

## Chapter II

### Fantasy and the Desire of the Other

Jacques Alain Miller  
Translated by Ellie Ragland

A writing of the fantasy:  $\emptyset$

( $S \triangleleft a$ )

The excellence of the fantasy:  
Diana and Achteon

Desire does not cause desire  
except via the object.

The hysteric as subject.

The permanence of the  
obsessional's ego.

I am going to continue today with the fantasy and the desire of the Other.

I say *the desire of the Other* in order to translate Lacan's writing of the barred O,  $\emptyset$ , in a necessarily partial way.

Each time one causes these writings to pass into current language, one, doubtlessly, adds something: That something is the meaning. Hoping to refind oneself in what it means, one removes something, at the same time, since the meaning is partial. In particular, the advantage of this writing is that it is unique, at least for two meanings: The one called the *desire of the Other*, and also that of the *split in the signifier*. There is only one writing, especially precious, then, where it is a question of what concerns us in the fantasy.

The fantasy, on the one hand, responds to what manifests itself as a split in the field of the signifier, in the signifying order

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– one can say *order* since it concerns an articulation -, and, on the other hand, responds to what in the Other's desire reveals itself from a like continuity.

These are formulae which can seem complex, and that I hope to have already justified based on clinical givens. Were it only by this: The fantasy reveals itself in the clinic of analytic experience as a stumbling block. This stumbling block is also a resistance to the signifying intervention of the analyst since it is from the side of the analyst, of the analytic interpretation, that we must approach the fantasy.

Now Freud indicated to us the character of this stumbling block to interpretation in his *A child is being beaten*, in these two sentences I read to you the last time. The form itself of this sentence, negative – *one cannot do otherwise than recognize that the fantasy is separate from the rest of the structure of the neurosis* – indicates to us that, for him, in our language, of course, the fantasy occupies the place of the real as impossible. He states it by the impossibility of reducing the fantasy to the remainder of the structure of the neurosis.

That immediately asks those who are not familiar with the phraseology we have to renounce any idea as to what the fantasy would be, first from the imagination, compared with what the well-known real would be.

On the contrary, if one defines the real by the impasses of the signifier, the fantasy merits being said to occupy the place of the real – in any case, for the analyst, since it constitutes an impasse to his interpretation, unlike the symptom.

I consider that I am there, at the level of Freud's reading, not at all beyond – certainly enlightened by what Lacan could see in this reading. You only have to comprehend the *Psychopathology of Everyday Life*,<sup>1</sup> it's funny; it's almost psychoanalysis for amusement. *The Interpretation of Dreams* is also an extremely distracting collection where the interpretation – one receives it with a joyful heart – of signifiers which have a repercussion on one another, join together, divide themselves . . . and then, all these little phonemes which magnetize themselves just so on one side, then, suddenly, displace themselves by what is precisely not a Brownian movement, but which resembles it,

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and which regroup afterwards at an other point of psychic reality. The symptom is funny; one can make people laugh with the interpretation of symptom. That is verifiable by experience. It is at the point where, among these first Freudian works, one counts with the third in the series, the *Witz*, the *Jokes and their Relationship with the Unconscious*,<sup>2</sup> that one can read as a collection of good stories. Many people use them, definitively, as a collection of Jewish stories, to amuse themselves.

It suffices to imagine this counter-test: You cannot conceive of the same thing at all for the fantasy. You cannot imagine a collection of fantasies.

On the model of *A child is being beaten*, what would that produce? Such a collection of sentences would not be distracting at all.

What does one do? One makes collections, for example, of small, true facts, as Stendhal did.<sup>3</sup> Or, one makes collections of crushed dogs, of squashed, imitated dogs – which is very complicated to do – as Félix Fénélon did<sup>4</sup> – an author that Lacan practiced -, who, in three sentences, gives us a block. A block is necessary – in which the crushed dog consists – in order that one can interpret it. A collision is sufficient.

The funniest part is that at the moment when I was thinking about that, there was a car crash under my window. One only needs two cars which hit each other – besides, that sustains a universal interest, in the street, for the passers-by -, and there you have it, we are into the good story.

Very well, one cannot imagine a collection like that of Freud's *Jokes* for the fantasy. That has never been tried. There is a monotony which belongs, properly, to the fantasy. A work like Sade's testifies to that, a work which gives us an idea of what a collection of fantasies would be. It is a collection, but the singular part is that it is a collection of the same fantasy. He

recycles that for 120 days.<sup>5</sup> You see that it has nothing distracting about it. What gave it this interest – and it is not by chance – is the fact that it was extracted from public curiosity for years, in order that it be read by amateurs, more or less under cover.

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The 120 days of the fantasy can be taken in opposition to what in Freud's *Jokes* constitutes a kind of lightning flash, and, I would say, the formation of the unconscious. I cannot even imagine what it would be to spend 120 days listening to the same *drole* story, simply by putting Marius and Olive in the place of Totor and Nanave, as Sade did.

If one wants to rank Sade in literature, that gives us two extremes which are – Lacan was interested in that, he made a little excursion on the side of Gide,<sup>6</sup> which is not an extreme in that field – *Joyce-the-symptom*<sup>7</sup> and *Sade-the-fantasy*.<sup>8</sup> One could make three by adding *Edgar Poe-the-letter*.<sup>9</sup> Edgar Poe is different from the other two. One can read him, while the other two, *Joyce-the-symptom* and *Sade-the-fantasy*, are unreadable.

Joyce, on the one hand, alleviated of the object *a* which creates a weight, delivers himself up to the pure *jouissance* of the signifier. If that *means* something, Joyce gives us an idea of it. Sade, on the contrary, is, in his literature, crushed by the object *a*; he cannot extricate himself from it. He testifies there to being swallowed up by the fantasy, out of which – effectively, it is a completely singular case – he has completely succeeded in making something which resembles a sublimation. In any case, he made a work out of it.

*The Unreadables*, that would be a collection to create. One need not only create collections of *readables*. This is to be verified, however: When one makes oneself understood – I suppose Lacan has also taken that into consideration –. The result is that one ends up being taken for an idiot. The unreadable, in this regard, protects whatever it is a question of; that is why there is a certain advantage to not reading the acronym  $\emptyset$ .

We are in a race against reading. Things are heating up. Thirty years ago, Doctor Lacan had a great advance over the surrounding milieu. Only, as we are living off this advance, at the end of thirty years, it begins to meet itself in the middle a little bit. Now, there are people who ask to attend the seminars of the third cycle, mine or others. The terrible part is that they imagine that it is a question of the secret of secrets in these seminars, since it is a little more closed than a public course. The secret is that what is done in the most closed seminars is

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exactly what is diffused in 12,000 to 13,000 copies, for example in this magazine which is called *L'Ane*.<sup>10</sup> There is strictly no difference. Evidently, the alert sign begins to be reached.

I opposed the 120 days of the fantasy to the lightning flash of the *Jokes*. From the temporal point of view, one can also consider that there is an inversion because the symptom, and more generally, the formations of the unconscious, include a structure of deferral in themselves; a complex temporal structure, then. That supposes, precisely, the crossings of series, of which the collision of the two cars gives the image, the most elementary emblem.

The symptom is a complex temporal structure, while the fantasy is a strictly punctual temporal structure, absolutely elementary. The time proper to the fantasy is the instant. Of course, that can be prepared by a little story, but, most profoundly, the heart of the fantasy is an instant – one can even say *an instant of seeing*, in order to request what the fantasy owes to the

imaginary dimension. The symptom is, rather, of the type *moment of concluding* in the temporality focused upon by Lacan. One glimpses that very well in the fantasy that has been developed by literature – because the fantasy is shared.

Of course, there is a Hieratique, a hieroglyphic character of the fantasy, but it is not stripped of suppleness. Lacan gives it the value of a supple signifying chain. It is even so supple that it can, at certain moments, be shared by people who make a profession out of writing. This period of literature which belongs to the Baroque – a completely elective period for Lacan, even more than Surrealism – testifies to it. Very well, in Baroque poetry, one sees this putting into commonness of the same fantasy and of the suppleness to which, even in its signifying rigidity, it is capable of responding.

Since I am at the point of the fantasy as an *instant of seeing*, I do not see why I should not evoke Diana and Achteon, a couple one meets in a *floppe* [classical volume] of poems, or of writings, and also of representations of the Baroque period. It is a fantasy of fascination as such, and which has, itself, a fascinating character – which it has had, in any case, and even collectively, since it has become a *topos* of this literature.

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I will be able, if I develop that later, to bring you a certain number of references and studies, but for now, I can be content with giving it to you as the emblem, the excellence of the fantasy.

Besides, *Diana and Acteon* has been revived in our epoch in a completely special way – as always with this author – by Klossowski, who is as worthy of our consideration for that work, as he is when he speaks of Sade;<sup>11</sup> and Lacan, in his *écrit* “*Kant with Sade*,” renders homage to him.<sup>12</sup>

We have a hieroglyphic [*hiératisme*] of function there, since we have the goddess and the one who surprises her in the bath.

This nude Diana is chaste, a virgin, and at the same time cruel and evil. She is a hunter who finds herself, in this story, hunted by Achteon, since he chances upon the glorious nudity of the goddess on a detour of his own hunt. He is a *veneur*, a great hunter, as the poetry of the epoch says. It is also a reference of Lacan’s, *Diana and Achteon*, when, with great exactitude, in order to qualify Achteon, he uses this word from Baroque poetry: *Actéon the veneur*,<sup>13</sup> which is more elevated in our language than *the voyeur*. Technically, it means that he violates or rapes by looking.

There, we have put a deadly figure that Lacan describes very precisely in these lines into function; *inhuman* – a word of the same type, which is in the theater of the seventeenth century, the inhuman;<sup>14</sup> For unconquered Diana, the vocabulary is especially adequate – *and unsubmitted to the choice of sex* -, which directs us towards this, of considering her as an hysteric.<sup>15</sup>

Lacan, himself,<sup>16</sup> identifies her with truth, in this text, especially the one that he makes speak in his *Chose freudienne*. Truth is Woman, as one knows. That does not repudiate the identification I propose.

The advantage of these grand *topoi* in relation to the clinical cases is that you know them when one makes allusion to them. The clinical case supposes that, from the start, one trusts the analyst who has approached the particularity of the case. Everything rests, either on the good faith one imputes to

him or her, or on the fact that one thinks one can surprise him, surprise his Diana and lose her dogs.

Here, Diana is an emblem. Let us try to situate her as a subject, since Achteon proposes himself to us, moreover, under the most evident genre – that of a piece of trash. He finishes, in the story, with this status; the one who is eaten up by Diana's dogs. It is also what happens to Athalia – Athalia of the *point de caption*.<sup>17</sup>

Diana, in this affair, is there as someone who steals away. She appears to Achteon *un-robed*, in the sense of nude. She has removed her dress, and she steals away from the character who represents to us, in a completely caricaturish fashion, the desire of the Other – the Other, about whom she understands very well that he remain Other. If there is a mythological figure who represents this refusal of the Other sex to us, it is, indeed, Diana. She is always represented as living in the middle of her nymphs and having no relationships except with animals, either to kill them, or in order to set certain ones against others. She refuses herself. In mythology she is the one who refuses herself to man. She is, par excellence, the figure who steals away from the desire of the Other.

There is a modern work which makes the companion piece to *Diana and Achteon: La mariée mise à nu par ses célibataires, même* (The Bride Undressed by her Bachelors) by Duchamp.<sup>18</sup> It is exactly Diana's problem, one knows it, among the gods, to accept falling to the rank of the bride, passing from her status of virgin to that of married woman. That has not been neglected at all by March Duchamp in this work. We shall also talk about this great *mise en scène* this year. It would be necessary to return to it.

What would happen – now that you know the story of *Diana and Achteon*, a little refreshed, Diana confronted with the desire of the Other sex – if the subject were phobic? It is not difficult to make variations on this story. If Diana were phobic – which, after all, is not impossible in the legend –, Diana's dogs, who are going to tear Achteon apart once he has sullied them with his regard, would be ahead of the letter, so to speak (*en avant-poste de*), of Achteon's arrival. They would

make a barrier to what can manifest itself and operate the desire of the Other. If the subject is phobic, as soon as the Other's desire shows itself, the dogs interpose themselves and bark at the subject.

You see that one could make the story pivot like that. That explains to you the way in which Lacan formulates, not the phobic fantasy – there is never a question of the phobic fantasy, in the proper sense, at least –, but, directly, phobic desire. This desire, Lacan says, is *an anticipated desire*.<sup>19</sup> I think I am imaging it for you there in an exact fashion. Simply imagine that our pack begins to bark as soon as one perceives the hunter Achteon in the distance. That functions like a signal, a warning that there is desire of the Other which is advancing, behind the little mountain. That warns the subject and, in another fashion, anticipates him before he is there. Thus, the subject keeps it for already said.

That would suppose, evidently, a Diana who would be afraid of dogs, exactly as Hans was afraid of horses. It is a way of protecting oneself – I will have to come back to that – from the anxiety sustained by the desire of the Other, to fabricate fear out of this anxiety. There, we

are very close to what Freud and Lacan explained to us. This Diana against whom the dogs bark, has not been represented, I believe.

One is led to make an hysteric of Diana – an hysteric with a moon face, since that is her emblem, her planet. This Diana, who lives with her nymphs asks that one respect her semblants. One sees in what way Lacan counsels us not to go looking at the underside, because she knows how to make the insolent one pay.

When she is represented nude, her phallic value is evident, but all the same, it is because the representation already veils it at the moment when she is denuded, because, essentially, the phallus, like the woman, needs a veil. And Achteon's crime! Obviously, one can say that the castration is on Achteon's side, because he gets himself devoured at the end. The *castr-achteon* is on his side, but, in fact, it is also – and that is *her* crime – on the side of the denuded Diana, in

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the measure that the veil is the condition itself of the phallic position.

The other solution is brought to us by Alphonse Allais who considers that the skin itself is a clothing. You know the famous story of the dance of the seven veils, which is done before a sultan. The dancer turns. Then the sultan says: *Remove that!* A veil falls, and it continues like that until the seventh. At the end, she appears naked. Then, the sultan says again: *Remove that!* and, since he has some brutal and obedient guards, they throw themselves on the dancer and remove her skin. They skin her and, at that moment, she dances, and . . . it is truly that.<sup>20</sup> Alphonse Allais is not unworthy of being put into a series in this affair, since that could also pass for a variation on the story of *Diana and Achteon*.

An obsessed Diana. She is that way too, because it is thus that one describes her, completely obsessed by the hunt, so much that she makes an exclusive passion out of it. It is what she barely endures as a subject, to fall to the rank of object for Achteon; she would have thrown her dogs on Achteon three kilometers before. That would give something like *The Woman with the Dogs*, a clinical case which has not been unfolded, as Freud unfolded his *Rat Man*.<sup>21</sup>

What makes the common trait of these three possible variations on *Diana and Achteon* that I give you as the excellence of the fantasy – also because it loans itself to representation –, is that Achteon has not asked for anything. It is, even, most especially, his crime. We have represented the Sadean fantasy very little, in any definitive fashion, except as some strapping fellows who wanted to do some malicious things. The Sadean fantasy contains nothing at all of this sumptuous extension of the representation of *Diana and Achteon*. Perhaps you have seen, some years ago, the exposition on the School of Fontainebleau.<sup>22</sup> You had *Diana* there, so many and more.

I have presented the question to you from Diana's side. One could present it from the side of Achteon. He is, doubtless, a piece of rubbish at the end, but he is like that from the beginning too, like a piece of trash-look – since the look as object has been isolated by Lacan.

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What is appropriate to the problematic of the fantasy too in this emblem is that we have a problematic of hunt and prey. Diana, the hunteress, metamorphosizes into prey that one traps – traps in the nets of the gaze of Achteon. At the same time, in the second metaphorosis, this

prey reveals itself as at trap, a lure. Take the convergence of it with what Lacan evokes regarding the fantasy, and about the image which clothes the object, page 818 of the *Ecrits* – *Prey seized in the nets of the shadow, and which, stolen from his volume that swells up the shadow, holds back the tired lure of the one with the air of a victim.*<sup>23</sup> I would say that the style is not at all elegant, because in one single sentence, you have the word *prey* twice and the word *shadow* twice. In the literature, there is truly one single poetic style which has speculated in this way on repetition: the Baroque style.<sup>24</sup>

## II

I give this small emblematic, like that at the beginning, to illustrate the structure of the fantasy in an imaginary fashion, that is to say, the liaison that it includes – I am following Lacan very closely – between an object and an eclipse of the subject. It is sufficient to review things, this time through Achteon's eyes: the object, the *fascinum*, and besides by this eclipse of the subject which is represented to us by the tearing to shreds of this Achteon.

To utilize this structure of the fantasy, one must begin by putting this into question: that *desire causes desire*.

First, the story of *Diana and Achteon* is the witness of the contrary. After all, if Achteon's approach witnesses his, that does not sustain the second the accord of Diana's desire at all.

The idea that desire causes desire is a false idea. One can admit that sympathy causes sympathy – It is even the hypothesis by which Lacan said he governed himself in his life: Sentiments are always reciprocal. To look further, the sentiments that a certain number of people have ended up bringing him, that gives an idea, after the fact, of the sentiment he had

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for them. For desire, it is not like that one can interpret Lacan's formula *desire is the desire of the Other*.

In hysteria, desire gives the impression of being able to directly sustain desire. It is not done in the mode of response, but that of identification. One has the feeling that it is direct because, when the hysteric's desire is sustained, one does not see the object. This pushes us to think that the only object common to the hysteric from the Other is lack. Lacan says it very precisely: For the hysteric, his identification operates starting with lack taken as an object. That means that it is an identification which operates based on dissatisfaction. There, the witty butcher's wife dream, as commented upon by Lacan,<sup>25</sup> is exemplary, since one sees very well that the object – you know! the salmon, the caviar, etc. – is indifferent. It is not in order to create a society of ladies who would like caviar. One could play bridge, obviously. Finally, bridge poses another question, because it is not, properly speaking, an object. It is certainly a mode of rapport to the Other of the signifier. There, this conjunction of desires operates. Finally, one only sees fire there, because the object in question is the lack itself, dissatisfaction itself.

Things work to the contrary in perversion. Effectively, the object places itself there. It is thus that perverse societies are formed, from the male side, anyway, since, on the woman's side, that depends on the vanishing of the object as well.

One cannot interpret *the desire is the desire of the Other as it is desire which causes desire*. Desire does not cause desire except via the object – in any case, it is a formula that I am

trying out. That can be seen by this, that the first effect of desire is not desire, but anxiety – according to what Lacan indicates to us from his experience as an analyst, which is an invitation to try to orient it, or to deny it. Until the present time, we have not tried very much to believe it, and I will not be the one to begin.

There we have the principle of a necessary mediation, that is to say, that introduces the problematic of what comes to swab this anxiety.

We will not talk about the anxiety of Diana, apparently, at this Baroque epoch – I am going to go through this literature more closely. Were there anguished gods as well? This question

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comes to me. Desire causes anxiety – one must add the *for the neurotic*. The gods were not neurotics – except Diana, who calls forth this clinic.

Desire causes anxiety for the neurotic.

The gods are the real<sup>26</sup> – It is also a sentence of Lacan's. There is no reason for them to be anguished. On the contrary, they are the ones who can anguish others. The particularity of the story of *Diana and Achteon* is that it reverses itself: There is a mortal susceptible of anguishing her, and she does what is required, immediately, in order to make that disappear.

I have insisted a great deal this year on the antinomy of desire and jouissance. This is to be resituated in the clinic. This antinomy is especially what we owe to the neurotic; it is not apparent to us on the basis of perversion, but starting with neurosis, which defends itself against jouissance, by desire. The pervert, on the contrary, assumes desire as the will to enjoy.

Look at this business of Achteon and Diana, about which I said, precisely, that the problem, for everyone, is that Achteon did not ask her for anything.

The fantasy of the pervert can do without the consent of the Other. It is founded on putting aside the problematic of the demand. It is based, rather, on the problematic of the constraint. Either of the constraint that the pervert exerts, or of the one exercised on him. Even if, besides that, the masochist must negotiate with his spouse – as one sees with Sacher-Masoch – she wants to constrain him. Madame Sacher-Masoch – who had the extreme kindness to leave us her *Mémoires*<sup>27</sup> -, Wanda, is a saint, who accepted to clothe herself. For the masochist, of course, a naked Diana is not interesting. On the contrary, fur, for example, had a great importance for Sacher-Masoch.

One has not represented Achteon seeking to see Diana dressed in a fur. One feels that it is not at all in the same register. What you can feel as an incongruity is a trait of structure.

In order to get dear Wanda to dress up like that, he had to really take good care of her. Finally . . . she could not manage any longer to play the master for him.

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There, you have this derisory side of the masochistic montage – that Lacan evokes -, and it is the closest to the clinic we have of the one to whom we owe the term, from Sacher-Masoch himself, as it is reported by the woman he had put in charge of constituting the Other for him.

In this perverse problematic, in distinction to hysteria, the object is seen; one is encumbered with objects. It is even what one tries to sell: a certain number of clothes, of objects, sustained by the perverse fantasy.



It is not the pervert who has taught us about the antinomy between desire and jouissance, since he loans himself thereby, in the *mise en scène* –, to the jouissance of the Other. Even if it is hidden, as in the Sadean fantasy, all the reading of Lacan consists in showing it.

Besides, what a lot of trouble they take, all these executioners of Sade! You see a little, 120 days to do that! One can say that they did their utmost. They are the ones who are at work, because the others receive. Okay, they receive blows, but they receive anyway.

One finds there the kinship relation that Lacan evokes of perversion to male desire. It is not exactly to that that I am referring – which is the end of *Subversion of the subject*. Man also carries the instrument which makes his destiny of male desire. It is different from what the woman appropriates to sublimation, because she brings nothing there; it is a question of doing something with nothing.

The pervert also lends himself to the jouissance of the Other, as an instrument, which also links the male as such with perversion. The neurotic, on the other hand, defends himself against perversion. The pervert does not defend himself. It is the same principle. On the sadistic slope, he does not defend himself. He attacks. On the masochistic slope, everything rests on the fact that he does not defend himself against blows. The neurotic defends himself by the very desire that anguishes him.

There we are at an impasse, a knot, a paradox. One can complete this writing ( $S \langle \rangle a$ ), taken from the graph of Lacan,<sup>28</sup> that I write.

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I have written the fantasy here, in its Lacanian writing, which lends itself in all its variations to one's situating there, orienting there, Diana and Achteon.

What that writes is, first, orientable in this rudimentary opening of the desire of the Other, which is a *mise en place*, a putting in place, of phobia.

Why does one never speak of the phobic fantasy? Phobia makes the economy of whatever serves the fantasy, simple in making the dogs bark against the subject. Evidently, that could still be written like that:  $S \langle \rangle a$ . It is rudimentary.

Can one extend the category of phobia to the point of making of it a special entity of the clinic alongside obsession and hysteria and maintaining it as a trait of fundamental structure in the adult? That is what our South-American friends are doing currently, so that this diagnostic of phobia is much more expanded than for us. To say *this is a phobic* can signal a passage, a propensity, but that does not signal, on the same footing as hysteria and obsession, a great nosological structure.

It is a great problem when dogs do not bark. You surely know *The Hound of the Baskervilles*, the story of Conan Doyle with Sherlock Holmes.<sup>29</sup> Everything turns around the fact that the dog of the Baskervilles has not barked that night. Very well, when one is Sherlock Holmes, it is much more difficult to become worried when the guard dog goes *woof! woof!* It is when there is no barking that something becomes worrisome. Exactly as for the foreclosure of the Name-of-the-Father, which is especially difficult to orient – it is made for that -, since there is not any. Thus, one can only define the surrounding properties of a lack. In hysteria and obsession, the problem is that, there too, there is none. The dogs do not bark.

It is there, however, as an equivalent to what the object in phobia is, the signifier of before-the-letters [*avant-postes*] that Lacan introduces – page 824 of the *Ecrits*<sup>30</sup> - a point which is remarkable in his work: the fantasy in its differentiated function, for the hysteric and for the obsessional.

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It is truly there that this writing finds its place.

The first fashion in which the fantasy, for the hysteric and the obsessional, responds to the  $\emptyset$ , is in effacing the bar, in persuading himself or herself that the Other is complete. This basic position is not always perceived, especially when one is confronted with the hysteric.

Lacan gives us all the formulae in his text: He convinces himself that the Other is complete, master of his desire. Another way to say that is that he is without desire, and that, on the other hand, he closes his eyes to desire, which is almost a definition. One ought to write it large: ONE MUST CLOSE ONE'S EYES TO DESIRE. To see everything kills desire – and, for that, it is not a method. Closing one's eyes to desire is, moreover, the principle of anorexia.

There is another version, a modern one, of Diana and Achteon, *L'Eve future* by Villiers de l'Isle Adam<sup>31</sup> – this entirely mechanical woman and, thanks to M. Edison, endowed with the capacity to respond to whatever one says to her, with wisdom and marvelous knowledge. At the end, one expects a realization of the highest destinies – she plunges into the Atlantic from a steamboat. Of this Eve, Lacan said *she made desire fade because she could not not see everything*.<sup>32</sup> Desire closes one's eyes. And it is there too that Achteon causes a problem, if one imagines he wanted to see Diana. This would truly be good – Someone had an idea of that in the Baroque epoch – to represent a blind Achteon. Would he have deserved the dogs then?

### III

I say *basic position*. It is the fantasy of a complete Other.

What is the hysteric's version of the thing?

I must introduce this reference to Lacan from the beginning of this course. To adjoin that with what is also the axiomatic value of the fantasy is one of the problems – that I recalled the last time in order to start -, that is to say, the fact that he or she can refind him or herself the same, albeit in different neuroses.

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Freud departs from that. If you read *A child is being beaten*, he presents a collection of neuroses, hysterias and obsessions, where the same fantasy is repeated.

It is better to approach this little problem to begin with. That the fantasy is rediscovered in different structures, that there is an obsessional and hysterical accentuation of the fantasy – how is this compatible? It is not contradictory, if one admits the fantasy as a supple chain where the functions can go toward lighting up such or such a differentiated point. This is the way Lacan proceeds. For the obsessional – it is his version of the epoch -, the S lights up, while, in the hysterical fantasy, it is the *a*. It is not, apparently, completely congruent with what he will say later, that, the hysteric is the subject, par excellence, in discourse.

Let us not take that to start with simply from the consistence of Lacan's terms. Let us try, rather, to emphasize it based on clinical givens.

Why does orienting the hysteric as  $\$$  not create a technical difficulty? In whatever fashion the hysteric brings herself to the analyst – it is also a trait of neurosis in general -, she presents herself as someone who has no place in the Other, as someone who is dislodged. It is in *that* that she is a pure barred subject. That means that this subject comes – the neurotic, as well – complaining, in a mode that is particular each time, complaining of the lack of a signifier that would anchor him or her in the Other.

Diana is in the woods – she is not a city girl -, but she could be in the woods even in the middle of the city. She takes the forest with her. While she *is* theoretically a social link – let us not forget that, contrary to the obsessional -, she announces herself, so sweet she is, this Diana, as a girl of the woods.

Perhaps I am especially brought to see things like that, since I live near the Luxembourg Gardens, a garden full of diverse nymphs; there are also some poets, some men of science, and some bearded ones. It is a rich environment.

It is not contradictory to say that, there, the hysterical subject presents herself as eminently dislodged, having no

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place. What would give her her place, would be to go forward, submitted to a signifier which attaches her in the Other:

$$\begin{array}{c} S_1 \\ \hline S \end{array}$$

On the contrary, the hysterical subject, let us say the hysteric as subject – since I am going to reach the point of presenting her as an object – presents herself thus, not sheltered by the signifier which would hook her to the Other:  $S$ . This means that she presents herself as being without a domicile, or crushed by her place of residence, while at the same time not being inserted there. The hysterical subject appears inhuman to herself, cut off from humanity.

When this subject is brought to the analyst, she comes to find a place in the Other and one must welcome him or her as a subject who is looking for a place in the Other. She is, thus, completely led to find herself at home in your home, and can, very well, at a given moment, make herself comfortable. That can be the cause of difficulties in what concerns daily life, the life of the Other, where this subject glories in bringing some disarrangement, since it is precisely for educating this Other – complete, as she imagines it – in desire.

That requires, for this subject, that one respect the semblants, in which she is prodigious, inasmuch as these takes the place of a possible niche in the Other for her. She has a linkage, not by the signifier, which the obsessional believes in as strongly as iron, but, on the contrary, she hooks herself to the Other by the signifier taken as a semblance.

It is fragile. . . and extremely resistant. In hysteria there are not seven veils. There are a multitude, so many that the subject doubts being *anything* under these veils. It is on that point

that, on occasion, this plaint of being of pure being of appearance comes forth, a being who lies in her essence.

Hysteria has changed its manifestations. That does not stop us today, when we are in contact with the hysteric, from

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finding what Freud perceived, as if untouched: The originary lie of the hysteric. As the Other has changed, this originary lie does not have the whole field in which to display itself, which gave her more consistent masters than we are. The appearances of these semblances are less teasing, could appear less spectacular, but, in reduction, we have the same thing, untouched, which made Freud write these unforgettable lines, and that Lacan wrote under the form of the S. That can be expressed, sometimes, in the form of the arrogance of the semblant, in reference to which the analyst seems a kind of oaf, entangled in realities, opposite an ethereal being, or on the slope of the sorrow of existence of the hysteric, of existing at the level of a fundamental emptiness.

One must respect these semblants, the hysteric's counterfeit money. There is a propensity to fabricate counterfeit money for the hysteric – which does not come from a bad sentiment, that of cheating you. The best proof is that it is completely compatible with the fact of giving gifts.

What is a gift there? It is also a way of making herself be represented for you, of inscribing herself in the Other, and, then, of staying there, even in physical absence. This conception also shows very well how we must appreciate the possibility of the hysteric's sticking to you at the end of the session, the difficulty she has of ungluing herself from you.

One can, of course, classify that in the category of the troubles she causes. This is a synopsis and not a very elegant one. We must take it as a way for her to occupy her place in the Other.

Now this type of adherence is completely compatible with the fact of saying “fuck you”. What counts for this subject is to succeed in digging her hole in the Other. The hysterical subject puts all her efforts into digging this hole, because she is persuaded that there is none. If she knew that you are already a cheese, that would make her vacillate. But not at all, she is so persuaded that you are armed in concrete that she truly has to go there with a pick axe and hammer.

Once the hysteric has succeeded in digging her hole, she is delighted to imagine herself as leaving you with a lack

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on your hands. She is calm at this moment. Because the subject in question imagines herself as leaving you unsatisfied, having operated her task of sustaining your desire, based on her persuasion that the analyst has none.

Lacan says it in one sentence, page 824 of the *Ecrits: for the hysteric* – it is the term a which is lit up – *inasmuch as desire only maintains itself by the dissatisfaction that one brings to it in removing herself as object.*<sup>33</sup> The *as object* gives a very simplified presentation of the hysteric's fantasy – that accentuates this aspect -, but one discovers it later in Lacan in the position of the hysteric as subject.

That means that the hysterical subject, in a certain fashion, has the desire to put a bar on you. One must hear her in many ways. First, to put this bar on you, persuaded that you do not have it, to reveal it. It is at the price – because it is correlative, as one can see in obsession – to revealing her own. The desire to have a bar on you is, first, to impose this bar or to manifest it, and, second, to hold the bar, in its literal meaning. That is why Lacan, in the discourse of the hysteric, inscribes this subject in the place of the master. It is in this way, essentially, that the hysteric's position is profoundly distinct from the obsessional position. This  $\emptyset$  is not simply to sustain desire in what one calls seduction – to call that seduction is a completely gross approximation. These last years, seduction has become a rather philosophical and literary theme. This is completely approximative. It is much more precise to speak directly in terms of writing. The advantage of that is that one perceives that it is the same thing as not keeping her word.

The bar on the Other, in this regard, does not simply mean to sustain a lack in the Other as desire, but also to cancel it as guarantee. At the same time the subject in question demands to be believed, and, in a certain fashion, does not believe herself. It is in this essential falsity that this subject is the most proper one to represent the truth – truth, whose end one never reaches, as one does reach the end of the veils. It is because truth never leaves its well naked. It always comes out copiously dressed, and even, were it nude, it would still have to go and look behind, as Alphonse Allais says it.

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The obsessional holds himself completely otherwise. He has not the least idea of having a bar on the Other. On the contrary, it is capital for him to not have a bar on the Other, which is the condition, as well, that there not be any on him.

In order to unfold things: If, in hysteria, the subjective bar responds to the bar on the Other, in the obsessional fantasy, it is a question of two non-barred terms.

$\emptyset$	$\S$
<b>O</b>	<b>S</b>

The difference is seen very clearly in the rapport to the Other. The hysteric asks you to watch out for her – most profoundly, she asks you to accept counterfeit money, to comport yourself with caution. The obsessional, on the contrary – it is what Lacan says – brings caution to you as the analyst. He wears the caution of the Other, forasmuch as the analyst lends himself to being confused with it; a way also, for him, to have nothing to do with you. He will tend to do what is necessary, but nothing more.

While the hysteric places herself as master, the obsessional places himself as slave. It is not that the obsessional cannot be rebellious, but this will always be in the name of a law. Of course, he attaches himself to the Other, but with the idea that that is contained in the rules. That horrifies the hysterical subject that things are contained in the rules, because it is a way of killing desire.

One must say that a very large part of humanity values things happening within the rules. Take the doctors of Molière. It is true that it is a fundamental desire, not only to live, but to die within the rules.

The obsessional is in agreement with obeying, but is not in accord with having anything to do with the caprice of the Other. He accepts the ruler, but not the caprice.

To write the obsessional subject without this bar, is to say that the object of which it is a question for him – which gives him a problem in analysis – is the ego. This establishes the permanence and the consistency of the ego. It is especially

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true to say for him – what Lacan evokes in some pages of *Subversion of the subject* – that it is to the desire that he transmits, transfers, the intermittences of the subject. It is, on the contrary, by affirming the permanence of his ego that, correlatively, he testifies to the vanishing of his desire before the object – finally, when he has it.

One could make of Achteon an obsessional. He thinks about Diana, for example, but, when he is there, the dogs devour him.

This permanence of the ego, to which the obsessional is attached, is seen in the function that vigilance has for him, simply, there, not for situating what is specific in his problems with sleep, but what is fatiguing for him, the watch. That is translated, on the occasion, by the apathy for which he may come to consult. It is that he especially puts something of his own there in order to remain permanent, to assure permanence.

It is very distinct in psychoanalysis. One can try to obtain the hystericization or the obsessionalization of the subject; that depends strictly on the position of the analyst. Psychoanalysis can just as well bring about the obsessionalization of the subject, ensure that that take place within the rules. If Lacan did not bend himself to the standards, which have been progressively put in place in the International Association, it is not because he was an hysteric. That is a hypothesis. Finally, he encourages them all: The hysteric, the obsessional, the psychotic, Woman. It is because that only has one result, a universal one, to live under that: to obsessionalize the analytic cure. It is convenient. One is sensitive, for example, to the bother that would bring to psychoanalysts to obey this norm. On the other hand, Lacanians would attack that at their leisure. It is completely false. In analysis drawn on the obsessional slope, what the analyst says is clear: *You can die. I don't give a damn.* He is not held to anything, outside respecting the rules.

I have few anecdotes from the interior, on the side of the International – They do not share confidences with me -, while I know some good stories about colleagues from the Lacanian side. We do not know any good stories from the other side, which are not at all of the same style.

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Most fortunately, a kind of pot-boiler was published on the orthodox New Yorkers.<sup>34</sup> There are some good stories that we must not take simply as jokes, but on the basis of this structure. It is this story: A patient arrives, her head completely wound in a turban. The analyst says nothing. He never returns to it. That's nothing, but it obeys a logic. He never returns to it. I believe it is true. A journalist of the *New Yorker* is the one who compiled all these little anecdotes. That signifies that the analyst also does what is necessary, and nothing more.

On the other slope – the slope of Lacan -, that can produce what we recently witnessed: A patient in the hospital, in a coma, that his analyst goes to see and tries to analyze, there where she is unable to move.<sup>35</sup>

Very well, it is on this slope which testifies to a Lacanian formation that the analytic cure must situate itself, and especially in considering what the fantasy is in the structures.

I am going to interrupt myself here, although I have only given half of what I wanted to say to you.

November 10, 1982

## Endnotes

<sup>1</sup> Freud, S., *The Psychopathology of Everyday Life* (1901), SE; "Zur Psychopathologie des Alltagslebens," GW, IV; *Psychopathologie de la vie quotidienne*, Paris, P. B. Payot, 1976.

<sup>2</sup> Freud, S., *Jokes and Their Relationship to the Unconscious* (1905), SE, vol. VIII; "Der Witz und seine Beziehung zum Unbewussten," GW, VI; *Le mot d'esprit et sa relation à l'inconscient*, Paris, Gallimard, 1988.

<sup>3</sup> Stendhal, One can refer, for example, to *On Love; De L'Amour*.

<sup>4</sup> Fénélon, F., *OEuvres*, Paris, Gallimard, 1948.

<sup>5</sup> Sade, Marquis de, *OEuvres complètes*, in the process of being published at Gallimard in the Pléiade; J.-A. Miller refers to it here most especially to the "120 journées de Sodome" (1785), *OEuvres complètes*, Paris, Pauvert, 1986, vol. 1, pp. 19-451.

<sup>6</sup> Lacan, J., "Jeunesse de Gide ou la lettre et le désir" (1958), *Ecrits, op. cit.*, pp. 739-764; "The Youth of Gide, or the Letter and Desire," *Écrits*, trans. by Bruce Fink, New York, Norton & Co., 2006m pp. 671-672.

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<sup>7</sup> Lacan, J., *Le Séminaire, Livre XXIII, Le sinthome* (1975-1976) in *Ornicar?*, nos. 7 to 11 & *Joyce avec Lacan*, Paris, Navaran, 1987; *Le Sinthome*, ed. Jacques Alain Miller (Paris: Seuil, 2005).

<sup>8</sup> Lacan, J., "Kant with Sade," *October*; "Kant avec Sade," *op. cit.*, *Le Séminaire, Livre VII, L'éthique de la psychanalyse* (1959-1960), Paris, Seuil, 1986, especially the part *Le paradoxe de la jouissance*; "Compte rendu avec interpolations du Séminaire de L'éthique," *Ornicar?*, no. 28, Paris, Navarin, 1984, pp. 7-18. *The Ethics of Psychoanalysis*, ed. by Jacques Alain Miller, trans. by Dennis Porter (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1992).

<sup>9</sup> Lacan, J., "Le séminaire sur la lettre volée," *Ecrits, op. cit.*, pp. 11-61; *Le Séminaire, Livre II, Le moi dans la théorie de Freud et dans la technique de la psychanalyse* (1954-1955), Paris, Seuil, 1978, pp. 225-240; *The Ego in Freud's Technique of Psychoanalysis*, ed. by Jacques Alain Miller, trans. by Sylvia Tomaselli (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1991).

<sup>10</sup> *L'Ane, le magazine freudien*, Paris, Navarin, 1981.

<sup>11</sup> Klossowski, P., *Le bain de Diane*, Paris, Gallimard, 1980.

<sup>12</sup> Lacan, J., "Kant avec Sade," *op. cit.*, p. 789; "Kant with Sade," *Écrits*, trans. by Bruce Fink (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2006).

<sup>13</sup> Lacan, J., “The Freudian Thing, or the Meaning of the Return to Freud in Psychoanalysis,” (1955) *Écrits*, trans. by Bruce Fink (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2006); “*La Chose freudienne ou Sens du retour à Freud en psychanalyse*,” *Ecrits, op. cit.*, p. 436.

<sup>14</sup> We have consulted LITTRE: RACINE J., *Andromaque*, I, 1: etc.

<sup>15</sup> Lacan, J., *op cit.*, p. 436.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 412

<sup>17</sup> Lacan, J. *The Seminar, Book III (1955-1956): The Psychoses*, ed. by Jacques Alain Miller, trans. by Russel Grigg (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1993); *Le Séminaire, Livre III, Les psychoses, op. cit.*, chap. XXI.

<sup>18</sup> Duchamp, M., *La mariée mise à nu par ses célibataires, même (1915-1923)*, Philadelphia, Museum of Art.

<sup>19</sup> Cf. notably Lacan J., *Le Séminaire, Livre XIV, “La logique du fantasme” (1966-1967)* (unedited), lesson of June 21, 1967. Lacan posits the three registers of desire there: *anticipated* in phobia, *unsatisfied* in hysteria, and *impossible* in obsession.

<sup>20</sup> Allais, A., “Un rajah qui s’embête,” *OEuvres anthumes*, Bouquins Robert Laffont, 1989, pp. 418-420.

<sup>21</sup> Freud, S., “Remark on a Case of Obsessional Neurosis (The Rat Man)” (1909), *SE*, vol. X; “*Bermerkungen über einen Fall von Zwangsneurose*,” *GW*, VIII; “*Remarques sur un cas de névrose obsessionnelle (L’homme au rats)*,” *Cing psychanalyses, op. cit.*, pp. 196-261.

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<sup>22</sup> One can consult the book by Jean-Jacques Leveque, *L’Ecole de Fontainebleau*, Neuchatel (Switzerland), ed. Ides and Calends, 1984.

<sup>23</sup> Lacan, J., “Subversion of the Subject and the dialectic of desire in the Freudian unconscious” (1960), *Écrits*, trans. by Bruce Fink (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2006); “*Subversion due sujet et dialectique du désir dans l’inconscient freudien*,” *Ecrits, op., cit.*, p. 818.

<sup>24</sup> Cf. Rousset J., *L’Anthologie de la poésie française, Josê Corti, 1988* (notably, an extract from *Actéon* by Le Moyne, vol. 2, pp. 32-33) & *La littérature de l’âge baroque en France, Circé et le paon*, Paris, José Corti, 1954, which contains a bibliography.

<sup>25</sup> Lacan, J., “The direction of the treatment . . . ,” *op. cit.*; “*La direction de la cure . . . ,*” *op. cit.*, pp. 621-628.

<sup>26</sup> Lacan, J., *Le Séminaire, Livre VIII, Le transfert (1960-1961)*, Paris, Seuil, 1991, p. 58.

<sup>27</sup> Sacher-Masoch, W., *Confession de ma vie*, Paris, Gallimard, 1989.

<sup>28</sup> Lacan, J., “Subversion of the subject . . . ,” *op. cit.*; “*Subversion du sujet . . . ,*” *op. cit.*, p. 817.



<sup>29</sup> Doyle, C., *The Hound of the Baskervilles; Le chien des Baskerville*, Paris, Robert Laffont, 1956.

<sup>30</sup> Lacan, J., “Subversion of the subject . . . ,” *op. cit.*; “*Subversion due sujet . . . ,*” *op. cit.*, p. 824.

<sup>31</sup> Villiers de L’Isle, Adam, *L’Eve future*, Paris, Eugène Fasquelle Ed., 1928.

<sup>32</sup> Lacan, J., “Mauric Merleau-Ponty” *Les temps modernes*, no. 184/185, Paris, 1961, p. 252.

<sup>33</sup> Lacan, J., “Subversion of the subject . . . ,” *op. cit.*; “Subversion du sujet . . . ,” *op. cit.*, p. 824.

<sup>34</sup> Malcolm, J., *Psychoanalysis: The Impossible Profession*, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1981); *Un métier impossible: psychanalyste*, Paris, Clancier-Guénaud, 1984.

<sup>35</sup> Cf. Hommel, S., “Une recontre avec le réel”, *Dix-sept exposés sur les moments cruciaux dans la cure psychanalytique*, *op. cit.*, pp. 9-10.