Introduction to Volume VI of (Re)-Turn

The first paper in our Theory section is chapter one of Jacques-Alain Miller’s Course The Us of the Laps (1999-2000). Miller says that as we pass from 1999 to 2000, everyone expects errors from machines. This leads him to a brief examination of calendars. Our Western calendar is Catholic. Its existence shows an epic of the signifier which unveils such startling facts as that China only adopted it in 1949. In harkening to the time of the signifier instead of lived time, Miller argues that the era of Invention was from the XIth to the XVth centuries. The XVI to the XXth centuries mark the time of the Renaissance. From the Xth to the XIIIth centuries, the university discourse was invented. The XVIIth century saw the birth of science, mathematics and physics with Galileo, Descartes, Newton and Einstein. Miller picks the year 1989 to mark the globalization of the Capitalist discourse, coinciding, indeed, with the end of the Cold War. He says, intriguingly, that the discourse of analysis is made up of the discourses of the university, science, and capitalism. The XXth century is marked by scientific inventions.

Then he turns to an explanation of his title. “Us” is short for “Usages” while “Laps” comes from disposing of, flowing away. We speak of lapses of time, religious lapses from faith. One of the usages of the lapse means that one must not waste time. In psychoanalysis, one does sessions, series of them. Something slips or fall, a lapse, one interprets it. In one sense a lapse is equivalent to the unconscious, to the subject-supposed-to-know which is also on the side of the question. There are many readings of the matheme for the transference. Most importantly, articulating gives “sense” a chance to appear. At the height of sense there is an enigma. Wanting to say is desire. Hysteria, meanwhile, demonstrates a certain inauthenticity of sense, a falseness. In the wake of hysteria one finds paranoia: the Other hides me, lies to me. Yet, there is a question in hysteria, a demand for knowledge and such a demand is a demand for love. Answering a question shows love. Silence from the analyst does not annul knowledge, only exposed knowledge, and it produces the supposition of knowledge as
an epistemology of the partial drives, as a giving of what is at the interior. There is, then, knowledge/love versus knowledge/power. In love one gives what one does not have. The patient gives what he has: money. What counts is the gift, what he does not have, love, a lover.

At the level of the subject-supposed-to-know an analyst gives an interpretation of knowledge while the analysand gives a place of unconscious knowledge, a function that comes from articulation. Between the analyst and the patient there is sometimes love, sometimes hate. On the side of the master discourse there is knowledge ($S_3$), while truth ($S$) is decontextualized. In the analyst’s discourse, knowledge is in the place of truth while knowledge focuses on what is lacking in it ($S$). Academics do not love what the analyst does with knowledge, while analysts love the unconscious. Academics love exposed knowledge. In analysis you pay for your jouissance. Since there is an unsymbolized part of knowledge in the unconscious, an analyst’s body, flesh and blood, must be there to bring it out. Indeed, symptoms are libidinal.

While Freud presented the unconscious as a hypothesis, a supposition, he still said it was inferred from real events and basic things such as forgetting. Lacan said the unconscious “is the uncensored chapter of my history.” The unconscious is what is deprived of sense, but one can give a meaning to these, even to the necessity of a hypothesis of the unconscious as real. Transference equals libido. For Lacan, the interpretation conditions the transference as a relation to time, a time supposed-to-know. This, then, is an affair of ethics, not an ontology.

In “Interpretation, Semblant and Sinthome,” Anne Lysy-Stevens says that the latest Lacan went from the symbolic order to the real outside sense. In Seminar XXIV, L’ensu bêvue… (1976-1977) Lacan takes us away from his classical idea that the couple of $S_1$- $S_2$ makes sense. Joyce’s prose led Lacan to talk about the relation between the real and the symptom, Joyce’s language is a kind of undoing by speech what has been done by speech. At play is the scope of words and the exclusion of sense. Miller argues that there is a dialectic of sense and jouissance, at the site where jouissance makes a kind of knot. One has the unconscious structured like a language and the
slope of the drives. The drive is on the imaginary side opposite the symbolic. Lacan gives the drive meaning by the interplay of the phallus and desire. The object a first has a logical consistency, then is a semblant and, after, a signifier that gives jouissance. It is a question of language developed by lalangue. Stevens calls the unconscious a place of mot (word)-terialisme. The unconscious consists, then, of marks left by the encounter of words with the body, by parental traces. The symptom in R.S.I. (1974-1975) is “that which of the unconscious is translated by a letter”—something that makes a hole in the surface. Lalangue, parlètre, sinthome, ablunder take us from the Other to the One. Interpretation itself becomes a mode of enjoying. Lacan started out talking about interpretation as the dominion of the symbolic order and metonymy as allusion. The point is to work upon the effect of signifier upon signifier to obtain what escapes it. Thus, one has desire versus the word. The object a is heterogeneous to the imaginary and the symbolic.

There is no science of the real, as Lacan once thought. In L’Etourdit he talks about the impossible which does not cease not writing itself—does not stop writing that that there is no sexual rapport. Lalangue is made up of homophony, grammar, and logic. Equivocation is the effect of lalangue on lalangue at the point of a hole. Interpretation, says the late Lacan, is like poetry, is a new signifier that wakes one up, the resonance of the effect of a hole. There is, then, a median emptiness, a kind of littoral. In working with the late Lacan, Miller has evolved a post-interpretive practice which says that short of structure, there is a real of immediate data, indeed it is the unconscious. Thus, the late Lacan disjoins interpretation and the unconscious. $S_1$ denotes a lapse while $S_2$ denotes interpretation. $S_1 - S_2$ is the Freudian unconscious versus the real unconscious of Lacan. The blunder precedes the unconscious which appears when a signification is added. One has chance versus destiny; contingency versus destiny. If one goes back to absolute elements of one’s contingency of existence, one finds repetitions outside of sense, disarticulations. The lying truth gives satisfaction in relation to the real which cannot lie. A reconfiguration in relation to jouissance yields the pass. Finally, the late Lacan shows that the symptom is not a metaphor. Body events give
the meaning of jouissance and structure lalangue and satisfaction. The presence of the real in the symbolic shows up as anxiety. While the symptom is real, has a sense, it is translated by a letter, a fixation. The jouissance of the symptom is opaque in its excluding sense. The point of analysis is to go from discomfort to satisfaction, to a semblant emptied of sense.

In the part on the **Feminine**, Gil Caroz says in “The Rudder and the Feminine” that in sexuation there are not only two logics, the masculine and the feminine, but also a part in the symbolic where there is one law for everyone, the phallic law ($\Phi$) to which there is no exception ($\exists$), and a part in jouissance where one must go case by case. The phallic law is on the masculine side while jouissance is on the feminine side. Yet, even when a woman is on the phallic side, she keeps a facility of movement that men do not have. Indeed, Miller says the feminine humanizes law. While the masculine resides primarily in relation to unconscious repression, the feminine relates to the lack in the Other, the real without law, the hole in the symbolic order. Yet women can act from the real in an unlawful way, as does Queen Esther in the Bible when she causes thousands of Jews to be killed. On the other hand, the silence of the father does not yield to the feminine, but to science, governance. Here the Other is mutated into the number and rejects difference: the One which forecloses the unconscious in the name of masculine logic. Solutions are of the order of one for all, while the feminine has the property of inconsistency. On the feminine side the unlimited aspect of the word points to an infinity beyond the phallus which creates a limit in itself. The masculine superego comes up with universal ideals, while the feminine has the glory of residing within the logic of the “not all” under the phallus.

In “Daughter, Mother, Woman,” Rose-Paule Vinciguerra talks of Freud and then of Lacan in terms of the sexual difference. Freud argued that girls must change from the masculine to the feminine. While he could not explain why women became passive at puberty, Freud could only claim that in terms of socialization women demonstrate great activity, even in the quest for a passive goal. For Freud hysterics are bisexual. While other little girls wait for their penises to grow,
marking penis envy (1918), little boys are narcissistic, loving themselves as the organ bearer. Freud maintained that while the baby was a metaphor of the clitoris, the phallus was a metonym of it. Any little girl who believes she and her mother have the phallus enters the perverse realm of disavowal. Insofar as the castration complex precedes the Oedipal drama, the little girl often thinks her mother did not give her a penis and takes this as a narcissistic humiliation. This is what Freud called the “ravage” of the mother, while Lacan translates this as devastation. Seeking a male partner means seeking an imaginary phallus. This turn towards the father, asking him for the phallus, calls forth passivity. Receiving something from the father not only compensates for his deficiencies, but also helps the little girl feel more like a man.

Lacan argues, rather, that the phallus functions as an image whose lack is symbolic, even the foundation of the symbolic order. This lack is specific to women, Miller adds, because the mother lacks it. As a daughter, one identifies with the mother’s lack and believes that a baby completes the mother. Only substituting the Name of the Father for the Desire of the Mother can humanize desire. Phallic semblants are masks of having, covering over what she does not have. Indeed, beyond the phallus is a castrated man or even a dead one. Thus, one could write feminine desire for a man as a semblant ($\emptyset \leftrightarrow a$). Lacan stresses the mother’s desire, not her love, her unconscious desire concerning her own castration. Indeed, feminine jouissance escapes the signifier. Woman can be found between the center of the phallic function and in her own absence from it, she is unrepresented as an Other jouissance. Thus, women are more on the side of the real, than of the semblant. For Lacan, the “ravaging” mother is one who lets go of her child and lets silence dominate, thereby struggling with what is uninscription in language. She also repeats her relationship with her own mother. Since the signifier for the feminine is foreclosed, there is a certain devastation to the girl child’s body. There is, then, no transmission from woman to girl. The mother wants the phallus while her daughter wants the substance of her love.

In the “Death Drive in the Feminine,” Dominique Laurent picks up on Freud’s 1924 “The Economic Problem of
Masochism.” He bases feminine masochism on his view of his own daughter, Anna. Lacan argues that woman’s problem is not masochism, but madness—the “not all” under the phallic function, her proximity to the real. Antigone and Medea are literary women who go beyond the limits to the point of suicide and murder, death being a mode of jouissance beyond the phallus. What Freud isolated as a fundamental lack—woman as castrated in reality, not having leading to penis envy—Melanie Klein changes, substituting the breast for the penis and arguing that it leads to object seeking. The mother has and the woman does not have, but makes a fetish, a semblant out of this lack. Miller calls this woman the postiche woman. In Lacan’s theory woman, as such, does not exist. What does exist is a relationship to the inconsistencies of the Other, a certain limitlessness that man lacks, constrained as he is by the symbolic order.

Man names woman beyond the phallus that limits her jouissance, thereby trying to fix the drift of the drive. Forms of the mother’s lack release the name jouissance, any such name being a semblant. In another turn, woman exists as the object of man’s desire, is also his sinthome, a bodily event. Miller writes the speakingbeing as the partner-symptom, forming a basis to lalangue.

Devastation arises for the little girl when she confronts her own mother’s jouissance. Madeleine Gide touched the object a of André by burning the literary treasure of letters he had sent her. Medea killed her father and two children to punish her husband Jason who had betrayed her. Love turned into hate gives the pure death drive. Aimée, the paranoid psychotic, thinks an acress has threatened her son’s life and she tries to kill her. Sygne’s suicide is sheer oblivion when contrasted to Antigone’s who could at least call up a life she could have imagined living. Beyond these excesses in the real where jouissance leads to the death drive, Laurent says that women have three choices: love, the drive, the phallic signifier (Φ). In modern life women face the choice of dropping the child and reducing it to an object a insofar as they take on the Father’s Name. This is a horrible plight because it can only lead to the death drive.

In “Anne Sexton: The Poet and Death,” Nassia Linar-
dou tells us that Anne Sexton began to write poetry at the time that she was hospitalized for a suicide attempt. Her analyst encouraged this after her first psychotic break at age 28. She said she wrote the poetry for her analyst. At age 29, Sexton tells us she underwent a rebirth. Dianne Middlebrook’s 1991 biography was scandalous because it used three hundred tapes of Anne Sexton’s psychoanalytic sessions. Martin Orve treated Sexton for eight years and had diagnosed her as an hysteric. But she had disassociations and hallucinations. Anne’s problems went back to her teenage years when she heared her aunt’s voice in her head. She first attempted suicide at fifteen years of age when her aunt died. But the voice continued to play in her head anyway. For Sexton, language foreclosed any lack-in-being and she spoke of words writing themselves as a kind of trick. On the tapes, Sexton revealed that both her father and her aunt had fondled her. Words seemed to be disassociated from her body in a trance. The literary materiality of the letter sent no message from the Other. Her poetry was her sinhrome of jouissance. She killed herself at age forty-six.

In “The Veil and Capitalist Discourse,” Svitlana Matviyenko introduces her paper with the rulings made against wearing the Islamic veil in public made both by France and Québec. She describes these decisions as fear of the Other, the fear of one’s neighbor, a case of my jouissance versus your jouissance. Insofar as consciousness is seeing oneself being seen, she says the Moebius strip joins the imaginary field of vision to the real of the scopic drive. She goes on to explain that historically the veil in various disguises has worked to show modesty for both sexes within Islam. She refers to the practice of not unveiling practiced by Islamic women when the men around them are inferior to them. In any case, the decision to veil is an effort to place an image beyond the sexual lack. Cosmetic surgery also functions as a veil trying to fill in the lack by a semblant. The feminine “not all” is specifically taken up in veiling insofar as it opposes the masculine all are one based on the exception to the law. One can either be the phallus, as in hysteria, or have the phallus, as does the postiche or fake woman. Matviyenko goes on to say that today’s consumer capitalist culture enjoins everyone to “Enjoy!” The superego command is to “buy.” The
jouissances of cosmetic surgery, depilation, and so on, keep the excess in feminine jouissance at bay. The pleasure principle leads to the homeostasis that marks the death drive. The nothingness painted onto a veil, as depicted by Lacan in Seminar IV, becomes something, the object $a$ that fills the hole in the symbolic with its estimate property of being both inside and outside at the same time.

In the section on Mathemes Ben Kozicki argues that in “Lacan’s Graph of Desire,” there are differences between Lacan’s complete graph of desire from the *Ecrits* (1966) in “Subversion of the Subject, or the Dialectic of Reason in the Unconscious Since Freud” (1958) and other representations of this graph in various Seminars. In Seminar XI Lacan tells us that the $s(A)$ is the equivalent of the “I” of the statement (p. 139). Miller also tells us that Lacan often wrote the symptom as $s(A)$. As we know, the $A$ is the French version of the O(ther) and the $m$ in the graph stands for ego (moi). The $i(a)$ stands for the ideal ego, the other as other of speech and body image. The $I(A)$ stands for the ego ideal on whose unary traits consciousness is based. The $S(A)$ means the closing point of an unconscious enunciation while the $A$ means that there is no meta-language, just the phallic signifier ($\Phi$) which has no signified. The $S \diamond D$ means demand or drive while the $d$ stands for desire which is left over when demand is subtracted from need. $S\diamond a$ denotes the fantasy which is, in part, an imaginary function of desire while $(A \diamond d)$ means the Other’s desire. $S_1$ marks the locus of the message and $S_2$ denotes positions of the Other. In figures 1 and 2, Kozicki shows the overlapping of conscious and unconscious systems. Denoting the changes of different mathemes to one side or the other of the graph, he stresses the simultaneity of elements. Jouissance gives rise to castration as a kind of unconscious enunciating. Pointing out that the first desire comes from lack, he adds that the second desire means “I desire what the Other wants of me.” He points out that neurotic fantasy is at the horizon of all demands while perverse fantasy is at the heart of all demands in the drives. Through a series of figures, Kozicki shows various permutations of the graph and ends with the graph for fantasy, $S \diamond a$ where the losange refers alternately to repeated symptoms or to enunciations.
In “The *poinçon* (◊) in Lacan,” Santanu Biswas says the ◊ has been called many things by Lacan, the diamond cut of, desire for, and so on, but most often it has been called the punch, the *poinçon*. In Seminar II (1954-1955) it was called the square of the L Schema, including all the vertices of that Schema. Indeed, it alters the status of the matheme for the $S$. In “The Direction of the Treatment…,” Lacan uses the punch as meaning envelopment-development and conjunction-disjunction, going from the $S$ to the $A$ and to the $a$. He also uses it in the $S \diamond a$ to point to fading of the subject. In “On a Question Prior to…” and in Seminar IX on Identification he calls it a cut in the surface and a signifier that gives rise both to difference and to discontinuity. When using the greater than sign $>$ it means something inscribed, continuity, direction. $S$, here, becomes the cut of $a$. In Seminar X it means the first moment of primordial jouissance as it introduces one to the Other. The $S$ becomes not only the sign of anxiety, but also a desire for the lost $a$. It means a hole. And in the lesser than sign $<$ as used in “Kant With Sade” it means an absolute non-reciprocity. In Seminar XI, Lacan takes up the meanings of disjunction, $\lor$ and conjunction, $\land$. Alienation is disjunction while separation is conjunction, as well as a rim process. Lacan works here with the notion of forced choice where one chooses either being beneath sense as in the unconscious, or a semblance in being over sense. If one chooses union as in set theory, then one is counted only once. If one chooses separation, he or she imposes his or her own lack from fading and has elements from two sets. In this section Lacan is working with an existential logical way of doing with signifiers. If and only if the $S$ is barred does one get the $a$ on the other side of the punch. The two cuts cutting each other make a hole. ◊ becomes a verb that produces a new subject. What does this all mean? Biswas suggests that it implies the real as a possible hole that can only be braced by contradictions. At the end of analysis, one says the impossible: $x – \text{hole} – y$. A gap is seen.

In “On Metaphor,” Dan Collins starts with Lacan’s modification of $S/s$. Not only is there no one-to-one correspondence between sound and meaning, the possibility for surprises, irony, and so on, are allowed in language by the fact that
there is no one-to-one correspondence between signifier and signified. Collins gives the example of fondue/definition/fondue → melted cheese/fondue. In other words, in metaphor one term is substituted for another such that the formula is written in *Ecrits*, p. 515 as S'/S. But why is a new signifier (S’) given rather than the signified as a definition? An answer is that signifiers make meanings be referring to each other endlessly. Analysis itself is a matter of putting signifiers into words. Not only is meaning given, but the meaningfulness of emotional investment in meaning is given as well. In the sense that all language is metaphor, there is no metalanguage (*Ecrits*, p. 813). There is no literal level that guarantees stable meaning. One can put fondue/? → S’/fondue. Meaning is irreversible: fondue/melted cheese → melted cheese/fondue. Yet, interpretation is not open to all meanings as post structuralists have thought (Seminar II, p. 250). Rather, metaphor is a four term operation (*Ecrits*, pp. 889-892). The classical model for metaphor is analogy. A: B :: C: D. Yet, even here the new signification has the structure of three against one: S/ S’, S. S,’/x → S(1/s’’). The first signifier S’/S has accustomed us to thinking that a new signifier (S’) is the metaphor instead of the one that has been dropped to the level of (S). S on top is the manifest signifier while S’ on bottom is the latent one. Logically, the new signifier is second and can be retrieved by interpretation, latent, as it is, in the operation. This meaning of metaphor takes up only the paradigmatic axis of language. Some S appeared and other S’s did not appear. Collins gives the example of a 2-3 year old little girl saying a tooth will grow on her bottom: S – tooth/S’ – penis. penis/x → tooth (1/s’’). Both individual and transindividual meanings appear here. Lacan gives an example of this formation of metaphor in “On a Question…” (*Ecrits*, p. 557): S/S’. S’/x → S(1/s). Meaningfulness is radically unique. Only in love do we imagine it might be shared.

In the section on *Politics and History* Anaëlle Lebovits says in “It will be Reborn from the Ashes,” that when Ségolène Royal was a candidate of the Socialist Party in France and Nicolas Sarkozy became the President of the French Republic, Royal immediately referred to future victories. Lebovits says that in having chosen her as a candidate, the French party only
wanted to lose. Of course, one could say this of any victory and defeat. But Lebovits argued that Royal’s candidacy proved a disorientation on the French left. This was not a cause of the defeat, however, but a symptom of it. Jacques-Alain Miller has argued that the French left is dead under a rain of consumer objects—the leftist too wants to enjoy. Existential questions are finished, says Miller, even strikes have become the occasion of a “party.” Objects have replaced ideas and the imaginary of the left has fallen into the public domain. The past means “less” value while the master word is the future. Lebovits continues, saying that the fall of the Berlin Wall did not kill Marxism. Marxism was already dead. Communist regimes have always wanted money, looking as far back as to China in 1917. Indeed, the Wall was only an effort to stop the flight towards Capitalism. The left is equivalent to the disinherited ones. But, Lebovits believes, an honest left—with the object—will be reborn from its own ashes.

Phillippe La Sagna writes in “From Plus-de-Jouir to Hyper-Jouir,” about the book of Gilles Lipovetsky called *Paradoxical Happiness*. The basic thesis is that from the postmodern to hyperconsumption, one is concerned only with the hedonistic individual. Jean Lyotard talked about the end of systems, the speed of the hypermodern towards emotion. The hypermodern is defined here as “jolts of sense” which succeed the void of the “post.” Indeed, the modern era is said to have ended in May of 1968. If the hyper era is more sensual than intellectual, one must say that the sense in question is a calculated sensation. There is also privatization of sensation and an affluent society where the law concerns what will sell—luxury, the hyper, the end of norms. One sees the end of discipline. As authoritarian, states consume the object, they do so along with sensual experience, even supplanting the object. Addictions have become limits. “Care” of the body contrasts with the work ethic of performance. Hyper-jouissance is even beyond the object. If one does not “enjoy,” he blames himself. There is also the therapy of hyperconsumption, therapy for the loss of the family. Health too is consumed, giving private happiness versus public insecurity. Moreover, this hyper-jouir is liquid. In the 1970s there was a kind of anxiety as the object a arose.
Now, the plus-de-jouir is a logical function. Yet, La Sagna says that none of this touches the object $a$ in the real. The love of the unconscious always brings surprises of the contingency of the real and attests to it.

In “The Renaissance Subject and the Generic Object,” Ellie Ragland writes of a crisis in literary genres in XVIth century France around 1530 when most medieval genres fell into disuse. From the hundreds of genres that existed in medieval times, in the Renaissance only five genres grew up: the proto-novel; lyric poetry and the sonnet; the essay; comic and tragic drama; and the epic. The “I” characterizes the Renaissance subject in contrast to the medieval collective anonymity. If we consider this in terms of Lacanian theory of language, we must say that genres are not stable categories, nor is the human subject stable or unified. The changes in the Renaissance demonstrate that language and thought are one, making history the condition of itself. The Renaissance no longer depicts a two-dimensional subject—hierarchical and feudal as was the medieval subject—but one that is divided along many registers. There is not only a rebirth of admiration for Ancient literatures, in this period, but a joy in using language itself. In the new Renaissance genres, language is stretched to the limits of conventions. This equals an impasse in consciousness. With the new literature and language, the personal and the subjective appear as a judging “I.” In Montaigne’s Essais there is an effort of “self” fashioning which lets us see the fading of the subject—“seeing” the subject through the eyes of the individual, not just through God’s eyes.

During this period there was also the birth of painting with mirrors, a new way of trying to link body to “mind” and image. As perspective became all important in art, the dimension of space was recognized. The Pléiade poets used distance to determine perspective and wrote manifestoes. With the centuries long fight between Nominalism and Realism, attention was given to Nominalism. Of course, Lacan returned essence to the individual in the form of jouissance, but this occurred centuries after the appearance of a Renaissance thinking “I.” Rabelais’s texts were critical of Church and man and used prologues as well to show the dimension of distance in
perspective. One could say, finally, that printing was a result, not a cause, of the move from an oral culture to the Gutenberg Galaxy. In 1500 clocks appeared, trying to measure time as well as space. This valorization of literature—including the thinking I, distance, time—goes hand in hand with Lacan’s idea that literature itself is strange within university discourses. One could place literature on the side of the real and its genres as mirrors of the subject “in crisis.”

In the section on The Clinic Fernando Schutt gives a case on “Anita.” His method of treating her was to ask questions when she sought answers. After a year, he ascertains that her back pains are a signifier linking her with back pains her father suffered when he was tortured for political stances taken. As she learns this, her own back pain subsides and she stops being so worried about her husband’s relation to her son. The final result is that she returns to work and suffers less.

In “Becoming an Analyst,” Heather Chamberlain says that she first took the pass at the beginning of her Lacanian analysis after having been with an IPA analyst for eight years. She describes this period as a change of her relationship to knowledge. Her second analysis was provoked by a repetition of her symptoms: her papers were disconnected; she had an enormous output of writing and projects leading nowhere. There had been no input from her mother—only bits and pieces. She felt that here she was the Other for the Other. A hole in her father’s sweater became a key signifier and she needed to darn it together. Suddenly she married her partner of twenty-six years; started a second analytic practice; and became able to write.