already situated it like that - is an organizing function of the symptom.²⁶ Those who attended the clinical section last year can approach, can grasp, this point.²⁷ The superego is not the less present in the fantasy. It is precisely this presence of the superego in the fantasy that Lacan's confrontation of Kant with Sade highlights.

What is the superego? What forms the superego, this agency which disturbs the well-being of the subject?

In Lacan's terms, this agency formulates: Enjoy. Lacan deciphers his imperative thus: The superego is a wish to enjoy. You can collect it under this expression in Lacan's text on Kant with Sade.²⁸

You find this desire for *jouissance* distributed on one side in the symptom, about which everybody now knows that it satisfies something in the subject - the subject would not be riveted to this symptom if it were not a mode of *jouissance* for him - but this *jouissance* is not any the less present in the fantasy, under another mode.

To speak of the *jouissance* of the symptom is a paradox since it presents itself under the genre of displeasure. We are now tied to this paradox, thanks to Lacan's injection in our conceptualization, of the term of *jouissance* as distinct from pleasure. These are the points of contact between *jouissance* and sorrow.

Definitively, the paradox is much greater from the other side, from the side of the fantasy where *jouissance* is accommodated to pleasure. Since the fantasy makes pleasure out of *jouissance* - which is profoundly sorrowful, in relation to the subject's subjectivity - the signifying apparatus of the fantasy is a very complex montage. Freud approached it from the angle of masochism, which recounts how one can make pleasure out of grief.

No clinic without ethics. That is valid for the analytic group.

Today, the International of Psychoanalysis - perhaps less in France than before, still, that is not certain - dreams of transposing Lacan's clinic into its international milieu. Now that Lacan in person is no longer there to provide an obstacle, they could not ask for better than to refurbish the old toys, while feasting on them a bit, thanks to Lacan and all the seals of painting he left us. We must maintain that this is futile since one cannot transpose Lacan's clinic into a group without ethics.

The IPA, the International Psychoanalytic Association, with its different branches in different countries, also ours in France, is without ethics. This group has, on the contrary, been formed especially for closing its eyes to the consequences of the analytic group, to close its eyes to Beyond the Pleasure Principle. For this reason, this group has never succeeded in giving its

place, either to the death drive, or to primordial masochism. It blinds us with its promotion of the ego and the id, to dissimulate what it amputates to the left and right of this work: Beyond the Pleasure Principle, the texts on fantasy and masochism. This group has formed itself to protect against the ethics of psychoanalysis. Lacan designates it as the SAMCDA, a society of mutual assistance against the analytic discourse,²⁹ a witticism to which one must give its most precise weight: to amputate the analytic clinic of its ethics.

For the Lacanian group - if I dare use this expression - the question is still open, and not closed. We do not know what the Lacanian group is, even if we know what the disorderly crowding around Lacan has been. For the moment, we do not have the least idea of what would be, could be, the Lacanian group. We make some attempt to know that in France, and

24

it is, of course, a question which is posed in different countries in the world. In any case, let us not think that the word of community is anything other than ironic. You doubtlessly know this science-fiction novel³⁰ - there is no community of the A, of Analysts, nor of the small a, whose semblance they must constitute. There is only a community of the non-A.

III

Let us approach this theme of the fantasy and the symptom a bit more closely.

I had to speak about it for twenty minutes this weekend,³¹ before another group. I have contented myself with introducing the differences of the symptom and the fantasy by saying that the subject complains about one, and that the subject pleases himself with the other. I based it on what the point of departure is, the phenomenological evidence of experience, and that analysts take up without first going further, and which is also present in Freud, from the *Studies on Hysteria* on,³² but also in the *Interpretation of Dreams*, where the community of the structure of the dream and of the fantasy, for him, lies in this: that both are the accomplishment of a desire. That said, Freud believes he can distinguish the fantasy from the dream, by marking the prevalent role that the secondary elaboration makes there. To start, he puts the accent on the narrative consistency of the fantasy. He understands, by that, a production of images, more precisely of imaged stories, that Lacan baptized scenario - a scenario at the disposition of the subject to which the subject can have recourse, and which implies a satisfaction there, completely naturally. At this point, Lacan was able to say - one must see the context - *that one only comes from his or her fantasies*.

It is not that one can say: I fantasize, therefore I am. One cannot reduce psychoanalytic thought to the *I fantasize*, since the question is, indeed, that of what the I in the fantasy is. This question is put on the first rung by the paradigm that Freud proposes to us of the fantasy, this impersonal sentence: a child is being *beaten*. In a general sense, the fantasy translates a putting aside of the subject, and a position of spectator, even if his or her identity and imaginary form can figure in the fantasmatic scenario.

25

The fantasy consoles the subject for his symptom. Even if it is not the most fundamental aspect of the fantasy, Freud always maintained the continuity between this conscious

fantasmagoria and the fantasy as unconscious; he kept the same term. Lacan's teaching has gone completely in the sense of accentuating this continuity of the fantasy as a day reverie at the disposition of the subject, to the point of the fantasy as unconscious. You have a very simple outline of it in the *Vocabulary* of Laplanche and Pontalis in the chapter *Fantasme*.³³

It is an exploitation of Lacan's teaching on the question which can give some useful guides, but, at the same time, the concomitant intention of finishing with Lacan - which was their intention at the moment they compiled this work - warps it and stops in its conclusions. They did not give a damn about making a series, these two clever fellows.

The reverie - if one takes things by the fantasmatic reverie - immediately highlights the two registers of fantasy. First, an imaginary function; would this not be because the fantasy apparently includes some forms, some characters, a scene? It is like a little novel, and even rather classic, truly not completely contemporary. Thus, there is an imaginary aspect which poses the question of the relation between this imaginary and what one classically called the imagination. It is very striking. One must wonder exactly what made these specialists of philosophical introspection glide over, pass to the side of, a function which appears so attached to the human being that one could call it, not simply *rational animal*, but also *fantasizing animal*.

Beside this imaginary dimension - which will appear in the foreground - there is a symbolic dimension of the fantasy because there are some replies, perhaps. In any case, there is an articulation of the history of fantasy. One can even posit, if one follows Freud in his paradigm, that one phrase is the support of it, the resume, or even that the fantasy is a sentence, the sentence: *a child is being beaten*.

These two aspects of the fantasy are the ones that Lacan presented first. He departed from the fact that Freud says that the fantasy is an accomplishment of desire. He tried to thematize the special relation of desire with the imaginary of the fantasy. It appeared to him that it was always, in the fantasy,

a question of the body - the body as an envelope, as form, the body as it is presented in the little Lacanian scenario of the mirror stage.³⁴ The body as a total form appears as the envelope of everything which is given to us in order to have access to desire, the epitome of desire.

You know that people have not stopped reflecting on the beautiful form of the body. It is, moreover, perceptible, given that this beautiful form is historical; the canons of beauty have varied through history. Of course, we have no witness, when one is before certain African sculptures, which present these visibly feminine characters to us with their enormous bellies, to say that it was that, for them, which fomented these objects. We are tempted to suspect that that was beauty for them. Evidently, we already perceive adequately, in our era of civilization, and for a certain historical period, what the historicity is of these canons of beautiful form. We are not standing before completely raw images; standing in front of these images, we are already put into a signifying function, which varies according to the signifying context.

This *a* which figures in the formula of Lacan's fantasy was, first, for him, the index of this body of the Other, which always comes into the fantasy, and even in an evident manner. You know that afterwards, he continued putting the body into function in the fantasy, but more the beautiful form of the body. It is something which is not self-evident.

Where is that found in "A Child is Being Beaten"? One sees well that one can put the small *a* as the body of the Other into function, which is even directly concerned by this pan

banging. It seemed to him that he has to put into function in the fantasy, not the beautiful form of the body, but the detached pieces of the body, which are the *a* objects. This is, clearly, not something one acquires on the first plane - it is one of our objects this year, to refind that, to test it by the Freudian paradigm of the text "A Child is Being Beaten".

I have given you a few considerations right from the start on the imaginary and on the symbolic of the fantasy.

The third dimension, that everyone awaits, thanks to Lacan's logic, is the real function of the fantasy. That came a little late, but was present from the start, if one notes it, if one

27

admits what one states - which is precisely a problem - that the fantasy does not modify itself like the symptom does. That too will be a focus of our interrogation this year: what is the relationship of interpretation and of the fantasy?

I could summarize the whole point of departure of this course in this sentence of Freud's, which is at the end of the second part of "A Child is Being Beaten." *The analyst, says Freud, is obliged to recognize that, in large part, these fantasies remain apart from the rest of a neurotic content and do not find any place, to tell the truth, in its structure; but, he adds, some impressions of this kind, as my own experience has taught me, one leaves too willingly aside.*³⁵ Put another way, Freud, already in that passage, justifies this partition that we can make in what he calls the neurosis; that the fantasy - let us take only that - is separate. We will concentrate on that this year; we will take it up again based on Lacan's teaching and on what experience can teach us as well - since this teaching passes into experience - which means that the fantasy is separate. Without this consideration, one is dedicated to a clinic without ethics.

What is also difficult, is that, on the one hand, that touches on the most immediate phenomenology of the case, but also, without this aim, one can very well not see it. The fantasy - that's the problem - the subject will not confide it to you willingly. He will not willingly put you on its track. We will not return to it with the complicity he can attach to his symptom. There is something like an avoidance of the fantasy, which, if the analyst is an accomplice to it - simply because he is not oriented in this research - can produce, not at all a stagnation - the blinding of the fantasy is compatible with a dynamics of the symptom - but at a given moment, constitutes an impasse. Freud signals this impasse: it keeps itself separate, a special case, and creates an obstacle.

In this path, what Lacan calls the pass, is played out. How does one make of the impasse of the fantasy the pass which decides the end of analysis?

This trait of obstacle that I stress is also what Lacan takes up when he accentuates, to the detriment of the imaginary aspect of the fantasy, its symbolic aspect; notably, that the fantasy is a sentence, that there is a fantasmatic sentence. This

28

is limpid, crystal clear, as soon as one reads "A Child is Being Beaten," where the sentence is approached on the basis of grammatical transformations: *I, a man, love him.*³⁶ Beginning with these examples, Lacan's proposition *the unconscious is structured like a language* appears justified, based on an immediate reading of Freud's texts.

It is the grammar of the fantasy which would be there in the foreground. There is a Freudian grammar of fantasy. It is striking that Lacan consecrated the expression *the logic of fantasy*,³⁷ and not the grammar.

The logic is a different face of the symbolic dimension, from the grammar. It is very surprising, if one thinks about it, because we have learned from Lacan, essentially, a logic of the signifier. I have accentuated this term when I was a student, from what I was reading then of Lacan's teaching: The logic of the signifier, which is before all else, a logic of the symptom.³⁸

What would the logical function of the fantasy be, in reference to its place in the grammar? That seems, precisely, to accentuate the symbolic dimension of the fantasy, certainly to the detriment of the imaginary, but even to the detriment of its dimension in the real. Its dimension of the real is scandalous, if one does not resituate that within Lacan's concept, since people usually think that the fantasy is equivalent to *illusory*. Of course, there is a paradox: the fantasy is fundamentally real.

We must see in what sense we are going to be able to say it. I am not going to give a definitive response to this question of the logical function of the fantasy. But, anyway, I shall recall what the point of Lacan's Seminar on this theme is, a point which has not been developed. His point is to say: the fantasy is an axiom. We are going to spend a little bit of time working with this proposition.

I could ask: what, indeed, does this proposition of Lacan's mean; that the fantasy is an axiom? This proposition has not flourished for a very understandable reason: everyone was sensitive to the fact that Lacan wanted, in regards to the fantasy, to stress something other than its symbolic dimension.

That can be seen, if only in the way Lacan wrote the formula for the fantasy: ($\$ < > a$) - the barred subject, a losange, and the *a*, all between parentheses. He proposed the

formula in italics to accentuate - that was his typography at one time - that these are terms inscribed in the imaginary register. We will enter into this formula.

One can feel from the start that this is not a formula where the subject is situated in reference to the signifier. Although Lacan has done the work to show that the fantasy is a sentence, he gave a writing of the fantasy which is not at all its writing as a sentence: *A child is being beaten*. One sees, rather, that it can be written with S1-S2. It even becomes problematic where the place of the subject as such is. It is, thus, completely surprising to maintain that the fantasy is a sentence and at the same time to write it in another fashion than like a sentence, as a rapport of the subject and the object.

Therein lies the paradox of this proposition: *the fantasy is an axiom*. If we had not taken up this sentence again - except, perhaps, as an exception that I do not know, although this is a rather striking formula, if it had remained a little to the side, it is because Lacan promoted, put forward, this sentence at the moment when he put the accent on what one could find of the real in the fantasy, and not on what he could find there of the symbolic. Finally, his auditors ended up embarrassed by this proposition *as a fish would be by an apple* - to return to an expression one finds frequently in Lacan.

I can situate this formula of the axiom for fantasy rather rapidly in order to take it as a point of departure. This formula puts the accent on the function of the real of the fantasy, if one

perceives that it designates, underlines, the beyond-sense of the fantasy. That can be seen from the side of interpretation.

From the point of view of interpretation, psychoanalysis feels - along with the reticence Freud signals - that the fantasy resists being inserted into the discourse of the unconscious, precisely in the discourse of the master, as its formula shows.

To say that it is an axiom is, indeed, to say that it resists the operation, the interpretative mutation, which supposes that one can add a signifier which makes sense. One does not add a signifier to an axiom. One must take the axiom literally, but by the logical letter, which is very different from the desire to take it *by the letter* - a formula of Lacan's which has been misused.

30

By *one must take desire literally*, Lacan meant that one must interpret the symptom on the basis of metaphor and metonymy.³⁹ Here, taking the fantasy literally means that one must take it as such. One must not dream of adding anything whatsoever. It is an axiom.

Since, actually, I still have twenty-nine class meetings ahead of me, can I say to myself that I could give at least one to this Stoic logic? It is already what they are looking for in the Stoic approach, Diogenes, for example.⁴⁰ In the axiom, there is a certain "place there," a *Dasein* of the language.

When Lacan says the *axiom*, it is not Diogenes he is thinking about primarily, but the axiomatic theory which started to be elaborated, looked for, beginning with the middle of the nineteenth century, and which culminates in the axiomatizations of the theory of ensembles - diverse axiomatizations, since you know that, even if some are principles, they are not exclusive.

An axiom is an absolute position in the symbolic. *Absolute* also means, in the context, detached. At that point we are on the path of Lacanian creationism, of which you have the echo in the Seminar *The Psychoses*.⁴¹ It is not simply that structuralism does not want to know anything about the origin of language; it takes language as structure from the beginning. Rather, the signifier is an absolute beginning, in pairs, and no theory of evolutionism permits us to engender what the absolute position of the signifying difference is.

It is at the point where the fantasy, taken as a sentence, as a signifying difference, as real, inscribes itself par excellence, that it finds its place. The fantasy is the signifying difference as real. That makes a new signification enter the world, which is, as such, an absolute beginning, before which there is nothing.

This is not the viewpoint one has of the symptom, of the dream, and all the formations of the unconscious, which is that one can always get or understand them backwards. As Freud says, that produces its own ramifications; it is a forest which makes one think there is no end of analysis.

To say *the fantasy is an axiom* is to say that there is no umbilical cord of the fantasy. This writing is obviously,

31

completely capital, princeps, as Lacan says, on page 816 of the *Écrits*.⁴² I will, of course, refer to a certain precise passage of the *Écrits*, as I did last year, where Lacan takes this acronym of the fantasy as exemplary of all his mathematical, algebraic writing. He posits, at the same time, that these are not *elements of a metalanguage, but index of an absolute meaning. Index of an absolute*

signification, he adds, *a notion which, without other commentary, will seem, we hope, appropriate to the condition of the fantasy*. In other words, even if he can present all the writings as the index of an absolute meaning, that seemed to him especially appropriate for the fantasy.

We only have to think about Freud's axiom: A child is being beaten. It is an absolute meaning because it is detached, and takes its value as a beginning of the world. At the point that this same fantasy can be found present in the neuroses of different structures, Freud advances it right away in his paradigmatic text, since he borrows examples from hysteria as well as obsessional neurosis.

Freud tells us nothing about that in his text "A Child is Being Beaten." Besides, one must not hypnotize oneself on the difference between fantasies in the plural and the fundamental fantasy. The question bears, rather, on the decantation of these fantasies, these dreams, right up to the traversal of the fundamental fantasy. The decantation, that means until the fantas-matic axiom surges forth in ever greater purity.

The question of the fantasy is crucial for the practice of the analyst, because a signification of truth is not interpretable. On the contrary, one interprets with it. The fantasy as axiom is an instrument of interpretation. The notion of instrument, with-out any other commentary, will seem - we hope - appropriate to the condition of the fantasy.

We will have to return to the fantasy, taken as an instrument of interpretation. But we can do that already, if only by approaching Freud's text, by being sensitive to what the fantasy includes of generalities in reference to what the montage of a symptom always retains of the particular. That is why knowledge of the fantasy in its generality does not dispense with the particular analysis of the symptom.

32

That means what? This point is difficult. This outside-sense of the fantasy makes sense in a manner which is particular each time. It will be a question of not being content with these formulas. I do not bring that to you as a response, but as a problem. How does this beyond-sense of the fantasy make sense in the symptom in a way that is particular each time?

I sent you back to the Freudian paradigm. There is, of course, in parallel, the Lacanian paradigm, *Kant with Sade*. We can expect something from these two texts, and from their parallel.

It is first perceptible that Freud approaches the question of the fantasy by masochism. The fantasy a child is being beaten, in the reconstruction that Freud gives of it, includes as a fundamental time, an *I am being beaten by the father*, while Lacan approaches it from Sade, and not by sadism. In one case, as in the other, it is a matter of the beyond in the principle of pleasure. Lacan puts this inquiry on the beyond in the pleasure principle back on its feet by the concept of *jouissance*.

We have the decantation of the Sadean fantasy under the genre of a schema. Of course, Sade's work, according to Lacan's expression, presents us the forest of the fantasy. For whatever concerns the multiplicity of the fantasy, Sade places himself a bit there. It is a work that is truly respectable as to quantity. It does not prohibit Lacan from giving us its decantation in the form of a schema with four terms.⁴³ This schema, as I have stressed, finds itself redoubled, in the measure that he passes a quarter of a turn in his life - because, Lacan says, *Sade was not duped by his fantasy*.⁴⁴ The term dupe carries all its weight with Lacan - he did one of his Seminars on *Les non-dupes errent*.⁴⁵ To say that Sade was a bit duped by his fantasy leads us to wonder what

being duped by his fantasy means, and what rapport that would have with the traversal of the fantasy. *Sade was not duped by his fantasy*, says Lacan, *in the measure that the rigor of his thought passes into the logic of his life.*

That is what will concern us: what gives supports, when there is one, to the logic of a life. It is, perhaps, an occasion for being able to make a clinic without making a psychobiography. Next week, I will take up how the fantasy attaches itself to the Other again.

33

The fact, signaled by Freud, that the fantasy is separate from the rest of the content of the neurosis is translated by us as: the fantasy does not have the same rapport with the Other as the symptom; it does not arise from the Other of the signifier as the symptom does. At that point, its function of axiom holds all its weight. Even if it is inserted into the signifier, this fantasy is in a completely different position there: it is borderline in reference to the Other. The fantasy arises, not from the big Other, from the Other of the signifier as complete, but from the Other as barred, from the lack in the Other.

That will be my point of departure next week in this initial clarification of the question.

November 3, 1982

Endnotes

¹Teaching given at the Department of Psychoanalysis of Paris VIII, *L'orientation lacanienne*.

²Seminar of the IIIe cycle, Department of Psychoanalysis of Paris VIII.

³Cf. *Delenda*, internal Bulletin which takes account of the work that accompanied the dissolution of the Freudian School of Paris.

⁴The experimental University of Vincennes, the only one in France to teach psychoanalysis in a specific department, whose Director was Jacques Lacan.

⁵Cf. "Lettre de dissolution" of Jacques Lacan, January 5, 1980, *Documents statutaires de l'École de la Cause freudienne*.

⁶September 9, 1981.

⁷Miller, J.-A. *L'orientation lacanienne II, I, "Scansion dans l'enseignement de Jacques Lacan"* (1981-] 982) (unedited), teaching given at the Department of Psychoanalysis of Paris VIII.

⁸Miller, J.-A. "D'un autre Lacan" (1980), published in *Escansion Analitica*, Caracas and, under the title, "Dialectique de désir et fixité du fantasme" in *Delenda nouvelle serie* no. 1 and *Ornicar?* No. 28, Paris, Navarin, 1984, pp. 49-57.

⁹ Miller, J.-A., *L'orientation lacanienne* II. I, op. cit.

¹⁰ Lacan, J. "L'instance de la lettre dans l'inconscient ou la raison depuis Freud," *Écrits* (Paris: Seuil, 1966), pp. 493-528; "The Agency of the Letter in the Unconscious or reason since Freud." *Écrits: A Selection*, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Norton, 1977), pp. 146-178.

¹¹ "The Ego and the Id," (1923). *The Standard Edition*, vol. XIX (London: The Hogarth Press, 1961), pp. 3-66; "Das Ich and das Es," *Gesammelte Werke*, vol. XIII, pp. 235-289; "Le moi et le Ça" *Essais de psychanalyse*, Paris: Petite Bibliothèque Payot, 1981, pp. 219-275.

¹² Freud, S. *The Interpretation of Dreams* (1900), *SE*, IV- V (1953); *Die Traumdeutung* (1929), 8th edition, *GW*, II-III, 1942; "L'interprétation des rêves," Paris, PUF, 1967.

¹³ Arlow, J. A. and Brenner Ch., *Psychoanalytic Concepts and the structural theory* (New York: International Universities Press, 1964), *Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association Monograph* 3.

¹⁴ Freud, S. *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, (1920), *SE*, XVII, pp. 1-64; "Jenseits des Lustprinzips," *GW*, XIII, pp. 3-69; "Au-delà du principe de plaisir," *Essais de Psychanalyse*, op. cit., pp. 41-115.

¹⁵ Freud, S. "A Child is Being Beaten: A Contribution to the Study of Sexual Perversions" (1919), *SE*, XVII, pp. 175-204; "Ein Kind wird geschlagen," *GW*, XII; "Un enfant est battu." *Névrose, psychose et perversion*, Paris, PUF, 1973, pp. 219-243.

¹⁶ Freud, S. "The Economic Problem of Masochism," (1924), *SE*, XIX, pp. 159-170; "Das Economische Problem des Masochismus," *GW*, XIII; "Le Problème Economique du Masochisme," *Névrose, psychose et perversion*, op. cit., pp. 87-297.

¹⁷ His course is not yet published.

¹⁸ Study Days in the School of the Freudian Cause, *Les moments cruciaux dans la cure psychanalytique*, Paris, October, 1982, pp. 13-19.

¹⁹ "Classified Index of the Major Concepts," *Écrits: A Selection*. Trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Norton, 1977), pp. 326-335; "Index raisonné des concepts majeurs" (1966), *Écrits*, op. cit., pp. 893-902.

²⁰ Miller, J.A., "C.S.T" (1982) *Ornicar?*, no. 29, Paris, Navarin, 1984, pp. 142-147.

²¹ Miller, J.A. "Scansions dans l'enseignement de Jacques Lacan," op. cit.

²² *Histoire de la psychanalyse en France*, under the direction of Roland Jaccard, Paris, Hachette, 1982.

²³ Term used by Jean Delay, *La jeunesse d'André Gide*, Paris, Gallimard, 1956.

²⁴ Lacan, J., "Kant avec Sade," *Écrits*, op. cit., pp. 756-790.

²⁵ Cazotte J., *Le Diable Amoureux* (1772), Paris, Garnier-Flammarion, 1979.

²⁶ Year consecrated to the study of the superego.

²⁷ Lacan, J. "Kant avec Sade," op. cit., p. 773.

²⁸ Lacan, J. *Television: A Challenge to the Psychoanalytic Establishment*, ed. Joan Copjec. Trans. Dennis Hollier, Rosalind Kraus, and Annette Michelson, (New York: Norton, 1990); *Télévision* (1973), Paris, Seuil, 1973, p. 27.

²⁹ Miller, J.-A., "Symptôme-Fantasy," *Dix-sept exposés sur les moments cruciaux dans la cure psychanalytique*, Actes de L'Ecole de la Cause Freudienne, Paris, Pub. of the ECF, 1983.

³⁰ Freud S. & Breuer J., *Studies on Hysteria* (1893-1895), SE, II; *Studien über Hysterie*, GW; *Études sur L'hystérie*, Paris, PUF, 1957.

³¹ Laplanche and Pontalis J.-B., *Vocabulaire de psychanalyse*, under the direction of Daniel Lagache, Paris, PUF, 1967, pp. 152-157.

³² Lacan, J. "The mirror stage as formative of the function of the I," *Écrits: A Selection*, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Norton, 1977), pp. 1-7; "Le stade du miroir comme formateur de la fonction du JE telle qu'elle nous est révélée dans l'expérience psychanalytique," *Écrits*, op. cit., pp. 93-100.

³³ Freud, S. "Un enfant est battu," op. cit., p. 221.

³⁴ Freud, S. *Psychoanalytische Bemerkungen über einen autobiographisch beschriebenen Fall von Paranoïa (Dementia Paranoïdes)*, GW, VIII; *Remarques psychanalytiques sur l'autobiographie d'un cas de paranoïa (dementia paranoïdes)*, *Cinq psychanalyses*, Paris, PUF 1954, pp. 308-310.

³⁵ Lacan, J., *Le Séminaire, Livre XV, "La logique du fantasme,"* (1966-1967), unedited.

³⁶ Miller, J.-A., "Suture," Screen; "La suture (Elements de la logique du signifiant)" (expose, February 24, 1965, in the Seminar of Jacques Lacan), *Cahiers pour l'analyse*, no. 1/2, Paris, Le Graphe, 1966, pp. 37-49.

³⁷ Lacan J., "*La direction de la cure et les principes de son pouvoir*" (1958), *Écrits*, op. cit., pp. 620-642.

³⁸ Diogène L., VIII, p. 48.

³⁹ Lacan, J., *The Seminar, Book III (1956-1957): The Psychoses*, Trans. Russell Grigg, (New York: Norton, 1993); *Le Séminaire, Livre III*, Paris, Seuil, 1981.

⁴⁰ Lacan J., "Subversion of the subject and the dialectic of desire in the Freudian unconscious," *Écrits: A Selection*, op. cit.; "Subversion du sujet et dialectique du désir dans l'inconscient freudien," *Écrits*, op. cit., p. 816.

⁴¹ Lacan, J., "*Kant avec Sade*," op. cit., p. 774.

⁴² Lacan, J. "*Kant avec Sade*," op. cit., p. 778.

⁴³ Lacan J., *Le Séminaire, Livre XXI, Les non-dupes errent*, (1973-1974), unedited.